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Abstract 
The September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks exposed considerable breakdowns in 
communications interoperability and information sharing among first responders. 
Multijurisdictional responses to the active-shooter incidents at the University of Texas in 
2010; Sandy Hook Elementary of Newtown, Connecticut in 2012, and the Reynolds High 
School shooting of Multnomah County, Oregon in 2014 were replete with 
interoperability failures as well. Recent multijurisdictional response events continue to 
illuminate difficulties with first-responder interoperability and minimal research exists to 
promote understanding of the interoperability challenges of university police 
departments. The purpose of this study was to explore the barriers that impede 
communications of campus based law enforcement agencies during multiagency or 
multijurisdictional response. General systems theory and the unified theory of acceptance 
and use of technology model provided the conceptual framework for this qualitative case 
study. Face-to-face interviews were conducted with 10 leaders of university public safety 
agencies in California. Data were collected, inductively coded, and thematically 
analyzed. Key findings indicate that participants perceived barriers of funding, policy, 
inclusiveness, and training that affect communications interoperability performance. The 
positive social change implications from this study include recommendations of policy 
change for improved interoperability during multiagency or multijurisdictional response 
which can contribute to increased first-responder safety, more efficient multijurisdictional 
response, and improved safety of students and society at large. 
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Chapter 1: Introduction to the Study 
On September 11, 2001, the inability of the United States’ first-responder 
community to communicate with one another in a multijurisdictional and multiagency 
crisis was revealed when terrorists besieged large East Coast cities with airline attacks. 
The management and response to these incidents was ineffective, noted Hamilton and 
Kean (2004), due in part to the inability of first responders to communicate with one 
another via their hand-held radios and the failure of existing critical infrastructure to 
support voice communications.  
Hurricane Katrina struck the Gulf Coast and extensively damaged New Orleans 
and the surrounding areas, including 31 universities in 2005; this event also highlighted 
the communication failures among responding emergency personnel. Among the reasons 
cited for the failures was that many of the systems used by the responders were destroyed 
by the hurricane. Those who did respond could not communicate because their radio 
frequencies were different, channels were not set up to communicate, and no protocol 
was in place prior to the event to coordinate emergency communications (Daniels, 2007; 
Simon, 2006; Stuver, 2006).  
The events of 9/11 and the subsequent communications collapse during Hurricane 
Katrina brought the seriousness of these interoperability issues to light on a national 
scale. The responses to 9/11 and Katrina were noted as failures of leadership and 
initiative because the leaders were not proactive in creating interoperability 
communication plans (Davis et al., 2006; Desourdis, 2012).  
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Government-led policy leaders created a renewed focused on interoperability, and 
on-scene first-responder communication improvement gained momentum following the 
2001 terrorist attacks on the Pentagon and the World Trade Towers in New York and 
hurricane Katrina along the Gulf Coast in 2005. Pechta, Brandenburg, and Seeger (2010) 
highlighted that reliable communication among first responders is a necessity for any 
coordinated response, leading to more efficient on-scene management during a crisis. 
Effective communication after the event also enhances recovery operations (U. S. 
Department of Homeland Security [DHS], 2008c).  
Communication interoperability concerns are not limited to terrorist attacks or 
natural disasters, but span across crisis situations to include large-scale fires, widespread 
medical emergencies, school campus emergencies, and localized law enforcement 
incidents. During the Boston Marathon bombing of 2013, most local first responders 
were able to communicate throughout the event; however, communications systems were 
saturated, and two federal agencies, including the Immigrations and Customs 
Enforcement Agency and the Secret Service, experienced limited ability to transmit 
communications to on-scene responding local law enforcement agencies (DHS, 2014).  
During a routine crime sweep involving Homeland Security Immigration, 
Customs, and Enforcement (ICE) agents and the Roseville, California police department 
in 2013, agents came upon parolee Samuel Nathan Duran, who was a gang member and a 
wanted parolee. This sweep escalated into a multiple location shooting involving Duran 
and several law enforcement agencies. During this event, the parolee shot multiple 
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officers from both agencies and over 300 officers from federal, state, county, and city 
agencies converged upon the city of Roseville to assist with the apprehension of the 
suspect. Multiple lessons were learned from this incident including the aspects of 
communications interoperability preparedness, multi-agency training, and governance 
(Simpson, 2015).  
Communications interoperability failures were also a contributor to inadequate 
coordination of response during the 1999 active-shooter event at Columbine High School, 
the 2007 mass shootings at Virginia Tech University, the active-shooter event at the 
University of Texas in 2010, the lone gunman at Sandy Hook Elementary in 2012, and 
the Reynolds High School shooting of Multnomah County, Oregon in 2014. The 
responding organizations operated either on different radio systems or on different 
frequencies and they could not communicate directly with each other. In addition, 
emergency responders reported that their radios did not work in some buildings (Virginia 
Tech, 2007) and channels were overloaded (Multnomah County, 2015). Erickson (2001) 
noted that the earliest problems the responding officers were facing at Columbine High 
School were due to lack of communication. Investigators from the Virginia Tech 
University event cited several post-incident recommendations included enhancing the 
county’s radio system to handle emergencies of this magnitude (Desourdis, 2012; 
Systems Planning Corporation, 2009), and the creation of a multidisciplinary group to 
develop and implement radio system improvements.  
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One of the interoperability difficulties for the response at Sandy Hook Elementary 
in 2012 was similar to that at Virginia Tech in 2007: the inability of state police radios to 
operate inside school buildings (Sandy Hook Advisory Commission, 2015; Sedensky, 
2013). The Kalamazoo, Michigan mass shooting incident by a 45-year old male Uber 
driver in 2016 also highlighted challenges with response and coordination among the six 
agencies (including two campus based agencies) who responded to the event (Straub, 
Cowell, Zeunik, Gorban, 2017). 
The focus of this qualitative case study was to gain a better understanding of these 
issues by exploring the perceptions of participants associated with law enforcement 
agencies on school campuses in 4-year universities in the state of California. Specific 
topics included (a) the participants' communications interoperability capabilities, (b) 
impediments and barriers to achieving interoperability capabilities, (c) interoperability 
performance from past examples of multijurisdictional or multiagency response events, 
and (d) perceptions of policy related to interoperability. I encountered a dearth of 
research regarding the barriers to interoperability of campus-based law enforcement 
agencies during multijurisdictional or multiagency responses.  
The safety of citizens during response and recovery is paramount. In his analysis 
of past communications failures, Uzarski (2007) highlighted the need for first responders 
to communicate in both single agency and multiagency methods, within a single 
jurisdiction or in expansion to multiple jurisdictions. Through effective communication 
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among all responders, emergency situations can be responded to more quickly and more 
efficiently, thus mitigating the harm and leading to faster recovery.  
Positive social change may result from the findings of this study by providing a 
deeper understanding of existing barriers and challenges faced by campus-based law 
enforcement organizations when involved in multiagency or multijurisdictional response. 
Enhanced information sharing among responding agencies can lead to more efficient 
response and recovery and greater protection of responders, students, and other citizens.  
This chapter begins with background information regarding the problem and a 
problem statement. I explain the purpose of the study and describe its nature. I formulate 
specific research questions to guide the study and present a conceptual framework. The 
definition of terms used in this study are followed by a brief synopsis of the significance 
of the study and its implications for positive social change. Assumptions, limitations, and 
scope are presented. The chapter ends with a summary and overview of the study. 
Background of the Problem 
The major catastrophic events of 9/11 in 2001 and Hurricane Katrina of 2005 
illuminated the importance of first responders’ ability to communicate with one another 
both in response to the event and during recovery operations. Locally based school 
campus incidents, including the Sandy Hook Elementary School shooting in 2012 and the 
Reynolds High School shooting in 2014 brought to light failures of radio communication 
during incident response and recovery. Krauss (2007) and the Sandy Hook Advisory 
Commission (2015) highlighted that the capability to openly communicate across agency 
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or jurisdictional boundaries must be established before the event. Interoperability 
challenges among responding agencies and jurisdictions can impede resolution of the 
event and make the situation difficult to manage (Krauss, 2007). Multnomah County 
(2015) highlighted the importance of interoperable communications to create shared 
situational awareness in response to the Reynolds High School shooting. In their critical 
incident report of the Kalamazoo, Michigan mass shooting, Straub, Cowell, Zeunik, and 
Gorban (2017) highlighted key themes of needed improvement, including more frequent 
training and exercises, standard operating procedures [SOPs] development and 
publication, and multiagency command and control planning. Interoperability of first 
responders has an impact on the emergency response to the situation because first 
responders need to communicate and share information; yet, interoperability challenges 
have plagued emergency responders for decades (Desourdis, 2012; Oversight of FirstNet, 
2013). 
Following the terrorist events of 2001, the United States federal government 
began a proactive campaign to increase the capabilities of all first responders nationwide 
to communicate and exchange information with one another regardless of affiliation or 
jurisdiction when responding to emergency events. In less than a month after the events 
of 9/11, President George W. Bush created the DHS through Executive Order 13228, as 
described by Woolley and Peters (2008). The DHS was chartered with addressing 
emergency preparedness and response policy initiatives to increase first responder 
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effectiveness, communications abilities, cooperation, and cohesiveness (Bea & Hogue, 
2006; Woolley & Peters, 2008). 
One year after the establishment of the DHS, on February 28, 2003, President 
Bush sanctioned Homeland Security Presidential Directive-5 (HSPD-5), which 
established the Office of the Secretary of Homeland Security as a cabinet position. The 
charter of the Secretary of DHS was to “to enhance the ability of the United States to 
manage domestic incidents by establishing a single, comprehensive national incident 
management system,” later abbreviated to NIMS (Homeland Security Presidential 
Directive/HSPD-5, 2003, Purpose section, para. 1). A basic premise of NIMS, as well as 
of HSPD-5, is that all incidents are local in nature (Buck, Trainor, & Aguirre, 2006). 
Leaders within DHS created the SAFECOM program and housed the program in 
the Office of Interoperability and Compatibility. (DHS, 2013; Project SAFECOM, 2004). 
Tasked with interoperable communications, the SAFECOM program administrators 
created the Interoperability Continuum, which graphically defined and identified 
elements to achieve interoperability. These elements included exercises and usage of 
interoperability technology, technology that enables interoperability, SOPs, governance 
regarding compatibility and interoperability, training and exercises of interoperable 
events, and usage of technology to maximize communications interoperability. Created in 
2001 with the initiative to increase federal preparedness and interoperability, 
SAFECOM's focus was later increased to include state and local levels of government. 
The interoperability continuum denotes the multifaceted impact that each of these 
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elements has on emergency response agencies suitably to address interoperable 
communications (DHS, 2015).  
The Jeanne Clery Disclosure of Campus Security Policy and Campus Crime 
Statistics Act (Clery Act) was enacted in 1990, through 20 U.S.C. Section 1092 (f) and in 
subsequent decades modified to serve as policy for crime reporting on educational 
campuses across the United States. The Act was named for a 19-year-old student, Jeanne 
Clery, who had attended Lehigh University of Pennsylvania and died on campus at the 
hands of another student. The court ligation of this homicide revealed that the university 
had records of 38 violent crimes within the preceding 3 years; yet, this information had 
not been disseminated among the public at large or disclosed to students at the university. 
Today, the Clery Act requires that all educational institutions that offer federally funded 
financial aid to produce crime statistics, policies on crime and safety, and describe crime 
prevention programs in use at the institution on an annual basis. A 2008 amendment 
requires that emergency response procedures must be documented and tested annually 
(Higher Education Opportunity Act, 2008).  
Throughout the United States, the level of interoperability of an agency varies in 
position along the SAEFCOM interoperability continuum, with the goal to reach 
maximum interoperability (Desourdis, 2009). Although significant progress has been 
made in operations planning, first responders still have problems communicating and 
coordinating effectively (Desourdis, 2012; DHS, 2014; Morris, Morris, & Jones, 2007). 
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The range of inefficient interoperability varies by degree at all levels of government 
agencies throughout the United States. 
Funding for interoperability improvements paralleled policy creation and 
execution. The DHS (2012) reported that, since 2003, over $18 billion in grants have 
been awarded to agencies in the United States to fund improvements of systems, 
governance, training, and technology purchases to enhance capabilities. Although these 
systems have improved, full interoperability remains a distant goal (U. S. Government 
Accountability Office [GAO], 2012). Funding is a necessary component of enhancing 
interoperability and measuring performance is vital. Unfortunately, state and federal 
funding that specifically includes campus public safety agencies is still lacking (Security 
on America’s college campuses, 2007). 
Efforts to improve interoperable communications vary in degree of success, and 
some challenges remain during emergency response to multijurisdictional or multiagency 
emergencies (Oversight of FirstNet, 2013). Less than half of campus law enforcement 
agencies at campuses with more than 2,500 students use a radio system that is fully 
interoperable with neighboring responder agencies (Reaves, 2015). To date, no researcher 
has explored communication interoperability challenges among campus law enforcement 
agencies in California. Research is needed to reveal what barriers to interoperability of 
campus-based law enforcement organizations exist in order to improve the situation and 
enhance campus safety, responsiveness, and recovery from incidents. 
10 
 
Statement of the Problem 
Natural disasters, mass shootings at the local level, and terrorist attacks are most 
often responded to by local emergency responders as a multiagency or multijurisdictional 
event. In these events, the first responders deploy from their local jurisdictions and 
neighboring jurisdictions and continue to interact with their home agency by using their 
existing radio communications equipment, while also becoming part of a broader 
emergency response team. Interoperable communications among first responders 
involved in multiagency or multijurisdictional events continue to be problematic. 
Researchers who conducted studies and after-action reports have shown that effective and 
efficient emergency response was often hampered because of challenges the first 
responders faced when trying to communicate with one another, impeding an effective 
emergency response (Desourdis, 2012; Hamilton & Kean, 2004; Lester & Krejci, 2007; 
Multnomah County, 2015; Oversight of FirstNet, 2013; Sandy Hook Advisory 
Commission, 2015; Sedensky, 2013; Systems Planning Corporation, 2009; Townsend, 
2006).  
Often, such failures are attributable to the lack of proactive planning within the 
first-responder organizations. This problem has negatively affected emergency response 
timeliness and efficiency, the safety of the responding personnel, and the safety of 
civilians (Oversight of FirstNet, 2013). Because interoperable events begin locally, the 
technology leaders at the local level determine the type of technology that is used in their 
respective geographic areas. In a survey of campus law enforcement agencies of large 4-
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year colleges and universities, only 48% of the participants reported using a radio system 
that was fully compatible with neighboring emergency response organizations (Reaves, 
2015). Although numerous trade publication articles and after-action reports exist 
regarding this issue, no empirical research has been undertaken to examine the 
interoperability challenges within campus law enforcement organizations.  
Purpose of the Study 
The purpose of this qualitative case study was to gain better insight into the 
interoperability capabilities and performance of campus-based law enforcement agencies 
in order to improve multijurisdictional emergency response. This study will contribute to 
the discipline and increase knowledge regarding communications interoperability within 
campus law enforcement agencies by identifying (a) possible gaps in communication 
sharing that impede response, (b) impediments and barriers to achieving interoperability 
capabilities, and (c) perceptions regarding policy gaps for mutual aid response between 
the campus-based law enforcement agency and surrounding jurisdictions. Included in the 
research paradigm is an exploration of factors that may enhance interoperability across 
jurisdictional lines. Such factors would enable first responders to make expeditious and 
cohesive decisions during an event involving multijurisdictional or multiagency response. 
Erickson (2001), Virginia Tech (2007), Multnomah County (2015), and the Sandy Hook 
Commission (2015) stated that, during the response to school campus shootings, 
emergency response suffered as a result of communication challenges among the 
responding organizations. 
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Nature of the Study 
I applied a qualitative exploratory case study method for this study and utilized 
interviews and archival-data triangulation to understand interoperability capabilities and 
performance of campus law enforcement agencies in California. A qualitative method 
was superior to quantitative methods because important factors such as perceptions of 
impediments to interoperability would remain outside the context of a quantitative 
design. In an effort to overcome the paucity of empirical research regarding campus-
based law enforcement interoperability, I used this exploratory qualitative research 
method to contribute to a better understanding of the factors affecting emergency 
response communications in this sector. McNabb (2013) recommends the exploratory 
approach when little is known about a topic.   
I used the case study method because the purpose of this research was to answer 
exploratory questions in a descriptive manner. Yin (2013) remarked that the case method 
is appropriate when research addresses descriptive or exploratory questions. I sought a 
greater understanding of the phenomenon of interoperability by asking questions directly 
of the participants with recent first-hand experience. Through semistructured interviews 
using open-ended questions, I gathered and analyzed data on the interoperability 
capabilities and performance from a purposeful sample of members of campus-based law 
enforcement agencies. Because I used thematic analysis in this exploratory multicase 
study, the sample size was predicated upon thematic saturation. McNabb (2010) 
emphasized that no ironclad rule exists regarding the number of cases to include in a 
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qualitative case study, and Creswell, Hanson, Clark, and Morales (2007) noted that 
studies involving the perceptions of the participants generally require 10-12 participants.  
I purposefully selected potential participants from campus-based law enforcement 
agencies within the state of California. The participants were limited to California to 
provide a reasonable commute by car to each participant’s location for the face-to-face 
interview. By utilizing maximum variation sampling (Patton, 2002), the small number of 
cases selected provided diversity relevant to the research questions. 
 Two basic inclusion criteria were applied for case selection. First, the case must 
be from a 4-year university in California. Second, the case must have experienced an 
interoperability event within the last 5 years that required a multiagency or 
multijurisdictional response. Further, the chosen cases achieved a balance between urban 
and rural locations, varied in law enforcement agency size, and were geographically 
dispersed throughout the state. I sent e-mail invitations to prospective participants, which 
explained the purpose of the study. Data collection was accomplished through open-
ended questions in a semistructured interview protocol and review of archival material 
including reports, documents, and the annual security report (ASR). I implemented the 
same protocol with all participants for consistency. This qualitative method provided in-
depth information relative to the phenomenon under study.  
Data analysis consisted of thematic identification, aggregation, and analysis. This 
analytical method was appropriate for answering the case study questions of what is 
happening, why it is happening, and how it happens in an organization as recommended 
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by McNabb (2010). I tape-recorded the interviews with the participants’ permission and 
submitted the recordings to the NVivo-11 transcription service for transcription. Upon 
thematic review, I separated the participants’ responses into logical categories. Tracy 
(2012) noted that qualitative research is built from inductive data analysis, through 
organizing the data into a comprehensive set of themes. Triangulation with the use of 
several data sources enabled me to cross-check the data for consistency (McNabb, 2013). 
This technique is valued for increasing the details perceived in the cases and improving 
the accuracy of the results (McNabb, 2013). Details of the research procedures are 
presented in Chapter 3. 
Research Questions 
The research questions for this study were as follows:  
1. What are the interoperability capabilities of campus law enforcement 
agencies in California as viewed by the agency? 
2. What are the participants’ perceptions regarding the barriers to achieving 
full interoperability capability of campus law enforcement agencies in 
California? 
3. What is the interoperability performance of campus law enforcement 
agencies in California during multiagency or multijurisdictional 
response? 
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4. How can government-wide policies and procedures improve the 
interoperability performance of campus law enforcement agencies in 
California? 
Conceptual Framework 
The conceptual foundation for this study rests upon the existing literature of the 
domains of public administration and technology and is based on general systems theory 
(GST) and the unified theory of acceptance and use of technology (UTAUT) model. The 
GST provides the conceptual foundation and theoretical framework necessary to 
conceptualize communications (Ruben, 1992; Thayer, 1968; von Bertalanffy, 1950, 
1968). All open systems comprise input and output (Denhardt, Denhardt, & Aristigueta, 
2009), and first responders convening in a multijurisdictional response represent a larger 
system of multiple responding agencies, tasked with emergency containment and 
resolution. Information flow and exchange in this larger system is an essential aspect of 
communications among the responders to create a common operating picture and shared 
knowledge (DHS, Federal Emergency Management Agency [FEMA], 2010).  
The primary communications-enabling device for information exchange is the 
radio and the radio communications system. These radios and systems can vary in 
interoperability capacity and, potentially, impede communication due to varying stages of 
technology acceptance among the responding agencies. Technology implementation has 
been studied through the lenses of several theoretical models to provide a better 
understanding of acceptance behaviors.  
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Adapted from eight prior theories of technology use and acceptance, the UTAUT 
model (Venkatesh, Morris, Davis, & Davis, 2003) is an accepted and widely used model 
for understanding user behavior with respect to the adoption of new technology. The 
UTAUT model consists of three contributing causal factors for intention to use 
technology: social influence, effort expectancy, and performance expectancy. In addition, 
the UTAUT model includes two determinants that drive usage behavior: facilitating 
conditions and the intention to use the technology.  
In this qualitative study, I utilized the GST to conceptualize multijurisdictional 
communication among responding agencies and the role of communication during the 
response and recovery phases of the emergency management event. Because of the 
multidisciplinary composition of crisis response teams, they fluctuate in size, openness, 
and scalability, and they form in an ad hoc, expedient manner (Gonzalez, 2010). As 
emergency response communication relies heavily on technology, I also utilized the 
UTAUT model for a better understanding of the perceptions prevailing within the 
agencies. A more thorough review of the conceptual framework is provided in Chapter 2. 
Definition of Terms 
The following terms are defined as used in this study.  
Campus law enforcement: Campus-based law enforcement personnel act in the 
capacity of law enforcement officials. They patrol colleges and universities and respond 
to incidents on campus. Campus police forces often consist of both sworn police officers 
and nonsworn security officers (U. S. Department of Justice, 2015b). 
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Capability: Capability indicates the ability to accomplish a mission or task (DHS, 
2008c).  
Common operating picture: The core situational awareness capability for 
effective decision making during mission execution (DHS, FEMA, 2010). 
First responder: Personnel who respond to emergencies, including law 
enforcement personnel, firefighters, and medical personnel. Responders can be from the 
same or different jurisdictions depending upon the size of the event (Yang, Prasanna, & 
King, 2009). 
Interoperability: The ability for first responders to communicate with one another 
during an event using radios (Mayer-Schonberger, 2005, p. 832). The ability of 
emergency responders to communicate as needed using a variety of frequency bands 
regardless of jurisdiction, agency, discipline, or level of government (DHS, 2008c, p. 2).  
Jurisdiction: A political subdivision with the responsibility for ensuring the safety 
of citizens within its legal geographic boundaries; it commonly has the primary role in 
emergency response (Barbera & Macintyre, 2007). 
Significance of the Study 
The significance of this research study is that campus law enforcement agencies 
can use the information gained regarding communications capabilities and performance 
barriers that affect interoperability with neighboring agencies and jurisdictions. This 
information can improve the state of interoperability between campus law enforcement 
organizations and neighboring emergency response agencies, which leads to better 
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coordination and faster response to and recovery from emergency events. This 
information can increase the safety of the citizens of the United States; citizen safety is an 
important core function of emergency response organizations. This information can also 
be used to enhance the safety of the first responder personnel. 
The ability of first responders to interoperate on-scene during an emergency event 
can mitigate the effects of the event and lead to quicker recovery. "Communication is the 
one constant that forms the foundation for all other public safety disciplines. It is the 
bedrock of every response plan, the core of every procedure. Without reliable 
communications, effective command and control cannot be achieved" (Oversight of 
FirstNet, 2013, p. 38). Responders acting in a coordinated effort to emergencies, whether 
man-made or natural, diminish loss and provide maximum recovery in a reasonable 
amount of time. Interoperability among various responding agencies enhances response 
and recovery (Buck et al., 2006). The findings of this study may benefit campus-based 
law enforcement agencies and assist them with decision-making processes to improve 
interoperability capability and performance. Policy makers at all levels of federal, state, 
and local government may benefit from the findings in this study and create policies 
aligned with improving the effectiveness of multijurisdictional and multiagency response 
to campus-based emergencies. 
Implications for Social Change 
Interoperability challenges are common among responders operating in a 
multiagency or multijurisdictional event (Buck et al., 2006; Krauss, 2007). Solving these 
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interoperability challenges can enhance communication and information sharing during 
response and recovery and create a common operating picture. Maximizing 
communications interoperability capabilities between campus law enforcement and 
common responding agencies creates an environment conducive to effective information 
sharing. Understanding the exercise of these capabilities and the barriers to maximum 
performance of interoperability of campus law enforcement agencies could promote 
positive social change through improved communications interoperability among 
responding jurisdictions. Such positive social change would benefit law enforcement and 
the safety of citizens.  
Assumptions, Limitations, and Scope of the Study 
This study included several assumptions. First, it was assumed that the 
participants possessed the necessary knowledge to discuss interoperability and 
communication. This assumption enhanced richness of detail as expressed through the 
participants based upon their knowledge and background. The validity of the study was 
based on the participants responding accurately and honestly to the interview questions 
and reviewing interview transcripts for accuracy. Another assumption was that the 
previous experience of the participants contributes to local leadership and policy 
decisions within their agencies regarding interoperability in their respective campus-
based law enforcement agencies. In addition, it was assumed that the participants 
responded truthfully and openly to the interview questions, notably with respect to their 
past experiences and such factors as they deem important to the improvement of 
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communications interoperability. It was assumed that the participants considered their 
contributions to this study valuable and that they perceived this study as an important 
contribution to the field. Another assumption was that the participants were not fearful of 
responding and that they believed that the researcher protected their anonymity. 
Additionally, it was assumed that the audio recordings of the interviews reflected the true 
nature of the interview and the participants’ points of view. Last, it was assumed that the 
review of archival and documents enabled triangulation, provided clarity of purpose, and 
enriched further analysis for answering the research questions.  
The scope of this qualitative multicase study encompassed the 2016-2017 time 
frame. The study was set to utilize cases that have experienced at least one 
multijurisdictional or multiagency event during the last 5 years. The study was limited to 
campus based law enforcement agencies within 4-year universities in the state of 
California. Excluded from this study are K-12 educational institutions, community 
colleges, and educational institutions that do not have a campus-based law enforcement 
agency. These assumptions and scope of the study were considered appropriate and 
allowed an objective examination of the data obtained. The results of this study are 
potentially transferable to other campus-based law enforcement organizations in the 
United States and beyond. 
Summary 
In this chapter, I provided the background of the problem and the problem 
statement. I explained the purpose and the nature of the study, formulated four research 
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questions to guide the study, and presented the foundation and conceptual framework 
including definitions of key terms as used in the study. I discussed assumptions, 
limitations, and scope and the potential generalizability of the results to other campus-
based law enforcement organizations. The chapter concluded with an explanation of the 
research significance and implications for positive social change.  
Chapter 2 contains a comprehensive review of the literature concerning 
interoperability and the conceptual framework of this study, based on GST and the 
UTAUT, which considers technology acceptance behaviors. Chapter 3 includes the 
research methods, including a discussion of the case method and a rationale for using it in 
this qualitative study. I discuss data collection and data analysis procedures; 
trustworthiness; the role of the researcher; and ethical considerations, including measures 
taken to protect the participants’ rights and anonymity. The results of the study are 
reported in Chapter 4. In Chapter 5, conclusions are drawn based upon the findings, and 
recommendations are offered for practical application and further research on this topic.  
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Chapter 2: Literature Review 
Introduction 
The purpose of this study was to investigate the attitudes and perceptions of 
participants associated with campus-based law enforcement agencies concerning their 
interoperability capabilities and performance in a multijurisdictional or multiagency 
emergency response. Interoperability and communication impediments among first 
responders became evident 17 years ago, beginning with the terrorist attacks on the 
United States on September 11, 2001, and continue to disrupt effective emergency 
response today.  
Current literature and after-action reviews of multijurisdictional and multiagency 
events highlight that effective response continues to be challenged by communication 
failures among the responders. Although some progress has been made in strengthening 
interoperability among disparate public safety agencies and jurisdictions, researchers 
have devoted little scholarly attention to campus-based law enforcement agencies.  
This chapter begins with a description of the literature search strategy, including 
databases accessed and key search terms used. Next, I describe the phenomenon of 
interoperability in light of the conceptual framework of this study and synthesize the 
concepts of GST (von Bertalanffy, 1968) and the UTAUT (Venkatesh et al., 2003) as 
they relate to interoperability. A discussion of the current literature is included in the 
literature review section. The chapter concludes with a summation of major themes and 
existing gaps in the body of knowledge, which provided the impetus for this study. 
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Literature Search Strategy 
The literature search strategy included searching peer-reviewed journals and 
government publications utilizing Walden’s Thoreau search engine and Google Scholar 
to obtain relevant literature for this review. The Walden library research databases 
accessed included EBSCOhost, Education Research Complete, ERIC, ProQuest, SAGE 
Premier, and the Homeland Security Digital Library database. Search terms included 
campus-based law enforcement, communications, general systems theory, emergency 
response, interoperability, school safety incidents, and technology acceptance theory. I 
used an iterative search process within the databases to refine the literature review by 
combining the interoperability search terms with terms pertaining to the conceptual 
framework such as technology acceptance and general systems theory to find significant 
or substantive contributions to the field of study. In addition, I found government 
documents relative to interoperability and communications policy and after-action 
reviews and reports primarily through the use of Google Scholar. Due to the paucity of 
scholarly research studies specifically focused on interoperability of campus-based law 
enforcement organizations, literature and documents regarding interoperability among 
law enforcement agencies and the public responder community as a whole were collected 
to permit a comprehensive review of the subject matter. 
Conceptual Framework 
In this study, I examined communications interoperability of campus-based law 
enforcement agencies during multijurisdictional or multiagency events. Derived from the 
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domains of public administration and information technology, communications 
interoperability shares frameworks with both the GST and the UTAUT model. The GST, 
developed by von Bertalanffy (1950, 1968), provides the framework for conceptualizing 
communications because all open systems comprise input and output and can be 
understood when approached from a systems perspective (Denhardt et al., 2009). Most 
systems are composed of multiple subsystems, while simultaneously being part of a 
larger system (Winter, Berente, Howison, & Butler, 2014). Because crisis response can 
form in an ad hoc manner, involve multidisciplinary organizations, and fluctuate in size, 
communications must be adaptable to the situation (Gonzalez, 2010).  
Since the 1930s, the primary communications device for first responders has been 
the two-way radio and the radio communications system. I utilized the UTAUT model, 
posited by Venkatesh, et al. (2003), to study communications interoperability in the light 
of technological adoption. Both communications interoperability and technology were 
contributing factors to the loss of lives during the evacuation of the World Trade Towers 
on September 11, 2001 (Peha, 2005). Technological advances and policy initiatives since 
2001, and involving radio communication, have provided a path to enable interoperability 
among disparate agencies and jurisdictions.  
The GST and the UTAUT model were the foundation for the research design of 
this study. The design was intended to (a) facilitate identification of the factors that 
contribute to interoperability capabilities of campus-based law enforcement organizations 
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when involved in multiagency or multijurisdictional events, and (b) identify the 
interoperability performance of these campus-based law enforcement organizations.  
General Systems Theory (GST) 
The conceptual framework for this study draws on systems theory, a sociological 
theory that demonstrates interconnectedness and interdependencies among component 
parts and processes within a system and its surrounding environment. Von Bertalanffy 
(1968) researched systems theory as early as the 1940s, published his seminal work on 
GST in 1968, and revised it in 1972. Von Bertalanffy's (1968) systems concept 
demonstrates the interrelatedness of components of objects and phenomena and shows 
that all open systems have the following elements in common: input, output, process, 
feedback, environmental controls, and goals. Von Bertalanffy's systems concept aligns 
with SAFECOM's interoperability continuum (DHS, 2015), whereby five interrelated 
systems contribute to interoperable capabilities of first responders. 
In an effort to combat reductionism and foster the unity of science, von 
Bertalanffy (1968) suggested that systems are complex equations of interacting elements 
that function as open systems, meaning that they interact with their environment. 
Interrelatedness and interdependence of phenomena in a system emphasize the principle 
of organization while holding intrinsically dynamic qualities (Drack, 2009). Further, 
Drack (2009) emphasized that GST is not derived from a single process, but rather from 
all of the processes within systems. Communication within and among organizations has 
roots in GST because communication is the flow of information among individuals and 
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groups. The need to communicate information in an emergency situation can arise within 
a single agency or involve a multiagency response (Bharosa, Lee, & Janssen, 2010).  
Organizational coordination through communication among disparate agencies 
during incident response impacts the effectiveness of the response effort (Agranoff & 
McGuire, 2003; Levinson & Granot, 2002). Kapucu (2006) remarked that “emergency 
management requires multiorganizational communication and coordination” (p. 221). 
Kapucu found that timely information flow across agencies and jurisdictions is critical for 
emergency response effectiveness in dynamic situations. Public safety interoperability 
includes sharing of voice or data information among authorized first responders, as 
needed in real time (Interoperability in public safety communications equipment, 2010).  
Communication during a crisis situation, explained Cheng (2013), is associated 
with transferring information to persons on a need-to-know basis in an effort to prevent a 
crisis, recover from an emergency event, or enhance situational awareness. According to 
Kuehn, Kaschewsky, Kappeler, Spichiger, and Riedle (2011), groups maximally benefit 
when information is shared in an open communications system. Crisis communication, 
remarked Seeger and Ulmer (2002), “concerns the processes whereby organizations 
create and exchange meanings among stakeholders regarding the risk of crisis, cause, 
blame, responsibility, precautionary norms, and crisis-induced changes in the 
organization and its relationship to stakeholders” (p. 128). Hu, Chen, Hu, Larson, and 
Butierez (2011) suggested that both timely knowledge and access to information are 
critical for effective law enforcement response. Communication between emergency 
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responders who are not in the vicinity of one another is carried out over critical 
infrastructure that enables transmitting and receiving voice communications over hand-
held devices (Kuehn et al., 2011; Oversight of FirstNet, 2013; Simpson, Lasley, 
Rockaway, & Weigel, 2010). 
These technological tools are important for improving interorganizational 
information distribution and decision making during multiagency or multijurisdictional 
response by emergency responders (Bharosa et al., 2010; Graves, 2004; Longstaff, 2005; 
Obama, 2010). Manoj and Baker (2007) highlighted that effective communication is the 
primary challenge when responding to emergency events, inferring that the 
“technological, sociological, and organizational” (p. 53) issues in communication must be 
resolved to ensure reliable communications during crisis events. Jenkins (2010) and 
Oversight of FirstNet (2013) were in agreement and stated that effective communications 
technology and systems are essential to first responders, as highlighted by the events of 
Hurricane Katrina and 9/11. Kuehn et al. (2011) noted that, in catastrophic situations, 
collaboration and coordination of emergency response requires interoperable 
technologies, including applications, devices, and networks, because most, if not all, 
challenges are technological in nature. 
Unified Theory of Acceptance and Use of Technology (UTAUT) 
In addition to the GST, I also used UTAUT as the framework for this study. 
Theories of technology adoption that draw from psychology and sociology include the 
diffusion of innovations theory (Rogers, 2004a), the theory of reasoned action (Ajzen & 
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Fishbein, 1980; Fishbein & Ajzen, 1975), the theory of planned behavior (Ajzen,1991), 
and the technology acceptance model and its revisions (Venkatesh & Davis, 2000). The 
latest models to study acceptance of technology are the UTAUT, created by Venkatesh et 
al. (2003), to study employee technology acceptance, and the UTAUT-2, as modified in 
2012, to study consumer acceptance (Venkatesh, Thong, & Xu, 2012). 
Two previous theories to assess attitudes related to information technology—the 
theory of reasoned action (TRA) and the theory of planned behavior (TPB)—have 
received widespread use (Dillon & Morris, 1996). However, I chose neither of these 
theories for the theoretical framework for this study because both the TPB and the TRA 
assume that intention to act or to adopt a technology is free from limitations such as 
economic or environmental constraints. Additionally, the TRA requires that behavior be 
volitional; therefore, it is not useful for measuring situations of low volitional control 
(Yousafzai, Foxall, & Pallister, 2010). Although the TPB solves for volitional control, it 
lacks comprehensive variables for behavioral intention (Davies, Foxall, & Pallister, 2002) 
and falls short for studying populations that are not university students. In addition, the 
self-reported measurements of the TBP do not appear to report outcomes reliably when 
the self-reports are compared to objective outcomes (Sniehotta, Presseau, Araújo -Soares, 
2014).  
The Technology Acceptance Model (TAM) theory is also a widely used model for 
assessing technology acceptance; however, I did not chose the TAM as the theoretical 
framework for this study because it does not always explain systems use, as Legris, 
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Ingham, and Collerette (2003) pointed out in their meta-analysis of TAM studies. Legris 
et al. (2003) further observed that the TAM could not explain more than 40% variance in 
behavioral intention and usage (Bagozzi, Davis, & Warshaw, 1992; Sun & Zhang, 2006). 
This observation was, however, subsequently criticized by Schepers and Wetzels (2007) 
for inadequate selection of research studies in the meta-analysis.  
The TAM and its revision, TAM-2, were not selected because the behavioral-
intention attenuation effects required large sample sizes, which are not representative of 
case study research (Schepers & Wetzels, 2007). In addition, the TAM has limited ability 
to assess the outcomes of technology adoption (DeLone & McLean, 1992; Lucas, 
Swanson, & Zmud, 2007; Sun & Zhang, 2006) and to explain the association between 
intention to use the technology and the actual usage of it (Legris et al., 2003). Finally, 
applications of the TAM's indicator of perceived ease of use to predict perceived 
usefulness and attitude were found to be useful only during early stages of adoption 
(Agarwal & Prasad, 1998; Chau & Hu, 2002; Tarhini, Hassouna, Abbasi, & Orozco, 
2015). Rogers's (2004b) diffusion of innovations theory as the theoretical framework for 
this study was not used because it fails to consider the environmental framework of 
constraints to diffusion and, conversely, opportunities for diffusion in the organizational 
setting (Oliveira & Martins, 2011) and also because of the bias that adoption of 
innovation is beneficial to all adopters equally (Rogers, 2004b).  
Venkatesh et al. (2003) formulated the UTAUT model based upon the empirical 
comparison of eight models of user acceptance of technology, namely, (a) the theory of 
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planned behavior, (b) the technology acceptance model, (c) the theory of reasoned action, 
(d) a model that combined the technology acceptance theory and the theory of planned 
behavior, (e) the social cognitive theory, (f) the innovation diffusion theory, (g) the model 
of personal computer utilization, and (h) the motivational model (Pullen, Swabey, 
Abadooz, & Ranjit-Sing, 2015; Straub, 2009). Although published less than 2 decades 
ago, the UTAUT model has served and been validated as a model of research acceptance 
and use of technology. A recent search with the use of Google Scholar turned up more 
than 800,000 articles on the UTAUT, including more than 12,000 of Venkatesh's seminal 
work, published in 2003. Although the UTAUT was recently adapted as UTAUT-2 to 
incorporate the three constructs of hedonic motivation, price value, and habit to study 
consumer use, I employed the UTAUT model because its focus is on employee 
technology acceptance (in this study, technology acceptance by law enforcement officials 
employed within a campus-based law enforcement organization), not on consumer 
acceptance (Venkatesh et al., 2012).  
 Coeurderoy, Guilmot, & Vas (2014) utilized the UTAUT model to provide 
performance information. Research data (N = 215) from a period of 6 months, across four 
organizations, were compared with the aforementioned eight models of technology 
acceptance to explain "between 17 and 53 percent of the variance in user intentions to 
use" new technology (Coeurderoy, Guilmot, & Vas, 2014, p. 1085). This validation and 
comparison formed a baseline assessment to compare with the UTAUT model. The 
researchers employed the UTAUT model with four determinants of usage and intention 
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on the same data set to reveal a 69% explanation of variance in usage intention, 
outperforming any of the previous models (Venkatesh et al., 2003). Taiwo and Downe 
(2013) validated Venkatesh et al. (2003) findings and remarked that the UTAUT model 
outperformed the eight individual models of R2 by 70%. Subsequently, Birch and Irvine 
(2009) employed the UTAUT model on a limited sample size study of teacher user 
acceptance of communications technology employed in the classroom and revealed the 
four UTAUT constructs were significantly correlated with behavioral intention. 
Researchers further tested the UTAUT model with two new organizations (N = 80 
for voluntary use and N = 53 for mandatory use), revealing a similar 70% explanation of 
variance, thus cross-validating the model (Venkatesh et al., 2003). Three key 
determinants were derived from the UTAUT model for intention to use technology: 
performance expectancy, effort expectancy, and social influence, and two key 
determinants for usage behavior: intention and facilitating conditions.  
The concept of technology adoption utilizing the UTAUT model has been applied 
in previous research studies and benefits the framework of the this study. Notably, Chau 
and Hu (2002) highlighted that technology-acceptance decision making can vary based 
upon professional context. Hu et al. (2011) suggested that user acceptance of technology 
by law enforcement professions may differ from other professions because of the 
specialized need for information and knowledge support under time constraints and their 
strong psychological attachment to their agency and partners. Hu et al. (2011) remarked, 
"Law enforcement officers represent a particular user group, characterized by specialized 
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work tasks and arrangements, extensive information technology support, and constant 
challenges to improve their timely and effective work performance" (p. 14).  
Performance expectancy. The determinant performance expectancy is defined as 
the degree to which an adopter of technology believes that using the technology will 
provide benefits or enhance job performance. Of the four determinants of acceptance and 
usage of technology, performance expectancy is the highest predictor of intention to use 
technology, according to Venkatesh et al. (2003). Studies have confirmed performance 
expectancy is a strong predictor of intention to use (Casady et al., 2015; Pullen et al., 
2015), including in specialized working conditions and professions (Chau & Hu, 2002; 
Mun, Jackson, Park, & Probst, 2006). Within the law enforcement setting, Hu et al. 
(2011) and Lin, Hu, and Chen (2004) noted that perceived usefulness had the greatest 
impact on acceptance and use. 
Effort expectancy. Defined as the amount of exertion of effort needed to use the 
new technology, or conversely, the ease associated with the use of technology, effort 
expectancy is also a determinant of usage behavior and user acceptance. The significance 
of this determinant exists in both voluntary or mandatory usage environments; however, 
effort expectancy is most influential during the introduction of the technology and 
becomes less important over time when usage is extended or sustained (Venkatesh et al., 
2003). Effort expectancy changes over time because process hurdles are more prevalent 
in the early stages of technology use and they are replaced by instrumentality concerns 
later on (Davis, 1989; Szajna, 1996; Venkatesh et al., 2003). Hu et al. (2011), however, 
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found that law enforcement officers placed less emphasis on ease of use, but it was a 
contributing factor. 
Social influence. Social influence is defined as the degree to which users consider 
the opinions of others as valuable regarding the adoption and use of the technology. The 
adoption behavior is influenced by societal perceptions of others predominantly in the 
mandatory acceptance of technology and to a lesser extent in the voluntary adoption of 
technology. In mandatory contexts, compliance is the predominate factor for adoption, 
whereas in voluntary contexts, identification—related to social status gains and prestige 
of using the technology, and internalization,—the number of influential groups using the 
system, and the social acceptance and support for technology usage predominate 
(Venkatesh et al., 2003). Lin et al. (2004) noted that, in the law enforcement setting, 
social influence has been determined to be an important indicator of user acceptance; 
however, Hu et al. (2011) found that peer influence had no distinct effect on intention to 
use. Additionally, Hu et al. determined that social influence can boost perceived 
usefulness, but it does not specifically drive intention to use or the actual usage of 
technology. 
Behavioral intention. Sheppard, Hartwick, and Warshaw (1988) proposed that 
behavioral intention focuses on the use of technology and can be influenced by available 
choices and whether the use is mandatory or voluntary. Behaviors that influence 
successful use of technology include understanding the advantages of usage, preparing 
for usage, and envisioning improvements potentially realized by usage of the technology. 
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Within law enforcement technology acceptance, behavioral intention was a driver of 
acceptance (Lin et al., 2004).  
Facilitating conditions. Venkatesh et al. (2003) defined facilitating conditions as 
the degree of perception that organizational and technical infrastructures exist to support 
the use of technology. Examples include the ability to seek help for using the technology, 
the availability of resources necessary to use the system, and the compatibility of the 
technology with job duties. Lin et al. (2004) found that technology that promoted 
efficiency in job duties was a driver of acceptance. However, Hu et al. (2011) found that 
law enforcement officers placed less emphasis on organizational support or facilitating 
conditions. 
Application of UTAUT in communications research. Within the realm of 
communications research, Williams, Rana, and Dwivedi (2015) noted that the UTAUT 
model has been used in 25 research studies on communications systems and four research 
studies utilizing the case study method. In addition, 90% of the studies were cross-
sectional rather than longitudinal. The case study was employed as a research method by 
Samoutis et al. (2008) and Trimmer, Beachboard, Wiggins, and Woodhouse (2008). A 
study conducted by Chen and Chang (2013) utilized the UTAUT model to understand 
user acceptance of a new technology—near-field communication—on an existing device, 
the mobile telephone. Chen and Chang's research is beneficial to the framework of this 
research because the device under review, the portable and mobile radio used by first 
responders, has also been in use for a period of decades, similar to the mobile phone. 
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Additionally, the radio user can now utilize it beyond original expectations to 
communicate multijurisdictionally, and not merely within the home agency. Further, 
Carlsson, Carlsson, Hyvonen, Puhakainen, and Walden (2006) utilized the UTAUT 
model to explain acceptance of mobile devices. Zuiderwijk, Janssen, and Dwivedi (2015) 
applied the UTAUT to open data technology, designed to promote the benefits of 
transparency, participation, and innovation; this use shares similarities with the public 
safety arena's need for open, transparent communications with widespread participation. 
Literature Related to Key Variables and Concepts 
Interoperability capabilities and performance are the two key concepts in this 
study of campus-based law enforcement organizations during multijurisdictional or 
multiagency incidents. Capabilities categorizations are the outcome of key legislative and 
presidential policy actions since 2001 and are described within the interoperability 
continuum created by the DHS (2015). Interoperability performance has been studied 
through after-action reports of noteworthy incidents. A serious gap in the professional 
literature pertains, however, to studies in the realm of campus-based law enforcement. 
Interoperability Capabilities 
Kuehn et al. (2011) defined emergency response interoperability capability as 
follows: 
The ability of disparate and diverse public safety agencies and their emergency 
response units to interact in emergency situations towards common goals, 
involving the sharing of information and knowledge between involved 
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organizations and the public via defined or ad-hoc processes to achieve 
coordinated actions, by means of the exchange of data between their respective 
information and communication systems. (Kuehn et al., 2011, p. 45) 
The National Task Force on Interoperability (2005) and Oversight of FirstNet (2013) 
summarized the key impediments to interoperability capabilities as follows: aging and 
failing communications equipment, incompatible equipment or frequencies, inadequate 
planning and funding, a limited and disjointed radio communications spectrum, and 
deficiencies in coordination and cooperation among agencies.  
Interoperability policy and presidential directives. Federal policy initiatives to 
enable capabilities gained considerable momentum following the 2001 terrorist attacks 
with an emphasis on general systems coordination with state and local agencies. The 
President, in HSPD-5 (Homeland Security Presidential Directive/HSPD-5, 2003) 
articulated that all emergency response starts at the local level, and local response is 
initially responsible for coordination and control of the event. According to this 
presidential directive, federal response is enabled only when local or state resources are 
overwhelmed and federal assistance is requested. This presidential directive created 
NIMS and the National Response Plan (NRP). Together, NIMS and NRP provide a 
general systems management strategy that coordinates federal, state, and local 
government preparation, response, and recovery from emergency incidents. NIMS is 
adaptable to emergency incidents of varying complexities and sizes (Homeland Security 
Presidential Directive/HSPD-5, 2003). Implementation of this presidential directive 
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impacted educational institutions with the expectation that emergency response plans be 
developed in collaboration with other agencies and neighboring jurisdictions (Griffin, 
2009). 
HSPD-7, issued by the president in December 2003, established a national policy 
for critical infrastructure protection through the cooperative efforts of federal, state, and 
local governmental and private agencies. Critical assets were defined as energy-
producing facilities, nuclear facilities, water treatment systems, and any physical or 
virtual asset vital to security, economic well-being, or public health and safety (The 
White House, 2003b). 
HSPD-8 (The White House, 2003c), implemented at the same time as HSPD-7, 
focused on national preparedness to events, including the prevention of, response to, and 
recovery from terrorist attacks, disasters, and emergencies. Annex-1 supplemented 
HSPD-8 by providing for a national planning process in the federal government, leading 
to the creation of the National Preparedness Goal. HSPD-8 and HSPD-8 Annex-1 were 
later replaced by Presidential Policy Directive 8 (PPD-8) in 2011 (The White House, 
2011), which places more emphasis on the concept that the response to incidents should 
be from an all-nation and all-hazards approach, which fuses together the strengths of 
federal, state, and local agencies to react to a crisis with a reinforcement on mitigation 
and resilience.  
HSPD-8 initiated and also provided further definition of federal funding 
dissemination to state and local agencies. Three of the seven priorities of the national 
38 
 
preparedness goal of HSPD-8 were relevant to emergency communications: (a) 
improving information sharing and collaboration among responders, (b) enhancing 
interoperability of communications, and (c) implementation of NIMS methods (Hawkins, 
2007). DHS Secretary Tom Ridge issued guidance to all state governors, indicating that, 
beginning in Fiscal Year 2005, in order for state and locals to access billions of dollars of 
eligible federal grant money to improve their communications interoperability scenarios, 
adoption of NIMS was required.  
NIMS is still widely used today and prescribes a common operating picture as the 
cornerstone for standardizing interoperable communications. According to Secretary 
Ridge (as quoted in DHS Office of the Press Secretary, 2004), “The National Incident 
Management System . . . fully puts into practice the concept of ‘One mission, one team, 
one fight’” (p. 1). A basic premise of NIMS, as of HSPD-5, is that all incidents are local 
in nature (Buck et al., 2006). The main components of NIMS are response preparedness; 
communications/information management for information sharing; resource management 
for personnel and equipment; command/control management primarily on-scene; and 
recovery from the incident, once the response phase has concluded (Anderson, Compton, 
& Mason, 2004). These components of NIMS function cohesively and flexibly to enable 
the incident management framework (DHS, 2008a). NIMS specifies communications 
interoperability as the ability of responders to communicate with one another. 
Interoperability among first responders is a critical element of all emergency response 
communications. Hawkins (2007) asserted that communication is an inseparable 
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component of command and control. Equipping for emergency response is an important 
phase along the NIMS preparedness cycle (DHS, FEMA, 2010). Peak, Barthe, and Garcia 
(2008) studied the NIMS preparedness of campus police departments and determined that 
77% of campus police departments follow some of the NIMS guidelines related to 
coordination, mutual aid, and multijurisdictional task forces. 
Funding for the interoperability initiative at the local level, following the 9/11 
attacks, gained momentum through federal grants. One of the first and largest grants was 
the one-time funded Public Safety Interoperable Communications (PSIC) grant program 
through the Department of Commerce in consultation with the DHS. The grant awards, 
distributed in 2007, were conditioned upon the states’ creating and submitting an 
approved Statewide Communications Interoperability Plan (SCIP) and approved 
Investment Justifications (IJ), prior to the release of funds. Policymakers within the states 
created and submitted SCIPs and IJs—initiating a plan that spearheaded the creation of a 
process in local interoperability collaboration and planning (Moore, 2008). Educational 
institutions were not always included as a stakeholder in these plans. 
The creation of the SCIP provided the first investment in efforts of state executive 
committees to meet with government officials at the state and local level to investigate 
communications challenges, consult on approaches and solutions to the challenges, and 
create plans to improve interoperability. The overarching SCIP governance model 
provided two paths of technology implementation for each state to consider: a statewide 
shared system or a system of systems approach. The statewide shared system model 
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included a communications system led by the state, with state agencies on the system and 
the local option of election by the agencies to participate as either a primary user or a 
secondary user. The system of systems approach eliminated the deployment of a 
statewide system and required, instead, technology implementation at the local levels, 
with the anticipation of local coordination and cooperation to expand the system beyond 
a city, town, or county to a larger interconnected regional system implementation. Each 
model was designed to mitigate interoperability barriers among disparate jurisdictions, 
especially for emergency response coordination that required a multijurisdictional 
response (DHS, 2008a).  
The success of interoperability policy to build shared open-standards systems 
lacked research and analysis. The only nationwide study to determine the effectiveness of 
the policy initiatives is a DHS baseline study, conducted in 2006. Participants in this 
study included 6,819 agencies. More than two-thirds of the participants reported using 
interoperability to some degree, but only one-third interoperated on a day-to-day basis. A 
large proportion (87%) of local agencies stated that they were focused on improving their 
interoperability and that they planned a significant upgrade to their radio system within 
the next 10 years (DHS, 2006). By 2008, policymakers in all 56 states and territories of 
the United States had developed a Communications Interoperability Plan that outlined 
how the state or territory would move toward interoperability with input from local, 
tribal, and county entities (Assessing the framework and coordination, 2008).  
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Within the realm of campus-based security, policymakers created the Jeanne 
Clery Disclosure of Campus Security Policy & Campus Crime Statistics Act (Clery Act) 
in 1990, and regularly amended over the past decades. The language in the Clery Act 
requires colleges and universities who provide federally assisted financial aid programs 
to their students to publicly disclose crime statistics and personal safety information both 
on campus and nearby. The Clery Act also instituted basic requirements for handling 
violent or emergency situations and mandated an ASR that includes 3 years of crime 
statistics and summaries of certain security policies. Among notable security policies 
included are the authority of law enforcement personnel; the relationship between 
campus and local law enforcement including the existence of a memorandum of 
understanding (MOU); and emergency response procedures, including one test per year 
(Higher Education Opportunity Act, 2008). Griffin (2009) noted that the authors of the 
Clery Act holds higher education institutions responsible for crime reporting and crime 
prevention through leadership within the university and in the community.  
 Interoperability continuum. The interoperability continuum was developed in 
2004 by administrators within SAFECOM, the communications program of the Office of 
Interoperability and Compatibility within the DHS, as an outcome to the Intelligence 
Reform and Terrorist Prevention Act of 2004 and serves as an interoperability guide 
today. SAFECOM identified five interrelated systems that are essential to 
multidisciplinary and multijurisdictional: governance within the agency and between 
agencies, SOPs to enhance response and recovery, compatible technology attainment, 
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training exercises, and usage of technology and policies (Ensuring operability during 
catastrophic events, 2005). The continuum is a general system of interrelated parts that 
provides a pictorial view of interoperability capabilities for all first-responder 
communities, including campus-based law enforcement organizations. SAFECOM 
developed this continuum to primarily help technology decision makers to understand 
their roadmap toward achieving degrees of interoperability ranging from fully inoperable 
to fully interoperable. Standards development, including the standards-based Project 25 
initiative, was a key goal of the SAFECOM administrators in an effort to facilitate large 
regional or statewide shared-systems deployment and to avoid scenarios where the only 
way to communicate was by swapping radios among responding agencies (Project 
SAFECOM, 2004). Policymakers modified the continuum in 2008 to add data elements to 
the technology highway (Werner, 2009). It continues to serve as an interoperability guide 
for assessing interoperability capabilities today (DHS, 2015; see Figure 1). 
 
43 
 
 
Figure 1. Pictorial description of interoperability. Each highway represents a lane toward 
achieving interoperability. The lane moves from left to right as increasing levels of 
interoperability are achieved. From “Interoperability Continuum,” by DHS, 2015. 
 
The developers of the continuum depict interoperability as a multidimensional 
general system with five interdependent elements, termed lanes or highways. These lanes 
comprise elements of interoperability; methods to improve interoperability through the 
creation of SOPs; technology improvements that range from inoperable to fully operable; 
training and exercises to practice procedures, policies, and use of technology through 
scenarios; and use of interoperable communications by emergency response personnel 
(Dwarkanath & Gusty, 2010; Miller, Granato, Feuerstein, & Ruffino, 2005). The 
interoperability continuum established criteria for measuring an organization’s 
achievement toward maximum information exchange and interoperability (DHS, 2015; 
Dwarkanath & Gusty, 2010). The left side of the continuum reflects lower levels of 
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interoperability. As an agency improves interoperability, it moves toward the right side of 
the continuum. This creators of the interoperability continuum made a valuable 
contribution to the professional literature in that the continuum defines the measurement 
of interoperability capabilities achieved by first responders within an organization and 
serves as a roadmap for policy makers and practitioners for short- and long-range 
planning of interoperability (DHS, 2015). Each process, or highway, in the continuum 
contributes to the general system of interoperability.  
Technology is an important medium for enhancing interoperability and serves as a 
critical enabler for enhanced interoperability. Although the categorical highways are also 
essential drivers to enhancing interoperability, none of those highways can operate 
without a technological backbone. In addition, those highways can be impeded by 
ineffective technological solutions (Dwarkanath & Gusty, 2010). Contributors to 
enhancing the technological capabilities include addressing the limitations of the current 
infrastructure already in place, costs of deploying new technologies versus benefits 
received from these new technologies, scalability, and sustainability. The technological 
voice categories on the technology highway of the interoperability continuum from least 
to most effective interoperable communications are as follows: 
Swapping radios. Swapping radios is a simple method to achieve interoperability 
during an event. In this scenario, a cache of radios is held to be dispersed to agencies 
responding to a wide-scale event that lack the ability to communicate with other locals 
using their existing radios. This method is viewed as ineffective because it is time 
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consuming and provides limited results due to the number of radios available and the 
number of channels that can be used during the event (Damanik & Gunawan, 2011; 
Facella, 2005; Jones & McGrath, 2005; McFarland, 2007; Miller, et al., 2005; Upham, 
2009; U. S. Government Accountability Office, 2007).  
Deploying gateways. Operators deploy gateways during events as a temporary 
interoperability solution. The gateways retransmit across several frequency bands as 
needed and are manually set up during the event, providing a short-term solution to 
enhance communications (Li & Qian, 2011; Marsden, Treglia, McKnight, 2012; Wang, 
Ghosh, & Challapali, 2011). However, gateways are ineffective because they “require 
twice as much spectrum because each participating agency must use at least one channel 
in each band per common talk path and because they are tailored for communications 
within the geographic coverage area common to all participating systems” (DHS, 2008b, 
p. 3).  
Sharing channels. Sharing channels is a method for interoperability utilized by 
known participants in an event because the channels are preprogrammed into the 
responders’ radios prior to the anticipation in an event. Shared channels can also be 
deployed on-scene utilizing a master radio to manually clone other radios with its channel 
scheme. Although this method can be limited in some geographic areas due to frequency 
congestion, sharing channels increases interoperability. In this scenario, interoperability 
is achieved because agencies share common frequencies with standardized channel 
names, known users have access to the channels, and operating procedures are 
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established usually in advance of an event. However, shared channels limit 
interoperability because the users are not operating on a shared system; also, sharing 
channels is event-based rather than long-term interoperability planning (Careless, 2009; 
Guo & Huang, 2011; Hallahan & Peha, 2010; Lehr & Jesuale, 2009; Upham, 2009).  
Proprietary shared systems. A proprietary shared system is a system that may 
have multiple agencies, cities, or counties using it; however, this system is not standards 
based. Generally, this limits the devices, or hand-held radios, that can be used on the 
system to the branded radios also manufactured by the same manufacturer as the system. 
Choice can be limited if the system is proprietary and thus constrains the procurement of 
components and radios for the system users. In addition, radio users in proprietary 
systems do not seamlessly communicate with other systems that are not of the same 
vintage or from the same manufacturer. This can be disadvantageous when an event is of 
such magnitude that it crosses multiple systems’ boundaries and can require gateway 
deployment to tie the proprietary systems together in an event that is large enough to 
cross system boundaries. (Bacchus, Taher, Zdunek, & Roberson, 2010; Buracchini, 2000; 
Kuehn et al., 2011; Oversight of FirstNet, 2013).  
Standards-based shared system. This method is the most advantageous scenario 
for achieving maximum interoperability among diverse responders who need to 
communicate during a wide-scale event because standards-based systems such as Project-
25-compliant systems and radios provide maximum interoperability. With the proper 
preplanning of talk group assignments, radio users who equipment is from various 
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manufacturers can communicate with one another without intervention. However, 
standards-based systems must still be tied together in events that cross system 
boundaries, limiting their true effectiveness beyond proprietary systems. Frequency 
bands can also be an issue in shared systems, whether proprietary or standards based. In 
events where one system is on a UHF, VHF, or 800 MHz system, and the other system is 
a different frequency band, the systems have difficulty operating together. Subscriber 
radios that have more than one frequency band can mitigate this issue (Khan, 2011; Lin, 
Wu, & Jin, 2012; Moore, 2010; Rounds & Doll, 2009; Yu, Zhang, Tang, Chan, & Leung, 
2009).  
In 2010, the Major Cities Police Chiefs Association noted that the need for 
campus-based law enforcement interoperability capabilities is similar to noncampus-
based law enforcement capabilities. The Association stated that guidelines for preparation 
and coordination should include (a) coordination and training, including joint exercises 
and written agreements and coordination plans, (b) interoperable communications 
technology and equipment, and (c) comprehensive information sharing. Administrators 
should write policies cooperatively between the local organizations and include specific 
information unique to the campus law enforcement organization, including roles, 
responsibilities, and procedures. In addition, MOUs should be developed to evaluate 
capacity and unique needs, tailored to specific events. Field training exercises should be 
conducted, modeling real-life scenarios to maximize preparedness among the 
multijurisdictional organizations, utilizing the MOUs. Interoperable communications 
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equipment should include channels from each organization and a mutual aid channel 
where available (Major Cities Police Chiefs Association, 2010).  
Interoperability Performance  
Authors who produced reports and analyses of widely publicized events, 
including the 2001 terrorist attacks along the east coast of the United States, the hurricane 
that struck the gulf area of the United States, known as Hurricane Katrina, and 
Superstorm Sandy of 2012, arrived at the conclusion that emergency responders’ ability 
to communicate was impeded (Barnes et al., 2008; Cheng, 2013; Comfort & Haase, 
2006; Hamilton & Kean, 2004; Lien, Jang, Tsai, 2009; Oversight of FirstNet, 2013; 
Simpson et al., 2010; Stephan, 2006; U. S. Senate, 2006). McKinsey (as cited in 
Petrescu-Prahova & Butts, 2008) noted that, during emergency response to the 9/11 
World Trade Tower terrorist attack, less than half of the emergency responders were able 
to decipher and understand the communications over the radio system. More than 60 
police officers and 121 firefighters did not hear the calls to evacuate, and radio-
communications failures may have been partly accountable for the loss of life at the 
World Trade Center, which included 343 firefighters (Comfort & Kapucu, 2006). The 
U.S. Senate (2006) revealed that both intra- and interagency communications were 
impeded during Hurricane Katrina and the months following the natural disaster. The 
communications interoperability failures experienced during Hurricane Katrina, in 2005, 
were due to a lack of effective communications planning (Lester, 2007). Similarly, during 
the response to the bombing of the Oklahoma City Alfred P. Murrah Federal Building, in 
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1995, first responders could not communicate between responding agencies because the 
radios were on different frequencies and different radio systems (Oklahoma City Police 
Department, 1995). In 2008, Contestabile testified before Congress that little action has 
occurred:  
We sit before you almost seven years to the day of one of the most tragic events 
on American soil: September 11, 2001. Following that event there was significant 
rhetoric about the failures of public safety communications systems and the need 
to improve them throughout the country. While there may have been small 
pockets of improvement in limited areas throughout the country, most of the 
rhetoric has not resulted in action. (Interoperability in the next administration, 
2008, p. 3) 
In his congressional testimony, Boyd remarked that billions of dollars have been 
invested in existing public safety communications systems to enhance interoperability, 
and this amount excludes additional expenditures incurred for training, maintenance, or 
staffing. The replacement and upgrading of communications infrastructure to enhance 
interoperability will, in Boyd’s opinion, take decades to accomplish (Interoperable 
communications, 2009, p. 292). Within state and local governments, according to the 
Tenth Anniversary Report Card, citing progress made since the 9/11 terrorist attacks, 
both unity of command and efforts toward interoperability remain unfinished (Bipartisan 
Policy Center, 2011). In citing the commission’s recommendations, the Bipartisan Policy 
Center (2011) highlighted that implementation continues to languish and stall. The 
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authors further emphasized that technology deployment across urban areas, regions, and 
states lacks coordination and planning. In 2012, the Office of Inspector General (OIG) 
concluded that, even within the DHS agencies, interoperability was a distant goal. The 
report revealed that (a) only 1 of 479 radio users could access the predetermined common 
channel to communicate, (b) only 20% of the radios contained the correct channel 
programming, and (c) the DHS governing structure for interoperability was ineffective 
(DHS, OIG, 2012). In the two years following the report, the DHS had made little 
progress toward achieving interoperability (DHS, OIG, 2015). The failures of the DHS to 
provide interoperability within its departments has led to the newly enacted Public Law 
114-29 (H.R. 615, 2015), which amends the Homeland Security Act of 2002 and requires 
the DHS to make substantial progress in implementing interoperability. The 
congressional hearing on FirstNet (Oversight of FirstNet, 2013) concurred with previous 
accounts that emergency communications by first responders continued to impede 
response and recovery.  
Conversely, the multijurisdictional emergency response to the 2007 bridge 
collapse along Interstate-35, in Minnesota, was hailed as a success because the fire 
department could communicate over the radio system with most mutual-aid responders 
on the 800 MHz radio system (Cook, 2009); however, some responders did not have 
access to the system. In addition, the after-action report of the emergency response to the 
Pentagon terrorism attack in 2001 noted that the majority of the first responders at the 
scene were able to communicate effectively and interoperate with one another (Arlington 
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County, 2002). Interoperability plagued police officers during the Ferguson, Missouri, 
riots because not all officers were able to receive information on their radios and had to 
rely on information obtained in person. In addition, the state police radio system required 
adjustments and patches during the police response. The report contained the conclusion 
that interoperability issues were significant because of different technologies, lack of 
available mutual-aid channels, and the wide range of responding organizations on-scene 
(U. S. Department of Justice, 2015a). 
 Reports of campus-based communications incidents included the 1999 
Columbine High School shooting in Littleton, Colorado, where incompatible radio 
systems caused mutual-aid slowdowns among the 46 public safety agencies that 
responded; command posts sent runners to communicate information to those who were 
not on the same radio systems (Erickson, 2001). In 2007, an emergency response to a 
gunman on campus at St. John's University in New York was hailed as a success because 
of the strong partnership between campus security personnel and local law enforcement 
(Major Cities Police Chiefs Association, 2010). However, that same year, 2007, at a 
different university campus, Virginia Tech, an emergency response to a shooting was 
hampered due to interoperability issues, leading to a less than effective coordinated 
response (Systems Planning Corporation, 2009).  
Institutions adopting the Clery Act and subsequent policy legislation (following 
the 2001 events) continue to suffer interoperability failures, as shown in the 2010 
University of Texas at Austin emergency response to an active shooter on campus. 
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Although the university planned for multijurisdictional law enforcement response, it 
failed to execute during an active-shooter situation because responders did not know on 
which channel to communicate, dispatch could not monitor or transmit on the selected 
channel, and the command post did not know if everyone had switched to the chosen 
channel (University of Texas Police Department, 2010). The after-action review of the 
2012 mass shooting at Sandy Hook Elementary School revealed that multiagency 
capabilities were not present because responders had difficulty communicating as they 
were operating on different frequencies and different radio systems, and some agencies 
lost communication within the buildings (Sandy Hook Advisory Commission, 2015; 
Sedensky, 2013).  
In an after-action report of the active shooter response to a student who shot and 
killed another student and injured a teacher before killing himself at Reynolds High 
School in 2014, authored by Multnomah County (2015) in Oregon, several major 
challenges were lessons learned from this incident. The incident command structure 
(ICS) at the incident site was challenging and required coordination of nontraditional 
response partners in the ICS, radio and cellular phone reception was challenging, the 
process for developing the common operating picture for shared situational awareness 
created communications difficulty between Multnomah County’s emergency operations 
center, the school officials, and the responders on scene due to additional incident 
command posts established by the school district office, and Gresham Fire and 
Emergency services. In addition, the police department and responders were on different 
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radio frequencies and could not communicate directly. Those agencies utilizing the 
separate frequencies also saturated the channels leading to distorted and ineffective 
communications. Radio communications within the school buildings were poor because 
the school buildings lacked in-building repeaters to transmit and receive voice traffic over 
the radio system (Multnomah County, 2015). 
In 2016, the Kalamazoo, Michigan mass shooting incident by a 45-year old male  
Uber driver created a fluid law enforcement event involving response from six law 
enforcement organizations including two campus-based law enforcement agencies: the 
Western Michigan University police department and the Kalamazoo Valley Community 
College public safety department. The suspect was responsible for shooting several 
people, while also picking up and dropping off passengers at a Western Michigan 
University dormitory. In a report published after the event, interoperability delays were 
created for several reasons. First, the Kalamazoo Valley Community College was called 
upon by the Michigan State Police to set up the emergency operations center on the 
Groves campus due to its close proximity to one of the shooting scenes. However, this 
plan was abandoned due to the issues with the 800 MHz signal on that campus and an 
alternate location was established. Second, the responding agencies cited lack of frequent 
training and exercises to prepare for an event of this magnitude. Additional reasons 
mentioned including the need for a fully integrated multiagency command management 
structure, standardized policies and procedures, and the ability to manage an influx of 
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data from voice, email, text, pictures and video and the transmission of this information 
to front line personnel (Straub, Cowell, Zeunik, & Gorban, 2017). 
Gaps in the Literature Promoting Positive Social Change 
Few scholarly studies have been published analyzing the interoperability between 
campus-based law enforcement agencies and neighboring agencies and jurisdictions. 
Researchers with existing studies do not adequately address the collaboration between 
local law enforcement and campus-based police agencies. Peak et al. (2008) and Reaves 
(2015) touched on campus-based agencies through quantitative descriptions, but they 
missed subsequent qualitative information, including capability assessments, 
collaboration, and performance. In the updated statistical report, Reaves noted that 70% 
of campus law enforcement agencies had some form of agreement or operating policy 
with outside law enforcement agencies, and half of campus law enforcement 
organizations on campuses with student populations of 2,500 or more used radio systems 
that were compatible with neighboring responding agencies. Reaves stopped short of 
providing an analysis of the effectiveness of collaboration or interoperability. Peak et al. 
(2008) utilized an online survey tool to gather descriptive information concerning 
demographics and issues of concern to campus-based law enforcement organizations. 
Among the chief concerns cited was lack of preparedness training for large-scale events. 
Notably, no analysis was conducted regarding collaboration or multijurisdictional 
interoperability capabilities and performance. 
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Kapucu and Khosa’s (2013) research on disaster resiliency and preparedness 
identified key elements to producing a disaster-resilient university (DRU). Through an 
online survey, distributed to DRU members of a listserv, they recruited participants that 
were in the professions of emergency management and risk management, and found key 
indicators for creating a prescription for disaster resiliency. High-impact indicators 
related to interoperability were building strong community partnerships, managing 
information, and leadership structure. Interoperable capabilities were encapsulated in the 
need for training and exercises. The researcher’s results showed that more than 75% of 
the participants reported regular exercises and training to demonstrate capabilities, and 
96% of the campus-based participants indicated collaborative partnerships with local 
police departments. However, Kapucu and Khosa (2013) used only self-reported data of 
capabilities and opinions and did not correlate these data with performance results.  
Giblin, Haynes, Burruss, and Schafer (2013) studied critical-incident 
preparedness and multijurisdictional collaboration, using paired survey response data 
between 116 campus-based public safety agencies and their matched local law 
enforcement departments. The study was limited to campuses with greater than 2,500 
student enrollment, nonprofit, and awarding either 2- or 4-year degrees together with 
their matching local law enforcement agencies. A key result of the study revealed that 
relying solely on the campus-based law enforcement organization self-reports to measure 
communications capabilities can be misleading. Performance data were not studied. The 
researchers noted that discordance existed among planning activities, advanced written 
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communications plans, and the duties and responsibilities of each agency during a 
multiagency response. Findings from this study also pointed out the importance of joint 
training activities. 
Researchers to date have synthesized the elements of collaboration, 
interoperability planning, leadership, and training and exercises as closely aligned with 
the concept of interoperability capabilities (Manoj & Baker, 2007). However, the 
synthesis of the capabilities with the actual performance of a campus-based law 
enforcement agency during a multiagency or multijurisdictional event has been neglected 
and remains to be studied. This research study pursued answers to key questions 
regarding the determinants of interoperability capabilities and barriers to full 
interoperability that have not been fully explored in previous studies. To address such 
critical gaps in the literature is both important and timely. Research focused on the 
performance of campus-based law enforcement organizations, when faced with a 
multiagency or multijurisdictional event, has been limited to after-action reviews, many 
of which remain unpublished and inaccessible for analysis. Despite policy creation by 
administrators at the federal, state, and local levels, interoperability performance among 
campus-based law enforcement agencies has not been researched. Employing a 
framework of GST and the UTAUT model as the conceptual framework for this study 
enabled me to answer the research questions regarding capabilities, barriers, 
performance, and policy improvements more fully. 
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Summary and Conclusions 
Throughout the literature, barriers to interoperability among first responders 
operating in an unplanned multijurisdictional or multiagency event were cited. Reaves’s 
(2015) quantitative study of campus-based law enforcement organizations provided 
ample evidence along with a multitude of after-action reports whose authors documented 
that shortcomings existed and barriers stood in the way of full interoperability during 
response events. The challenges of interoperability are well-known; however, research is 
lacking that synthesizes capabilities and performance of campus-based law enforcement 
organizations, including their perceptions of barriers to interoperability. Little is known 
about the perceptions held in campus-based law enforcement organizations regarding 
policies that could improve interoperability. This study fills a gap in the current body of 
research and enhances understanding while extending the knowledge about the 
capabilities and performance of campus-based law enforcement organizations. 
In this chapter, I provided a description of the literature search strategy, followed 
by a synthesis of a conceptual framework based on GST and the UTAUT model. I 
reviewed pertinent literature and prior studies related to communication and law 
enforcement technology acceptance in light of the framework’s concepts. Key concepts 
of interoperability capabilities including policy and presidential directives were 
researched concluding with the interoperability continuum. Next, interoperability 
performance was examined through key after-action findings over the last 15 years. The 
chapter closed with an explanation of the gap in the literature regarding interoperability 
58 
 
of campus-based law enforcement organizations and a chapter summary. In Chapter 3, I 
present the research methods for this study, including a rationale for choosing the 
qualitative multiple case study approach. Next, a description of the role of the researcher 
is provided along with a restatement of the research questions and discussion of data 
collection and data analysis procedures. The measures taken to assure ethical procedures 
in the research are described including safeguarding the participants’ rights and 
anonymity. 
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Chapter 3: Research Method 
Introduction 
The purpose of this qualitative case study was to explore the perceptions of 
participants from campus-based law enforcement agencies about interoperability 
capabilities and shared performance between the campus-based law enforcement 
organization and local law enforcement organizations. I also explored potential gaps that 
impede the information and communication flow to and from campus-based law 
enforcement agencies during multiagency or multijurisdictional events.  
In this chapter, I present an overview of the research methods for this study and 
provide a rationale for choosing the qualitative case study design. I present the research 
questions guiding this study and discuss the role of the researcher and describe data 
collection and data analysis procedures, including the use of face-to-face interviews and 
triangulation with other data sources such as documents and archival materials. 
Trustworthiness is discussed and the steps taken to ensure validity and reliability of the 
data, including member checking. I also describe the measures taken to protect the 
participants’ rights and anonymity.  
Rationale for Qualitative Research  
The qualitative exploratory multicase method was chosen for this study because it 
was the best fit to explore the problem of interoperability performance and to answer the 
research questions posed. Yin (2013) notes by applying multicase exploration with cases 
from multiple sources, the researcher can create a holistic picture with in-depth 
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information. The qualitative research approach enabled inquiry through open-ended 
questions and accommodated the exploratory characteristics of this study. The qualitative 
multicase approach assumes that there is not one measured phenomenon at a single point 
in time, but rather multiple constructions and interpretations of the data that can change 
over time or across cases (McNabb, 2013). This method aligned with my goals and the 
purpose of this study. 
McNabb (2013) notes that a function of qualitative research is exploring 
interpretations of reality within a context at a defined point in time. Gathering descriptive 
and illustrative data are a central part of the qualitative design (Patton, 2015). The 
qualitative process allowed me to create a description of the interactions affecting 
interoperability capabilities and performance, which fit the goals of this study. In 
addition, the qualitative design enabled me to describe the circumstances of 
interoperability on the basis of interviews and archival documentation, identify themes 
during data analysis, and derive conclusions. I chose the exploratory method for this case 
study research because of the apparent lack of academic research devoted to the problem 
at hand. 
Selecting the appropriate research method required considering alternative options 
of quantitative and mixed methodologies (McNabb, 2013). I considered a quantitative 
design, but deemed it inappropriate for studying the experiences, attitudes, and 
perceptions of participants from the selected cases because a quantitative design would 
have resulted in numerical measurements with deductions from correlations among 
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variables. Tracy (2012) proposed that the quantitative approach generally yields 
statistical data and employs a post positivist framework for expanding knowledge, using 
methods such as surveys and experiments. In quantitative methods, data collection is 
done with validated instruments to reveal numerical and statistical values with deductions 
from correlations among variables (McNabb, 2013). In addition, a quantitative research 
method was inappropriate for this exploratory study because the focus of the study was 
not on evaluating the effect of a stimulus on an outcome (Vanderstoep & Johnston, 
2009). Important factors such as perceptions of impediments to interoperability would 
remain outside the context of a quantitative design because the distinctions and 
interactions involved are not easily quantifiable. Tracy (2012) remarks that research on 
perceptions or ideas is best performed through the qualitative method in order for the 
researcher to capture rich detail. While some studies of interoperability, undertaken under 
the auspices of the DHS and the U. S. Department of Justice, have been quantitative in 
nature, no qualitative studies have focused specifically on campus law enforcement 
interoperability capabilities and performance.  
A mixed methods design was also considered for this study, but this approach was 
rejected for two reasons. First, researchers utilizing the mixed methods research 
framework employs the use of both quantitative research (i.e., statistics through surveys 
or experimentation), and qualitative research (i.e., understanding the meaning behind the 
statistics), as explained by McNabb (2013). The aforementioned discussion of the reasons 
why quantitative inquiry is not appropriate in this study applies here as well. Second, the 
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purpose and the goals of the study were focused on a rich and deep exploration to answer 
the research questions. Numerical values are not included in this research study because 
rich detail and conceptual understanding is a primary objective. Moustakas (1994) 
remarks that qualitative studies are not numerical. Because the focus was to explore the 
ways in which the participants construct meaning based on the phenomenon under study, 
the qualitative method fit the philosophy of this research as supported by Tracy (2012).  
Rationale for Qualitative Exploratory Multicase Study  
Tracy (2012) asserted that the goal of qualitative research is experiential meaning 
making, and there are five main approaches to qualitative inquiry. The first approach is 
through a phenomenological study, which examines the meanings of lived experiences 
about a concept or phenomenon. Grounded theory is the second approach, which seeks to 
generate a substantial discovery or theory. The third approach is biography; it focuses on 
the life of an individual. Ethnographic studies comprise the fourth approach, which 
describes a group or cultural system, seeking interpretation. The fifth approach is the case 
study, which focuses on describing and explaining a phenomenon, using a single case or 
multiple cases, with data collected from multiple sources (McNabb, 2013).  
This study did not involve the examination of different cultures; the ethnographic 
design was, therefore, not applicable. The grounded theory design was also not 
appropriate because I did not seek to develop a new theory. The biographical approach 
was not appropriate because the research goals were not focused on the life experiences 
of an individual. The phenomenological approach was rejected because this study did not 
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focus on the meaning of lived experiences, subjective interpretations of reality, or the 
understanding of how individuals view themselves (Willis, 2007). Because this study's 
core theme was focused on understanding the experiences made within agencies, or 
cases, the case study approach is the best design. Through this study, I described the 
capabilities and performance of interoperability within campus-based law enforcement 
agencies with the main focus was on gaining a better understanding of the cases and 
examining their functioning and activities.  
McNabb (2013) stated that case study research "in public management has proven 
to be an effective way of identifying and disseminating knowledge on the successes and 
failures of public managers" (pp. 2-3) in organizations. McNabb (2013) further explained 
that case study inquiry is an accepted form of inquiry and Public Administration Review 
(PAR) by stating that PAR "has accepted the case study method as a mainstream research 
approach” (p. 4). Most importantly, Gerring (2004) pointed out that the case study 
method is the most appropriate method when the researcher studies performance 
measurement. The case study approach was, therefore, the best qualitative inquiry 
method for this study. 
Case study research can be grouped into three main categories: interpretive, 
critical, or exploratory (McNabb, 2013). In interpretive case studies, the researcher goes 
beyond explaining the phenomenon and proceeds to interpreting the meaning of the 
phenomenon. Interpretive studies are context laden with a phenomenon under constant 
change; they are used primarily to study culture and social relationships (McNabb, 2013). 
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Critical research studies are used to expose alienating or harmful social conditions, with 
the purpose to emancipate members of a society from harmful conditions (McNabb, 
2013). White and Adams (1994) further explained that the primary objective of this type 
of research is to encourage people to change their beliefs and thereby change their 
circumstances. The exploratory case study, according to McNabb (2013), is the most 
common research strategy, "conducted to develop causal explanation of some social 
phenomenon” (p. 28). McNabb goes on to explain that an exploratory case study seeks to 
“gather fundamental information about a topic, its contributing factors, and the influences 
it might have on various outcomes" (p. 29).  
The critical research design was not appropriate for this study because the 
population studied was not under duress or harmful conditions. The interpretive research 
study was not appropriate because the phenomenon of interoperability capabilities and 
performance is not constrained to social relationships alone. The exploratory case study 
was the most effective research design for the study because I sought causal explanations 
of interoperability gaps and performance by gathering information about the 
phenomenon, the contributing factors, and influences. 
A qualitative research design utilizing the case study method is necessary in order 
to explore issues and perceptions in depth (Yin, 2013). McNabb (2010) remarked that "a 
goal of case study research is to describe what is happening, why it is happening, and 
how it happens in an organization" (p. xvix). The case study method is one of the most 
popular approaches in public administration research, tracing its roots back to an 
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administrative research study at Harvard University, in 1948; the case study method was 
later promoted as a credible way to perform public administration research by Harold 
Stein in 1952 (McNabb, 2013). Further, Yeager (as cited in McNabb, 2013) noted that 
case studies share characteristics of interviews, archives of documents and other media, 
and observation.  
Researchers employing the case study approach can choose between two different 
methods of case selection: a single case or multiple cases for a multicase study. McNabb 
(2013) asserted that three main points determine the decision to use a single case versus a 
multicase research design. First, the single case is the preferred method when the intent of 
the case study is to broaden, challenge, or confirm a well-developed theory using a clear 
hypothesis or proposition. Second, single case design should be used when studying a 
rare or unique phenomenon. Third, the single-case research design is appropriate to 
reveal information that is not fully understood.  
Conducting multicase research is similar to conducting experiments on related 
topics and should be used to develop a greater understanding of the phenomenon 
(McNabb, 2013). In a multicase study, the phenomenon can be studied in varied settings 
(Stake, 2013). Researchers using the multicase design follow the same data collection 
methods as the single-case design; however, multi-case design is employed when a single 
case will not provide enough evidence of the issues the researcher wants to emphasize 
and a more robust analysis is desired (McNabb, 2013).  
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The objectives for this study were to deepen the understanding of the 
phenomenon of interoperability capabilities and performance, to draw out the issues 
through multiple perceptions of the problems, to identify the commonalities and 
differences, and to frame the issues with core concepts. McNabb (2013) and Stake (2013) 
recommended that the best method to achieve those objectives is the multicase 
exploratory design. The multi-case method was therefore most appropriate for this study. 
Role of the Researcher 
My role as the researcher was to investigate the phenomenon under scrutiny and 
seek answers to the questions posed for the study. I was engaged in the research 
environment through interpreting information from document reviews and interactions 
and discussions with participants. Qualitative findings are dependent on the researcher's 
abilities to draw conclusions and interpretations (Tracy, 2012).  
I have more than 10 years of experience in public safety communications 
interoperability, which I acquired through my positions in account management for two 
major suppliers of communications solutions. My present position as a senior account 
manager includes interacting with and recommending solutions to local public safety 
agencies in northern California and Texas. Although I am a professional in the public 
safety technology industry, I had no current or previous relationships with any of the 
cases selected for participation in this study. 
Research Questions 
The following research questions guided this study: 
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1. What are the interoperability capabilities of campus law enforcement 
agencies in California as viewed by the agency? 
2. What are the participants’ perceptions regarding the barriers to achieving 
full interoperability capability of campus law enforcement agencies in 
California? 
3. What is the interoperability performance of campus law enforcement 
agencies in California during multiagency or multijurisdictional 
response? 
4. How can government-wide policies and procedures improve the 
interoperability performance of campus law enforcement agencies in 
California? 
Data Collection Procedures 
Before data collection began, I reviewed the laws of the state of California to 
ensure compliance with all applicable state and federal regulations. Complying with state 
and federal regulations includes obtaining the informed consent of participants and 
providing them with notices regarding confidentiality. This study conformed to the 
National Institutes of Health (NIH) training conducted for Walden researchers. Approval 
to conduct this study was sought from the Institutional Review Board (IRB) of Walden 
University prior to conducting any data collection.  
I obtained contact information for potential cases and participants in this study 
from the campus’ Websites. To obtain a list of potential participants, a list of universities 
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in California that have a campus-based law enforcement agency was compiled with 
Microsoft Excel. The list contained key distinguishing dimensions in order to utilize 
maximum variation sampling (Patton, 2002). The dimensions were geographic location, 
law enforcement agency size, type of university (private or public) and whether the 
university is in an urban, suburban, or rural setting. Participants were purposefully 
selected from the list to achieve a balance among the dimensions. The letter of invitation 
was transmitted through e-mail to potential cases within the campus-based law 
enforcement agencies to explain the study and ask for participation. Letters of invitation 
were sent and interviews conducted until thematic saturation occurred.  
Participants were contacted by telephone or e-mail with a request to set an 
appointment to discuss the study. The participants were emailed an invitation to 
participate in the study with informed consent and the demographic survey. The 
questions regarding the participants’ demographics pertained to (a) the name of the 
agency the participant represents, (b) how long the participant has been employed at the 
agency, (c) the size of the agency and the numbers of sworn and nonsworn officers, (d) 
the type of radios and radio systems used, and (e) confirmation that a multijurisdictional 
event involving the agency has occurred within the past 5 years survey (see Appendix A). 
If the participant met the inclusion criteria, specifically an affirmative response to (e), the 
researcher set up an initial interview to last no more than 1 hour at a time and place 
convenient for the participant.  
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The interview began with a reiteration of the purpose of the study and informed 
consent, as explained in the initial e-mail invitation. The participant's answers from the 
demographics questionnaire were discussed and confirmed (see Appendix A). Upon 
completion of the demographics survey and if the case met the inclusion criterion of a 
multijurisdictional event within the last 5 years, an appointment was set up with the 
participant at a mutually agreeable time and place. If the case did not meet this criterion, 
another case was selected. Upon informed consent from the participant, the appointment 
commenced with a semistructured interview protocol conducted in person.  
The primary data collection method was an in-depth semistructured interview 
utilizing my research protocol (See Appendix C). The interview protocol, which was 
developed prior to conducting the interviews, consisted of a research guide that included 
sections for notes for the researcher, the interview method, the interview time and place, 
the interview overview, components of the interview, and the interview questions (see 
Appendix C). This interview consisted of open-ended questions to encourage participants 
to answer the questions in detail. This protocol was used to guide the interview and 
facilitate consistency of interviews across the cases. For the sake of confidentiality and 
the protection of the participants’ rights and anonymity, the cases and the participants 
within the cases were given pseudonyms, marked as C1 to C10.The interview questions 
drove the conversation between researcher and interviewee, giving me opportunity to ask 
for more information to enhance richness of detail. In interviews, probing for additional 
details and depth is appropriate (McNabb, 2013; Stake, 2013). The interviews were 
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scheduled to last approximately 1 hour and were digitally recorded. Each participant was 
asked at the beginning of the interview for permission to record the interview (Blau, 
Elbow, & Killgallon, as cited in McNabb, 2013). In addition, a field journal with 
reflective notes was archived regarding personal thoughts, impressions, and observations 
made during the interviews.  
I supplemented the information from the interviews with documents and archival 
data. McNabb (2013) states that information should be gathered from several sources. 
Marshall and Rossman (1999) noted that document review strengthens the research and 
permits data triangulation for corroboration of conclusions. I collected documents to 
review relevant to the cases sampled from the public domain. The types of documents 
collected for each case included (1) a list of frequencies in use by each case and its local 
mutual aid partners within the region published by the Federal Communications 
Commission (FCC) and (2) the most recent ASR for each case, published on each case’s 
university website. The list of frequencies published by the FCC represents the best 
source of data for understanding the types of radio frequencies in use for each case. The 
FCC is the authoritative source for this information. The ASR is an annual disclosure 
required of the Clery Act for all colleges and universities that receive federal funding. 
This report must include the annual crime statistics for 3 calendar years and include 
details on efforts taken to improve campus safety. Specifically, this report is required to 
include a statement of the policies concerning campus law enforcement and the working 
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relationship with state and local police agencies and whether written agreements exist 
between the agencies.  
Each participant was given the opportunity to review the transcribed interview 
and make any corrections to answers to the interview questions. Participants could return 
any comments or corrections to the researcher by email or postal mail. Participants exited 
the study at the conclusion of the interview validation and document collection period. 
Participants will be debriefed by receiving a two-page summary of the key results from 
the study once the study is published. 
Trustworthiness 
Issues of trustworthiness of the study might involve credibility, dependability, 
confirmability, and transferability. Credibility (or internal validity) involves the 
believability of the research and can be enhanced by saturation of themes and data 
triangulation of interview and archival information (McNabb, 2013; Thomas & Magilvy, 
2011). Transferability refers to the applicability of the results to other similar settings or 
contexts (Thomas & Magilvy, 2011). Transferability was achieved through a thorough 
and thick description of the research context and the assumptions made and a deep 
characterization of interview results. Thick description and richness in detail enhance 
transferability (Creswell, 2013; Tracy, 2010). Transferability was also enhanced by 
aiming for maximum variation during participant selection (e.g., geographic location, size 
of agency within the campus).  
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Dependability exists when a subsequent researcher can follow the decision trail of 
prior research (Thomas & Magilvy, 2011). The issue of dependability was addressed by 
accounting for any changes during the data collection phase and an assessment of the 
potential impact of such changes to outcomes of the study. Dependability was also 
addressed with preservation of tape recordings, transcriptions, audit trails and 
triangulation, and allowing the participants to review their transcripts for accuracy.  
Confirmability refers to the extent to which the results of this research can be 
corroborated by other researchers undertaking similar studies, as well as by the 
participants in the current study. Confirmability exists when credibility, dependability, 
and transferability are also present (Thomas & Magilvy, 2011). In this study, I addressed 
confirmability by documenting the procedures used to check the collected auditing the 
data collection and analysis procedures for bias or distortion. The participants also had 
the opportunity to review their interview transcripts. In addition, confirmability was 
strengthened through the use of reflexivity, which I exercised by reporting 
preconceptions, beliefs, and values during the research process.  
Data Analysis 
Data analysis was comprised of information obtained in interviews and through 
the document review to answer the research questions posed for the study. I used NVivo-
11 for Microsoft Windows to transcribe, organize, and analyze the content obtained from 
interviews, surveys, and documents. The cases were coded with pseudonyms to protect 
the identity of the participants and the names and locations of the agencies constituting 
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the cases. Yin (2013) recommended that applying a coding scheme with a database 
allows for analysis of large amounts of data in a qualitative study. 
The interview recordings were transcribed using NVivo and returned to the 
participants for confirmation of accuracy. Any necessary clarifications were conducted 
through follow-up interviews either in person or by phone. Once validated as an accurate 
transcription of the interview data, I analyzed the responses given in answer to the 
interview questions and explored factors and themes of interoperability capability and 
performance. This analysis was conducted in light of the conceptual framework of this 
study, which is based on the GST (von Bertalanffy, 1968) and the UTAUT model 
(Venkatesh et al., 2003).  
Document review included documents, reports, listings of radio frequencies in use 
by the participants, and any other unobtrusive written or visual materials about the cases, 
which I collected where available. Webb, Campbell, Swartz, & Sechrest (2000) noted 
that documents can be written, visual, or audio in nature. Web pages and documents used 
for document analysis were gathered using NVivo's NCapture. I used inductive reasoning 
to develop patterns and correlations in order to draw conclusions. Yin (2013) highlights 
the importance in inductive reasoning in qualitative analysis. I coded the data to identify 
themes to be stored in nodes and later connected through patterns to develop explanations 
and theory.  
74 
 
Case Selection 
 The sampling technique used in this study was nonprobability sampling, or 
purposeful sampling employing maximum variation. Emmel (2013) noted that purposeful 
sampling allows the researcher to best answer the research questions by selecting cases 
that are rich and provide the best insight. Patton (as quoted in Emmel, 2013) remarked in 
an earlier work, "The (purposeful) sampling strategy must be selected to fit the purpose 
of the study, the resources available, the questions being asked, and constraints being 
faced" (p. 34). Further, Patton (2015) emphasized that purposeful sampling is appropriate 
when the researcher is focused on a distinct population. Patton (2002) synthesized that 
maximum variation sampling from diverse cases can produce significant common 
patterns that “cut across cases and derive their significance from having emerged out of 
heterogeneity” (p. 235). Because sample-size decisions regarding the number of cases in 
a qualitative study should reflect the study's purpose (Suzuki, Ahluwalia, Kwong-Arora, 
& Mattis, 2007) and there is no immutable rule for the number of cases to include 
(McNabb, 2010), I selected cases until thematic saturation occurred. In studies involving 
the perceptions of participants, 10-12 cases have been deemed appropriate for saturation 
(Creswell et al., 2007). 
The target population for this qualitative case study was campus-based law 
enforcement agencies at 4-year universities in the state of California. To be included in 
the study, the case must have experienced an interoperability event in the last 5 years that 
required multiagency or multijurisdictional response. In addition, I achieved balance by 
75 
 
including cases from rural, suburban, and urban schools, schools with various agency 
sizes, and geographic dispersion throughout the state. Trade schools, K-12 schools, and 
community colleges are excluded from the study.  
The participants that were selected for the interviews had relevant knowledge 
about their agency including interoperability capabilities and performance. The position 
and responsibilities of the participants were characteristically among the supervisory or 
command staff of the agency. Position titles of the participants included Sergeant, 
Lieutenant, Captain, Assistant Chief, Chief, or Director. The participant also had 
knowledge about one or more interoperable events within the last 5 years at their 
respective campus. All participants in this study were volunteers, and no remuneration 
was offered for participation.  
Informed Consent and Ethical Considerations 
Approval by the IRB of Walden University was obtained to conduct the study 
under its auspices. The IRB approval number was 05-19-16-0142648. I followed all 
institutional guidelines and the laws of the state of California. I was certified by the NIH 
to conduct research with human subjects (see Appendix B). Participants in this study 
were adult volunteers from campus law enforcement agencies in the state of California. 
This study did include any participants from vulnerable or protected populations.  
Tracy (2012) pointed out that all participants must consent to take part in the 
study and have the opportunity to withdraw at any time. I explained the importance of 
informed consent in the e-mail invitation and again at the beginning of each interview. I 
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obtained informed consent before the commencement of the interview. I also informed 
the participants that they can elect to withdraw from the study at any time and that they 
may choose not to answer any of the questions in the study with which they felt 
uncomfortable (Ritchie, Lewis, Nicholls, 2013). All communications with participants 
was honest and open, with no compensation provided for participation in the study, and 
the participants were protected from any harm the study could inflict on their lives. I 
assured confidentiality and the participants’ anonymity (Patton, 2015) by using codes and 
pseudonyms, instead of the participants’ names. No information was used that could 
identify either the participants or their agencies.  
The results of the study were reported in aggregate form. I also informed the 
participants about my own employment and my employer and assured them that this 
research study is independent of and not affiliated with my employment; it was 
conducted as part of the requirements of my doctoral studies at Walden University. 
Computer-stored data were password protected, and all audio recordings on hard media 
and hard-copy files were stored in a locked file cabinet. Access was restricted to myself, 
as the researcher of this study. All materials relevant to this study will be retained in a 
locked cabinet for a period of 5 years, as required by the IRB. Five years after completion 
of the study, the data will be destroyed and rendered unreadable. 
Summary 
In this chapter, I presented the research methods for this qualitative multicase 
study, including a rationale for choosing a qualitative exploratory multicase design. I 
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provided a description of the role of the researcher and a restatement of the research 
questions. I described the data collection und data analysis procedures and discussed 
issues of trustworthiness and the measures taken to protect the participants’ rights and 
anonymity. The results of the study are reported in a future chapter. The research 
questions are answered and conclusions drawn based on the findings. Recommendations 
are offered for practical application and further research on this topic. 
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Chapter 4: Findings 
Introduction 
The purpose of this qualitative case study was to explore the perceptions of 
participants from campus-based law enforcement agencies about interoperability 
capabilities and performance between their campus-based law enforcement organization 
and the local mutual aid organizations when involved in a multiagency or 
multijurisdictional event. The potential gaps that impede the information and 
communication flow to and from campus-based law enforcement agencies during 
multiagency or multijurisdictional events were examined. Through the perspectives of the 
campus based law enforcement population who have been involved in at least one 
multiagency or multijurisdictional event in the preceding 5 years, interoperability 
capabilities and performance were explored to answer the research questions. 
The following research questions were addressed by this study: 
1. What are the interoperability capabilities of campus law enforcement 
agencies in California as viewed by the agency? 
2. What are the participants’ perceptions regarding the barriers to achieving 
full interoperability capability of campus law enforcement agencies in 
California? 
3. What is the interoperability performance of campus law enforcement 
agencies in California during multiagency or multijurisdictional 
response? 
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4. How can government-wide policies and procedures improve the 
interoperability performance of campus law enforcement agencies in 
California? 
 The primary data were obtained from semistructured interviews with participants 
and archival data; each audio recorded interview was transcribed. During the interviews, 
the participants described their perceptions of their interoperable capabilities and 
performance when involved in multijurisdictional or multiagency response events. 
Archival documents provided triangulation of interoperable capabilities and 
complemented the interview data. The collected data were thematically analyzed within 
the cases and cross-case analysis was performed. I explored the issue of interoperability 
through multiple perceptions of the issues achieved through a multicase comparative 
design as recommended by McNabb (2013) and Stake (2013), I identified the 
commonalities and differences, and framed the issues with core concepts and themes.  
This chapter is divided into eight sections. In the first section, I introduce the 
findings and present the research setting. In the second section, I describe the 
demographic features of the cases. In the third section, I describe the methodology and 
procedures that I used to collect, organize, analyze, and interpret the data. I discuss 
variations in data collection, and I also describe the steps taken to protect participant 
confidentiality. In the fourth section, I describe the procedures employed to enhance the 
rigor of the research trustworthiness evidenced through credibility, dependability, 
confirmability, transferability and reliability. In the fifth section, I present the data 
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analysis followed by the findings of the study to address the research questions. In the 
final section, I provide a summary of the research findings. 
Setting 
This study took place in the state of California. The 10 participants were from 
campus based law enforcement agencies of 4-year universities. I conducted face-to-face 
interviews over a period of four months from October 2016 to January 2017; interviews 
were recorded and held at the place and time chosen by the participants. The setting of 
the interview was chosen by the participant and provided a safe environment conducive 
to exploration of the research questions without interruption or undue stress to the 
participant. Miller (2017) highlights that rich detail can be obtained from face-to-face 
interviews and the social interaction can build rapport. The face-to-face interviews 
enabled me to establish a rapport with the participants, interlace prompts where needed 
during the questioning, and capture the tenor of the responses and the nonverbal body 
language throughout the interview. 
During the period of the study, personal and organizational conditions remained 
steady and without significant influence on participants or their experience at the time the 
interviews were conducted. In addition, conditions remained steady between the time of 
the interview and return of the interview transcripts to the participants. Participants were 
still serving in their roles at leader of their law enforcement organization without change 
to their role or organizational structure. No adverse or significant events transpired 
between the interview and when I returned the transcripts to the participants.  
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Demographics of Research Participants 
The selection criteria for inclusion in the study was that of chiefs of police or 
similar position who were currently employed at campus based law enforcement agencies 
of 4-year universities in California, had the knowledge of their agency’s interoperability 
capabilities and performance, and had experienced at least one multiagency or 
multijurisdictional event in the preceding 5 years. I purposely selected participants that I 
had no prior relationship with or had no direct contact with through my employment or 
trade association membership. Purposeful recruitment of participants took place through 
email invitation and telephone.  
Eighteen chiefs were contacted to participate in the study from a population of 34 
California 4-year universities with campus police departments. Two recruits declined to 
participate, and 11 chiefs of police responded to the invitation to participate in the 
research study. Ten participants consented to the study. Six chiefs did not respond to the 
invitation. Of the two chiefs that declined, one cited a busy schedule as the reason not to 
participate, and the other chief stated a lack of time and that she would only participate if 
I was a student at her university. One participant proceeded through the demographic 
questions but did not consent to the study. Recruitment and participant size 
characteristics are found in Table 1. 
82 
 
Table 1 
Recruitment and Participant Characteristics 
Size of law enforcement agency within campus Number of 
Campuses 
Contacted Participated 
All Campuses 
 
Number of law enforcement employees 
  Less than 26                                                                         
   26-50 
   Greater than 50 
34 
 
 
  8                                                             
17 
  9 
 18 
 
 
4
 10 
   4 
10 
 
 
  2 
  5 
  3 
 
To protect confidentiality, I did not include the names of the participants in the 
research notes or transcripts, and instead assigned labels to the participants as Case 1 
through Case 10, and represented as C1 through C10. Of the 10 chiefs that consented to 
participate, two were women and eight were men. To further protect participants, the 
gender of the participant was not identified and all participants were labeled the pronoun 
“he” or “his” including the two female participants. Length of employment at the agency 
ranged from 8 months to 23 years. The size of agency ranged from one to 115 sworn 
officers and nine to 120 unsworn officers. All participants reported using radios and radio 
systems as a communications medium. All participants affirmatively stated they had 
knowledge of their agency’s interoperability capabilities and performance and had been 
involved in at least one multijurisdictional or multiagency event in the last 5 years. 
Participants were purposefully chosen and the balance of participant selection was 
achieved with representation of participation from rural, suburban, and urban schools, 
agency size, and geographic dispersion throughout the state.  
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The participants responded affirmatively when asked if their agency had been 
involved in a multijurisdictional or multiagency event in the last 5 years. All participants 
stated they possessed knowledge of their agency’s interoperability capabilities and 
performance and agreed to participate in the study, which was further supported by 
comments to my request for interview with remarks such as “I look forward to discussing 
my agency’s capabilities and my concerns” (C3), and “yes, I will agree to your request to 
participate in an interview to discuss our interoperability with other agencies” (C10). 
Data Collection 
My primary data collection method was in-depth semistructured interviews 
utilizing my research protocol (See Appendix C). The interview protocol, which I 
developed prior to conducting the interviews, consisted of a research guide that included 
sections for notes for the researcher, the interview method, the interview time and place, 
the interview overview, components of the interview, and the interview questions. 
Opdenakker (2006) stated that by carefully following the protocol in each interview, the 
researcher can benefit from reduced stress by following the sequential roadmap in the 
protocol. The researcher also benefits from the reduced chance of straying from the 
interview questions or injecting interviewer subjectivity, as the protocol has prompts for 
the researcher when needed. Therefore, I followed the interview protocol attentively each 
time. In concurrence with the recommendations of the Belmont Report (The National 
Commission for the Protection of Human Subjects of Biomedical and Behavioral 
Research, 1979), I used the interview protocol to brief the participants of the purpose of 
84 
 
the study, the procedures used to protect the participant’s rights, the confidentiality 
protections, and informed consent. After the briefing, with the participant’s written 
consent, I then proceeded with the interviews, using the interview guide as a roadmap, to 
engage the participants in rich dialogue during their interviews and to obtain information 
for the research questions as recommended by Doody & Noonan (2013). 
As the researcher, I served as the data collection instrument for this case study.  
Pezalla, Pettigrew, & Miller-Day (2012) note that the researcher is the data collection 
instrument in interview studies. The data sources included the interviews, handwritten 
notes during the interviews, demographic questions, and documents related to the cases. 
The research questions were sufficiently supported from the collection of evidence that 
included semistructured interviews and documents collected for all 10 cases. I proceeded 
to collect after Walden IRB approval was obtained and I complied with all applicable 
institutional, state, and federal regulations. The participants were interviewed at the date, 
time, and location chosen by each participant. Consent was obtained prior to inclusion in 
the study.  
I was the sole researcher and conducted semistructured interviews with 10 
participants who consented to the study; the interviews were organized and progressed 
through a series of questions contained within my interview protocol (Appendix C). I 
conducted the interviews in person during the months of October, November, December 
2016 and January 2017 and I scheduled the interviews as participants agreed to 
participate in the study. Interviews ranged from 11 to 49 minutes in length and were 
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recorded using a digital voice recorder and transcribed. Each transcript was emailed to 
the participant for the purposes of review and comment. The interview transcripts 
provided the data to perform inductive coding of the data.  
I wrote notes by hand during the interview for redundancy in the event the 
interview failed to record; however, all interviews successfully recorded and were 
transcribed. During the interviews, the participants provided their perceptions with 
interoperable capabilities and performance, as aligned with the research questions. The 
handwritten notes also provided opportunities to record participants’ attitudes and 
nonverbal cues and the my impressions of the interview. At the conclusion of each 
interview, I reminded the participants that I may need to contact them for follow up 
questions or clarifying questions and that each participant would receive a transcript of 
the interview for review. Each participant was provided the opportunity to review his or 
her interview transcript and make any clarifications or corrections. Moustakas (1994) 
highlights the importance of researchers documenting their reflections and perceptions of 
each interview. Therefore at the conclusion of each interview, I documented my 
perceptions and reflections of the interview and my perceptions and reactions to the 
information provided during the interview. Vaismoradi, Turunen, & Bondas (2013) note 
that through content and thematic analysis, researchers can label categories of content. I 
conducted content and thematic preliminary analysis of the interview data immediately 
after each interview to begin to discover emerging categories, frequencies, and themes.  
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 Upon completion of each interview, I performed a detailed search of relevant 
documents available in the public domain. To do this I used Google to search for ASRs 
for each university, information on the radio systems used at each university, and 
frequencies of the radio systems related to the universities participating in this study. All 
applicable documents related to the cases were saved and stored on my computer. For 
consistency, I used NVivo 11 to transcribe, organize, and analyze the content obtained 
from the demographic survey, interviews, and documents. All data were stored on my 
password protected computer to ensure protection from unauthorized access. Paper files 
were protected in my home office in a locked file cabinet. I am the only person who has 
access to the data. Documents obtained from the public domain enabled cross-checking 
of interview data for clarity regarding radio system composition and radio sharing among 
interoperable partners. The documents further added to the depth of discovery and 
examination of interoperability capabilities and performance among the cases and 
important points were recorded within NVivo 11 and Excel spreadsheets. 
Variations in Data Collection 
There were challenges in data collection. Recruitment of participants by email 
followed my expected recruitment procedure; however, I encountered a low response 
rate. In order to overcome lack of response, I followed up with a telephone call to the 
potential participants in order to enlist participation. This additional step in my procedure 
enabled me to set an appointment with each potential participant, explain the study using 
a printout of the email I had sent to each participant which included the e-mail invitation 
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and informed consent. During this appointment, I answered any questions and enlisted 
participation. I provided a copy of the email invitation and informed consent to the 
potential participants. In Chapter 3, I discussed that the demographic survey would be 
administered over the telephone as a screening for inclusion to the study. Instead, the 
demographic survey was administered in person. Informed consent from each participant 
was obtained prior to conducting the interview.  
 I encountered an unusual circumstance in the data collection due to the reluctance 
of participants to provide documents or 911 recordings regarding their interoperable 
performance. Student privacy was the primary stated reason. Some of the participants did 
state that their ASR was current and available for disclosure. I extended my document 
search and obtained documents from the public domain where available to cross-check 
the data for consistency and accuracy as recommended by McNabb (2013). This served 
useful in validating the types of radios and radio systems used by the participants. 
Participant Confidentiality 
I informed the participants that both their name and the name of their agency 
would be protected from disclosure. Cases were given numerical codes and no names 
were used. Due to the small population from which the participants were drawn, 
demographic information was presented in summary form only, and any references to the 
participant’s specific gender was removed and standardized with “he” or “his” pronouns. 
In instances where a participant is quoted, additional care was taken to ensure the 
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participant’s identity remained anonymous. In some instances, this required names of 
agencies or interoperable partners to be omitted from the study. 
Evidence of Trustworthiness 
 Each of the participants was a chief of police with knowledge of his or her 
agency’s interoperability capabilities and performance which contributes to evidence of 
trustworthiness. Care in participant selection provided (a) balance in participation 
geographically throughout California with no cluster of participants from any one 
specific geographic area, (b) participation across diverse campus sizes as measured by the 
number of law enforcement officers at the agency, and (c) balance of campus setting 
among rural, suburban, and urban locals. Evidence of trustworthiness was reinforced by 
establishing credibility, dependability, confirmability, and transferability (Elo, 
Kaariainen, Kanste, Polkki, Utrianinen, & Kyngas, 2014), as described below.  
Credibility 
Credibility is an important aspect of qualitative research internal validity, as the 
research should link the study’s findings with reality. In establishing the credibility of the 
study by considering (a) if the findings made sense, (b) are the findings believable, and 
(c) if an authentic portrait of the issues was portrayed (Miles & Huberman, 1994). 
Triangulation was a technique I used to strengthen credibility among the findings by 
exploring the results of the analysis of the available data sources to the results of the 
interview data analysis to reveal ensure that the results paint a clear picture of the 
experience of the participants and reinforce the results of each analysis. This was 
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particularly useful in vetting the interoperability capabilities of the cases. Credibility is 
also strengthened through self-awareness of the researcher (Koch, 1994) to avoid leading 
participants or subjecting bias into the research. In order to fortify the objectivity of the 
interviews, I followed my interview protocol carefully, inserting prompts when needed 
throughout the questioning to enable rich detail and perceptions without manipulation. I 
asked the broad question and then enabled elaboration of the participant as they desired. 
Selecting the sample size of 10 participants from a population of 34 potential cases 
strengthened credibility along with prolonged engagement of the data. Prior to the 
interview, I spent time building rapport with the participants where they felt protected to 
share their perspectives with me and reinforcing the confidentiality of their identities. The 
sample size was effective as saturation was reached by the seventh interview. Elo et al. 
(2014) states that conducting research until saturation enhances credibility through 
comprehensiveness.  
Dependability 
Elo et al. (2014) states that dependability exists when the data and the process of 
the study is stable over time and under varying conditions. To provide opportunity for 
high dependability, I described in detail the selection factors for inclusion of participants 
in the study. In addition, I used multiple sources of data collection including interview, 
field notes, and documents. I compared the results of the analysis of the interviews with 
the results of the document analysis to gain a more thorough understanding of the issues 
and corroborate potential analyses and findings. In addition, each interview was 
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compared to the others to increase the dependability of the results. I reported my analysis 
process with focus on the steps in the process and highlighted the salient themes in the 
data with vivid detail. Elo et al. (2014) remarks that high dependability of a research 
study in conditioned upon the ability of another researcher to replicate the steps and can 
follow with ease the decisions made by the preceding researcher. Through describing the 
research process analysis in records and field notes, I reinforced the study’s dependability 
through proof of systematic procedures. I also performed coding checks of the data 
analysis to test for agreement as well as data quality checks for bias. Miles and Huberman 
(1994) recommend checking the data for agreement in the analysis and also performing 
checks for bias. 
Confirmability 
Confirmability relates to the objectivity of the research and can include the 
replicability of the study by other researchers (Miles & Huberman, 1994). I strengthened 
confirmability by describing the methods and procedures explicitly and with detail. I also 
provided tables of data that correlate to the conclusions. I established an audit trail by 
providing a record of the methods and procedures in the study and maintained my self-
awareness to alleviate bias through any personal opinions I had about the research or the 
results. I also have retained the data and they are available to future analysis by others. 
Transferability 
Transferability of the conclusions of the study was operationalized by the use of 
several methods. First, the audit trail provided a technique for future researchers to apply 
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the methods to different settings or groups. I employed purposeful maximum variability 
sampling to select participants for the study chosen in California and summarized the 
demographics of the participants for replication in another geography or class of 
institutions. Overall, to enhance transferability, I provided information on the sample 
size, inclusion criteria, the data collection methods, the length of the interview sessions, 
the questions explored, and the time period of the data collection. Shenton (2004) states 
that researchers should provide detailed background information to allow for 
comparisons by future researchers. I provided thick description of the topic of the 
investigation to provide understanding and potential comparative emergence. To 
maximize knowledge of transferability, I defined the scope, boundaries, and limitations 
of the study to enhance applicability to other populations or situations. 
Data Analysis 
Qualitative data analysis in research studies involves converting essence and 
experience into the form of words (Miles & Huberman, 1994). I followed an iterative 
process which involves data coding soon upon completion of the interview and document 
retention, systematically moving back and forth between acquiring new interviews and 
processing completed interviews. Upon completion of the interviews and document 
retrieval, I organized the data into interview, field notes, and public documents within 
NVivo 11. Each interview was imported into NVivo 11 and transcribed. To begin the 
analysis, each interview was read multiple times. During this process, I made notes about 
word usage, patterns, and any thoughts I had while reading each transcript. I combined 
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this with the field notes I took during each interview to ensure I captured as much 
information as possible. I used NVivo 11 to code the data using an inductive data analysis 
approach and source linked the codes back to the transcript or document from which it 
originated.  
Thematic Analysis 
Once the transcripts were completed, I began the process of analysis with 
organizing the raw data. I conducted an inductive qualitative analysis on the textual data 
contained in the interview transcripts as recommended by Thomas (2006). I used NVivo 
11 as a tool to code the narrative data to create themes. For qualitative researchers, 
themes capture the quintessence of the data; that is the meaning that encompasses the 
participant experiences in a succinct, understandable manner (Braun and Clark, 2006).  
To prepare the data for analysis, all interviews were transcribed then loaded into 
NVivo 11 as recommended by Leech & Onwuegbuzie ( 2011). I employed NVivo 11 as a 
means to organize and manage data during the process of data analysis. I began by using 
Braun & Clarke’s (2006) thematic analysis data analysis method. One of the strengths of 
this method was that it is not linked to any specific qualitative philosophy, which enables 
researchers to use it regardless of methodology (Braun and Clarke, 2006). Thematic 
Analysis is a six-step data analysis plan that was refined by Braun and Clarke (2012) to 
its current implementation. Braun and Clarke (2012) indicated that thematic analysis 
employs a list of steps for qualitative researcher uses to identify, analyze, and report 
patterns and themes within the gathered data. The six stages of thematic analysis are used 
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in a recursive manner, with a researcher moving back and forth between stages as 
necessary. Using this six-step method, I explored the entire dataset and uncovered 
repeated patterns of meaning.  
Stage 1: Read and re-read the data. During this initial phase, it is essential to 
become familiar with the data through immersion, by reading and rereading the 
transcribed interviews multiple times. This method concurs with Braun & Clarke (2006) 
who stated it was essential to listen to audio-recorded data at least once to note analytic 
observations. Braun & Clarke (2012) suggested making notes on the datum while it is 
being read or while audio-recorded data are being listened to. This note-making assists a 
researcher in reading the transcripts for data discovery. Importantly, this means that a 
researcher is not simply taking the data at face value, but reading the words actively 
including analyzing what is read and starting to think about what the data might mean. 
After listening to the interviews, I began to slowly and carefully read each interview 
transcript making notes of my observations. I read each transcript at least five times, and 
reread certain sections repeatedly during the analysis process if I was searching for 
deeper understanding. Once this process was complete, I uploaded all transcripts into 
NVivo 11. Table 2 contains samples of data with associated notes. 
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Table 2 
Sample of Data and Associated Notes 
Data Associated Notes 
So you think more money spent, perhaps, 
there's not enough policy around it so that it's 
spent to maximize what it was meant for. 
 
Money is not the only answer – policy is also 
important. 
At this time, I don't see any major barriers. 
However, in my time in this jurisdiction, matter 
of fact, in 2012, there were major barriers in an 
incident that occurred in my area, California, 
the CHP, California Highway Patrol, did not 
have the ability to go to our radio system and it 
could have been detrimental because of 
gunmen on the campus area. 
 
Although there used to be issues – today 
communication is very good. 
Well, I have to get on the radio [cell phone] 
and contact the local PD, because we don't 
have direct radio contact. These are serious, 
serious officer safety issues as far as I'm 
concerned. You have a cell phone that could be 
in a dead area. You got a radio that may or may 
not work depending upon where the officer is 
Officer safety can be effected by a lack of 
interoperability 
 
Stage 2 - Parse the data and identify specific phrases or sentences and assign 
a descriptive code. Braun & Clarke (2006) suggested that coding is not simply a method 
of data reduction, but is more complex, involving an analytic process that leads to 
defining both a semantic and conceptual reading of the data. Braun & Clarke (2012) 
stated that codes identify and provide a label for a feature of the data that may be relevant 
to the research question. Codes are the most basic element of the data and represent 
instances where the researcher labels portions of data with the prevalent topic discussed 
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in the data (Bazeley & Jackson, 2013). Codes can summarize parts of the data, describe 
the content of data, and provide an interpretation of data content.  
I utilized the CAQDAS NVivo 11 to create codes for words, sentence fragments, 
or sentences that hold significant meaning. I continued the analysis process by generating 
codes across the dataset in order to ultimately create themes. To begin analysis, I opened 
each transcript individually in NVivo 11. As I read through the interview, referring to any 
field notes, observations, or notes I made during the initial reading process, I began to 
highlight chunks of text and assign codes. The chunks of data, segments of sentences, or 
complete sentences were assigned code, which are called nodes in NVivo. Initially each 
code was created as a node in NVivo 11. Across all interviews any data that was 
associated with the code was sorted into each appropriate node. Examples of this process 
are found in Table 3. 
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Table 3 
Sample Codes and Associated Data 
Codes Associated Data 
Backup for radio system We have also cars that have convertacoms. I 
don't know if you've ever heard of those, where 
you slide them into the box. The convertacom, 
it's a similar type of fashion, but instead of the 
box that you slide the radio into, it's just a 
connector that adapts to the side like this. 
 
Money effects equipment quality It really is. It comes down to money. The CHP, 
just to re-upgrade their entire system, was over 
$1 billion [laughter] 
 
Delays are serious These are serious, serious officer safety issues 
as far as I'm concerned. You have a cell phone 
that could be in a dead area. 
 
It caused lots of problems because you don't 
know what buildings they're clearing. You 
don't know where they're at. 
 
The problematic thing with the patch is it's 
always a little slight bit of a delay, and so that 
delay sometimes is problematic, 
 
Too many people on a frequency Then they also run an issue of a system where 
you're used to having 2, 6, 10 or 15 people on. 
Now all of a sudden you have 20 to 25 people 
on, and everybody's talking, and reality is 
instead of now having three frequencies you 
usually just have one. Now everybody's talking 
and nobody has a chance to really listen or talk.  
 
There was a lot of radio traffic— I had about 
100 officers 
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Phase 3 - Gather like codes into categories and then combine categories to 
form tentative themes. According to Braun & Clarke (2006), a theme is a coherent and 
meaningful pattern in the data that is relevant to the research question. When combining 
categories to form tentative themes, I looked for similarities in the data. Braun & Clarke 
(2012) suggested that searching for themes is an active methodical process where the 
researcher generates themes rather than discovering them. During this phase the 
researcher must review the coded data multiple times to recognize areas of similarity and 
overlap between codes.  
During phase three, I searched for themes once the whole dataset was coded. 
Because NVivo 11 is a software program, I was able to toggle between screens of 
participant data and the list of raw codes. I began by using the list of raw codes and 
sorted those codes into clusters of codes with associated meanings. Using NVivo 11, I 
was able to use my mouse to drop and drag codes as I sorted through the data. The newly 
created clusters were labeled according to their relationships and served as tentative 
themes. Because the codes were attributed to words, fragments of sentences, and full 
sentences, I was able to cluster those codes together without concern about the loss of 
narrative data. This process continued through multiple iterations until no further 
reduction of data was possible. An example of this process is displayed in Table 4. 
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Table 4 
Samples of Codes, Clusters, and Tentative Themes  
Sample Codes Sample Clusters Tentative Themes 
Using Technology 
Types of Radio 
Governing rules 
Standard procedure 
Training across departments 
Desktop training 
Who is in charge 
Working with others 
SOPs 
Manuals – written policy 
Local governance groups 
 
Technology 
Governance 
Training 
Procedures 
SOP 
Interoperable capability 
Not enough money 
Need more funding 
How do we coordinate 
Communication between 
agencies 
Working together is 
challenging 
Integrating technology 
Training 
Lack training 
Left out of training 
Money 
Policy 
Coordinating and integration 
of technology 
Need training 
 
What gets in the way 
 
Phase 4 - Review the themes to ensure quality and depth. Braun & Clarke 
(2006) stated that during this step or stage a qualitative researcher checks that the themes 
make sense when comparing both the coded extracts and the full data relevant to each 
theme. This state of reviewing the themes requires reflection on the part of a qualitative 
researcher on to determine if the themes tell a compelling story about the data. A 
researcher may also have to decide if it may be necessary to merge two themes together 
as one theme, or to further split the themes into two or more themes. Vaismoradi, et al. 
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(2013) cautioned not to count only the frequency of codes and suggested that researchers 
are sometimes accused of removing meaning from the context. It is more important to 
understand the essence of what was said by the participants in the transcripts and its 
relevance to the research question, rather than simply noting frequency of various themes. 
At this point, a qualitative researcher strives to understand how each theme was generated 
from the raw data including the components of the relational fit of the themes to the 
research question, and how the developed themes tell the story of the participants’ 
experiences. 
During this process, I revisited the data by comparing the themes to the interview 
transcripts. I searched the data to ensure that I accurately reflected the experiences of the 
participants. I explored the existing themes to see if any changes needed to be made and 
finalized all themes. The themes I created stood as analyzed and no changes, additions, or 
reductions were made during this step. Table 5 lists the final themes and subthemes. 
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Table 5 
Final Themes and Subthemes 
Themes Subthemes 
Participants described the interoperable 
capabilities of their agencies 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
How local governance was perceived 
 
Standard operating procedures 
 
Participants described technology employed for 
interoperable communications 
 
Employing voice communication for interoperable 
communication 
 
Participants spoke about training in relation to 
interoperable communication 
 
Participants spoke about how they used interoperable 
communication 
Participants identified barriers to 
interoperability 
 
 
Communication worked smoothly 
 
 
Challenges with and learning from  
communication Issues 
 
 
Polices need to be defined and changed 
 
 
Stage 5 - Define and name the themes. Braun & Clarke (2012) stated that when 
defining themes, a researcher should be able to clearly identify how each theme is unique. 
The authors further posited that a good thematic analysis (a) contains themes with a 
specific focus, (b) that themes are related but do not overlap in content or meaning, and, 
(c) themes directly address or answer each of the research questions. By reflecting on the 
story each theme tells, a qualitative researcher constructs a name for each theme that 
reveals the essence of each theme.  
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During this phase of the analysis, I explored the initial identifiers that I assigned 
each theme. I chose not to make changes to the names because I felt that the already 
created identifiers accurately reflected the experience of the participants in the study. I 
wrote a brief definition of each theme that reflected the meaning in more detail as I 
represented in Table 6. 
Table 6 
Themes and Associated Definitions 
Themes Definitions 
Participants described the interoperable 
capabilities of their agencies 
The participants spoke about how their 
agencies implement interoperable 
communications, areas of strength and 
weakness, standard policy, their systems and 
technology. Included in here was also a review 
of their frequencies, radio systems, and annual 
security reports. 
 
Participants identified barriers to 
interoperability 
The barriers associated with implementation of 
interoperability. 
 
Communication worked smoothly 
 
Participants spoke about times when 
communication and interoperability worked 
well. 
 
Challenges with and learning from  
communication issues 
Participants spoke about the challenges they 
faced with the implementation of 
interoperability and what they learned from 
those challenges. 
 
Policies need to be defined and changed One of the major issues participant spoke about 
was policy and how it needed to be changed. 
This included interagency rivalry, funding 
priorities, and perceptions of university 
security and policing. 
  
 Stage 6 - Report the results. Braun and Clarke (2012) reminded us that we do 
not complete data analysis and then write it up; rather, writing and analysis are 
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interwoven and iterative in qualitative research. This interweaving includes moving from 
informal note and memos, to more formal analytic processes, and into report writing. 
During the report writing, consideration should be paid to the logical interconnectedness 
of the themes and the progression of one theme to another, building upon previous 
themes. Vaismoradi, et al. (2013) suggested that the result of the report writing is the 
narrative of the story, and that the qualitative researcher functioned as a narrator by 
placing the results suitably in alignment to the research questions. In this phase, I 
carefully constructed a written report of the findings. The results of the thematic analysis 
are reported in the results section of this chapter. 
Content Analysis 
A content analysis of the gathered public data was conducted following the 
completion of the thematic analysis. The documents explored included (a) each agency’s 
ASR, (b) the frequencies in use by each agency and their mutual aid partners in nearby 
jurisdictions, and (c) data about the various radio systems deployed by the agencies. This 
data were used in order to better answer Research Question 1. The type of content 
analysis employed was conventional content analysis because the purpose of this study 
was to describe the phenomenon of interoperability (Hsieh & Shannon, 2016). This type 
of method was appropriate given the limited existing research, and involved content 
categories and category names to derive from the research rather than imposing preset or 
pre-established categories (Elo & Kyngäs, 2008).  
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I began by uploading the data into NVivo 11 for analysis. Once the data were 
uploaded I read and reread the information to gain a deeper understanding of the gathered 
documents. As I read and reread the data, I made notes of my impressions. I highlighted 
the text that captured the key concepts. Once this process was completed I used NVivo 11 
to search for commonly employed words to uncover patterns in the data. Searching for 
word frequencies is the most commonly employed method of content analysis 
(Krippendorf, 2004). The words were then sorted into categories. Using the most 
frequently used words, as well as the notes and memos I created, I coded the data. This 
process paralleled the thematic analysis process described previously. I sorted this data 
into the categories created while analyzing the interview data. Once the data were coded, 
I began to cluster the codes together into categories. Once the data could not be reduced 
further, I examined the data to see what information was relevant to the research 
questions. Any data not relevant was discarded. The results of the content analysis were 
reported in the results section of this chapter and organized under Research Question 1. 
Research Findings 
 The data analysis produced themes and patterns central to the study’s research 
questions to contribute new knowledge relevant to the phenomenon of interoperability 
examined in this study. Manifesting through themes and patterns, the results contributed 
to the significance of the study’s findings to convey meaning and knowledge to the 
leaders, emergency management community, constituent multijurisdictional partners at 
the state, local, and federal levels, and citizens to consider relative to campus safety and 
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law enforcement response to events. The themes described served to highlight a 
widespread emergency response concern among campus based law enforcement agencies 
and impart opportunities for improvement and policy guidance. 
Research Question 1 
The first research question was employed to identify as a baseline in order to 
capture the actual capabilities of the campus based law enforcement agency as viewed by 
the participants. Research question 1 was “What are the interoperability capabilities of 
campus law enforcement agencies in California as viewed by the agency?” During the 
interview phase, I posed this question focused on the participant’s own capabilities, 
enabling a free flow response with prompts including the technologies used, how often 
interoperability was used, what types of events drove usage, what types of training and 
exercises for interoperable communications existed in the participant’s area, if the 
participant’s agency participated in training and exercises and the existence and 
participation of a local governance group for interoperable communications. When 
analyzing the documents, I explored the agencies usage of frequencies, radio systems, 
and declarations of existence of SOPs for interoperating with other agencies within their 
ASRs.  
Theme 1: Participants described the interoperable capabilities of their 
agencies. Each of the participants in this study provided their perceptions regarding 
interoperable capabilities including technology, governance, SOPs, training and 
exercises, and usage. Figure 2 represents the elements of the capabilities of 
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interoperability and each of the participants expressed varying degrees of success among 
the elements. Utilizing the interoperable continuum (DHS, 2015), the following 
discussion depicts the participants responses of capabilities.  
 
Figure 2. Interoperability capabilities 
Subtheme 1. How local governance was perceived. Within the bounds of the 
capabilities discussion, I asked participants if a local governance group existed, the 
capacity and reach of the group, and whether the participant’s agency was a member of 
the group. Table 7 depicts the responses to governance, modeled within the framework of 
the Interoperability Continuum (DHS, 2015), whereby the level of governance is minimal 
at the left of the table, moving to better levels of governance towards the right of the 
table.  
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Table 7 
Interoperability Continuum - Governance 
Individual 
Agencies 
Working 
Independently 
 
Informal 
Coordination 
Between 
Agencies 
Key Multi-
Discipline Staff 
Collaboration 
on a Regular 
Basis 
Regional 
Committee Working 
within a Statewide 
Communications 
Interoperability 
Framework 
C4 C1    
C3                         
C2   
C6   
C7  
C8   
C9 
C5   
C10 
 
Nine of 10 participants stated that governance was coordinated in some manner, 
either formally or informally. One participant reported that he was not part of a local 
governance group and was unsure if one existed. Seven participants reported that local 
governance was discussed on a regular basis through formal coordination and the 
participants participated in scheduled meetings, with five of these participants noting that 
collaboration took place between key multidiscipline staff on a regular basis, and the 
other two participants reported the collaboration reaching the highest level of governance 
as represented on the Interoperability Continuum (DHS, 2015) with the committees 
formed regionally within the statewide framework for interoperability.  
Participant C2 described his departmental interactions and stated, “the county 
chiefs and the sheriff's department meet monthly in regard to anything that deals with 
portable radios, radios in a car, anything radio 800 megahertz, Motorolas, or their 
upgrades.” He felt the system worked well and reported, “we're real close-knit, and then 
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we have an active chief of police organization that discuss these procedures and keeps 
them fairly common among us.” Participant C2 believed that the goodwill engendered 
through these meetings aided the working relationships and further felt that the 
coordination improved communication between agencies on a technological level. Two 
participants stated that governance minimally included informal coordination between 
agencies. Participant C5 reported a similar experience and remarked: 
We participate in a monthly meeting that brings together our responding partners. 
I think this is why our communication is so well coordinated. Attendance in this 
meeting includes the county sheriff, ourselves, the highway patrol, the chiefs in 
the nearby cities, the district attorney’s office, and patrol and probation 
departments. In these meetings we talk about a number of things. One of those 
things is communication and mutual aid. 
Similar to Participant C2, he believed that this local governance group was one of the 
reasons coordinated responses worked well in his region. 
 Subtheme 2: Standard operating procedures. Participants spoke about their use 
of SOPs. Participants noted that their campus based law enforcement organizations had 
SOPs involving interoperable communications when the response involved one or more 
mutual aid partners. The majority of the participants (80%) reported that communications 
SOPs were written at a regional level, with one participant reporting attaining the highest 
level of SOP integration as represented in the Interoperability Continuum (DHS, 2015) 
with the SOP integrated within the NIMS framework. Participant C10 spoke about his 
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community and stated, “We have a countywide protocol that talks about all this, from 
earthquakes to major criminal incidents.” Having a unified protocol ensured that all 
agencies followed similar procedures and reacted in a similar manner during emergency 
situations. 
 One participant noted they shared no SOPs with partners, but the SOPs did exist 
within their individual agency. Participant C4 said his agency did not have any shared 
SOPs He said, “we have MOUs with the local police department but [it has] nothing to 
do with the radios.” Table 8 represents the levels of realization of SOPs of the cases, 
modeled within the framework of the Interoperability Continuum (DHS, 2015), whereby 
the SOP is minimal at the left of the table, moving to higher levels of SOP coordination 
with constituents towards the right of the table. 
Table 8 
Interoperability Capabilities – Standard Operating Procedures 
 
Individual 
Agency SOPs 
 
 
Joint SOPs for 
Planned Events 
 
Joint SOPs 
for 
Emergencies 
 
Regional Set of 
Communications 
SOPs 
 
National Incident 
Management System 
Integrated SOPs 
C4   C1  
C2  
C3  
C5  
C6  
C7  
C9 
C10 
C8 
 
 An exploration of the ASRs of the universities revealed the existence of policies 
with interoperable partners. Very little variation existed with most ASRs noting policies 
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existed. No differences from what participants reported were noted. The contents of these 
reports supported the observations of the participants. As no materials from coordinating 
agencies were available in the public domain, it was not possible to compare or analyze 
the details of the SOPs between the universities and other agencies in their areas. 
Subtheme 3: Participants described technology employed for interoperable 
communications. Participants provided thick description of their interoperable 
capabilities by stating the ways they communicate both within their agency and 
communication with other agencies. Most (7) of the participants did not cite a method for 
interoperating through employing shared data. Participant C3 said, “We get notifications 
regarding crimes that have occurred, situational awareness notifications, notifications 
regarding special events. So we're dialed in. But again, that's not technology based. A lot 
of that is Internet emails. But again, some of it is just telephone calls.” Their capability 
for communication with other agencies was not based on any one system of shared data, 
instead, they received information more informally, employing email or the telephone. 
Participant C4 agreed and remarked: 
I need to tell you that we are not on anybody's or any other law enforcement's 
frequencies so when we have a problem we have to use the cell phone that the 
officer's carrying on duty to contact the local agency, or the local sheriff, or CHP, 
whoever we need, but mostly it's we have to contact the local agency. 
Because their radio systems lacked interoperability, they used other means such as cell 
phones to send and receive information, or for interpersonal contact when aid was 
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necessary. He indicated that this often added to response times and made it challenging to 
coordinate responses or receive aid. Participant C4 perceived this to be an issue and said, 
“these are serious, serious officer safety issues as far as I'm concerned. You have a cell 
phone that could be in a dead area. You got a radio that may or may not work depending 
upon where the officer is.” He believed the lack of modern communication systems that 
were interoperable compromised officer safety and their ability to effective respond to 
emergency situations. 
Three of the participants reported employing data methods, with all mentioning 
the use of Computer Aided Dispatch (CAD) and Records Management Systems (RMS) 
as the interoperable communication method of choice. Table 9 represents the data 
technology elements. 
Table 9 
Interoperability Capabilities – Technology – Data Elements 
Swap Files 
 
Common 
Applications 
Custom-
Interfaced 
Applications 
One-Way Standards 
Based Sharing 
Two-Way Standards 
Based Sharing 
 
 
C1 
C7 
C10   
 
Participant C1 spoke at length about the system available to his agency and said: 
It's a satellite radio system that was done through the [omitted]. But for all intents 
and purposes for us, let's say all hell breaks loose and we lose our radio system 
and everything else, we have a mechanism now to get outside of the area to get 
other help from sister campuses, be able to talk to them because they have the 
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same satellite link as well as talking to the [omitted] County EOC via that 
mechanism to at least get help. 
He indicated that having the system was reassuring, and in order to ensure effective use 
during an emergency the agencies on the system ran monthly tests. Participant C1 
believed this to be important and remarked, “the chances of using that are far higher than 
they are of any other type of thing.” He believed that in a situation where interoperability 
was key, using the satellite system would be the typical method of communication. 
Participant C10 reported robust interoperable capabilities. He spoke at great 
length and said: 
We are currently working with another law enforcement agency so that we can 
not only patch radio channels, but we can actually integrate dispatch stations. So 
that we can-- in an emergency here, if I don't have enough staff or if there's an 
extra 911 or whatever and for redundancy purposes, that dispatch center can then 
dispatch as well for us. Throughout the county here, we do have a channel. It can 
be used by every agency that works in the county, and we can all go to there. And 
we generally go to there for interoperability and major incidents. The agency that 
has jurisdiction of the event continues to maintain the dispatching just using that 
channel. 
He indicated that the agencies in his area worked with a consultant to create their 
interoperable system. He believed the design of the system gave his department an ability 
to easily communicate with other agencies when necessary. 
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Participant C7 reported employing a variety of methods to communicate with 
other agencies. He stated, “We do use cell phones. We also have CAD, so we can 
communicate through CAD. We have satellite phones. Certainly the Internet, email, lots 
of instant messaging.” He felt this combination of methods was effective and enable his 
agency to communicate and share information with others. 
Subtheme 4: Employing voice communication for interoperable 
communication. All participants reported that interoperable methods between agencies 
occurred through the use of voice communication. Two of the 10 participants utilized a 
standards-based shared system. Notably, these two participants who discussed their voice 
communications interoperability on a standards-based shared system did not discuss 
multiple methods of voice interoperability such as gateways, shared channels or 
swapping radios.  
Participants who lacked shared standards-based voice communications systems 
discussed using several types of technology including shared channels, gateways, and the 
swapping of radios depending upon the partners involved in the mutual aid response. 
Table 10 provides a representation of the responses to the use of technology. 
 
113 
 
Table 10 
Interoperability Capabilities – Technology – Voice Elements 
Swap Radios Gateway Shared Channels 
Proprietary  
Shared System 
Standards-Based  
Shared System 
C1 
C3 
C4 
C10 
C1 
C6 
C7 
C9 
C10 
C1 
C6 
C7 
C8 
C9 
C10 
C1 
C6 
C2 
C5 
 
 
When asked about technology employed for interoperable capabilities, all 
participants noted the use of radio communications as the primary technology used within 
the agency. Participant C2 was particularly pleased with the system employed and stated: 
We have probably one of the better communications in southern California. As a 
matter of fact, I know it's much better than some of the Los Angeles areas and 
some other areas because we're able to interact with them [other agencies] 
immediately by using one specific crime channel and also being able to switch to 
each one of their channels at any given moment. 
Participant C2 believed that the instant nature of communication with other departments 
was essential. He felt that this enabled coordinated responses and helped ensure that 
resources were correctly distributed during emergency situations. Participant C7 also 
used radios but had to create the interoperability. He said: 
So generally I have my radios all programmed. I have 16 local channels that I 
have programmed into my radios where I can speak to, certainly all the 
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surrounding local agencies-- I think it's working. So that gives me capabilities just 
to talk to 16 of them right away. 
Thus, he was able to speak with agencies in his area, but had to spend the time to create 
the system and turn to the correct radio channel, it was not a built-in instantaneous 
method of communication. 
 Six of 10 participants cited the use of cellular phones as an additional device to 
gather information during response situations. Participant C5 remarked that most of the 
management and command staff used their cell phones to interact with the local city 
police department. Thus, this interoperable communication was available to management, 
but not as easily available to officers on the street. Participant C8 reported that cell 
phones were used by most people in his department for communication with other 
outside agencies. He recollected: 
I would really kind of categorize that [cell phones] as really an informal network. 
For example, I mean, I certainly have-- and as part of a local chiefs' association, 
we have contact list for all the chiefs in the area and all of the major commanders 
so we have all of their particular contact information. And I know that our guys 
on shift, day shift and the night shift, they've got that all programmed in for their 
level as well, the sergeants and the officers from the sheriff's department that they 
typically work with. I know that that goes on but I don't think that's a real formal 
kind of passing of information, just more informal. 
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He felt that it was good that communication existed, but was very clear that this 
communication was informal. In an emergency situation, the use of cell phones could 
hinder efforts to coordinate as information was shared with no real system in place to 
manage the communication. 
All but one participant cited the use of radio communications as the primary 
technology used for interoperability among agencies or jurisdictions in planned and or 
unplanned events. The disparate participant, C4, stated that portable radios were used as 
the primary communications device within the agency, but cellular telephones are used 
when interoperability or mutual aid was needed in unplanned events. C4 emphasized:  
I need to tell you that we are not on anybody's or any other law enforcement's 
frequencies so when we have a problem we have to use the cell phone that the 
officer's carrying on duty to contact the local agency, or the local sheriff, or CHP, 
whoever we need, but mostly we have to contact the local agency.  
C4 further provided evidence of swapping radio during planned events, such as 
graduation:  
We have to give two of our radios one to their command staff, one to their officer-
in-charge of the graduation. And when we have a graduation, you got 5,000 
people sitting in the auditorium or sitting in the graduation area. All my officers 
have the radios, but because again no communications with the local PD, we 
provide them a pair of our portable radios. And that's how we communicate to 
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them if we need assistance, either medical assistance or any problems that we 
have in the field. 
He acknowledged the cumbersome nature of communications during large events. 
For this participant, the ability to communicate with other agencies during large 
events was limited by their ability to get radios to the other agencies or the use of 
cellular technology. 
Subtheme 5: Participants spoke about training in relation to interoperable 
communication. Participants provided examples of training and exercises. Unsolicited 
information provided by the participants in seven of 10 cases noted active shooter 
training as a specific training that was offered. C1 remarked “We do drills on all kinds of 
things, like active shooter. In fact, we run the largest multidisciplinary active shooter drill 
in the area.” 
Table 11 provides types of training and exercises discussed by the participants, 
correlated with the Interoperability Continuum (DHS, 2015) with basic low level training 
at the left, followed by more comprehensive training moving to the right of the table.  
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Table 11 
 
Interoperability Capabilities – Training & Exercises 
General 
Orientation on 
Equipment & 
Applications 
 
Single Agency 
Desktop 
Exercises for 
Key Field and 
Support Staff 
MultiAgency 
Tabletop 
Exercises for 
Key Field 
Personnel 
and Support 
Staff 
MultiAgency Full 
Functional Exercises 
Involving All Staff 
Regular 
Comprehensive 
Regionwide Training 
& Exercises 
 C4 C6 
 
 
 
C1 
C2 
C3 
C5 
C7 
C8 
C9 
C10 
 
Seven of the 10 participants remarked training was an important aspect of 
preparing for interoperable scenarios. They indicated that participation in regular 
comprehensive training and exercises occurred and was important. Two participants 
indicated that training only occurred using a desktop simulation program. One participant 
mentioned annual desktop training was conducted only within the agency and that no 
other cross training with other agencies occurred. One participant did speak about 
multiagency tabletop exercises. Participant C6 stated: 
Our agency also has a health system and we do a yearly table top with the health 
system which usually involves some sort of either active shooter incident or it 
might be a contaminant, like a flu - we've done like the swine flu type thing - to 
where we have an influx of patients in the health system, to where our resources 
would be taxed, and we'd have to use other agencies. So we do table tops with 
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them about once a year. We do a county-wide table top once a year, and that 
usually involves an active shooter incident. We test our dispatch center monthly 
with our neighboring agency. 
He found these practice sessions, enabled the disparate departments to work together 
well. By holding rehearsal sessions, he believed they were better prepared to deal with 
any eventuality. 
Subtheme 6: Participants spoke about how they used interoperable 
communication. Some participants provided multiple examples of how they used 
interoperable communication. Seven of 10 participants remarked that interoperable 
communications were used daily, while three participants noted that interoperable 
communications were used less frequently. Examples of less than daily usage included 
responses to occasional localized incident medical emergencies. Six participants noted 
planned events such as a protest, union strikes, dignitary visits, high visibility speaking 
events, commencement, political rallies, and concerts drove usage. C8 provided an 
example of daily usage and stated:  
Our other primary public safety partner is the [name omitted] Sheriff's Office. So 
our campus is located in an unincorporated area of [name omitted] County. And 
so our primary law enforcement partner is the sheriff's office. And so if we have a 
situation on campus where they're coming as well to help—[our] officers making 
a felony traffic stop at night time. We've got two officers on duty. There 
are multiple subjects. Maybe some have left the car. We need some day-to-day 
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mutual aid. And so even in this area of the county that's unincorporated, the 
sheriff's department has one car assigned to the area. And so there's one deputy 
that's out here, and if they're making a stop somewhere out there, they need 
backup and we've got to go to that. Or if we're here and we need it, they've got to 
come as well. 
This participant indicated that interoperable capabilities were used regularly to ensure 
officer safety. As backup was not always easily accessible for other agencies, his 
department employed this cross communication to help other agencies. 
 Table 12 highlights the data results; some participants stated more than one 
category of usage. The participants indicated that there were four main areas where they 
employed any interoperable capabilities. It was interesting to note the overlap in usage 
among the participants with many reporting a similar combination of use. 
 
Table 12 
Interoperability Capabilities – Usage 
Planned 
Events 
 
Localized 
Emergency 
Incidents 
Regional 
Incident 
Management 
Daily Use  
Throughout  
the Region 
C1 
C4 
C6 
C7 
C9 
C10 
C1 
C3 
C4 
C5 
C6 
C9 
C10 
 C1 
C2 
C3 
C5 
C7 
C8 
C10 
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Research Question 2 
The second research question employed to explore the participants perceptions 
regarding barriers to achieving full interoperability with local mutual aid partners. This 
research question provided a means for the participants to discuss the inhibitors related to 
interoperability when engaged in a multijurisdictional or multiagency response. Research 
question 2 was, “What are the participants’ perceptions regarding the barriers to 
achieving full interoperability capability of campus law enforcement agencies in 
California?”  
Theme 2: Participants identified barriers to interoperability. The most 
frequently mentioned barrier to interoperability was identified as money and access to 
funding by nine out of 10 participants in the study. Seven participants remarked that the 
lack of policy for standards was a barrier to their agency achieving interoperability. The 
third most mentioned barrier, with six out of 10 participants responding, was the 
coordination and integration of technology as well as the relative lack of understanding of 
the importance of interoperability for campus based law enforcement agencies. Table 13 
lists all of the mentioned barriers and the number of participants discussing the barrier. 
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Table 13 
Barriers to Full Interoperability 
Barrier Number of Cases 
Money 
 
9 
Lack of policy for standards 
 
7 
Coordination & integration of technology 
 
6  
Lack of understanding of the importance 
 
6   
Focused on operability, not interoperability 
 
2  
Physical obstructions 
 
2  
Access to training 2  
 
Not a high enough priority 
 
1 
 
Although nine out of 10 participants noted barriers to achieving full 
interoperability, one participant remarked they currently had no barriers to 
interoperability. C2 stated:  
At this time, I don't see any major barriers. However, in my time in this 
jurisdiction, matter of fact, in 2012, there were major barriers in an incident that 
occurred in my area. The CHP, California Highway Patrol, did not have the 
ability to go to our radio system and it could have been detrimental because of a 
gunman on the campus area. That would have been a technical one that CHP has 
overcome. 
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He believed that although issues had existed in the past, currently the communication he 
was able to access with other agencies was adequate to the agency needs. 
Participants in the study felt that of all the barriers they discussed, one of the most 
significant barriers they faced was a lack of funding/money. Participant C3 spoke at 
length and remarked:  
Well, I think the biggest hindrance is the expectation or the assumption that 
because I work for a private university - it's not just our university - private 
universities tend to be looked at as they're not tied into government, they're not 
tied into the state, they're not tied into the city, of the private entities. They're tend 
to be looked at as like they're business or a security company in the sense that 
they're self-sufficient, and that's not the case. I'll give you an example. Our 
university has about [omitted] students and we're private. There is a similar sized 
public institution in the same city, and they are entitled to grant funding, grants 
equipment that they can request through Department of Homeland Security and 
other places. We can't, but technically because we're private. 
He believed that the fact that his university was private served to put them at a 
disadvantage. In spite of their size, they could not access public funds to aid in increasing 
their interoperable capabilities. Unlike public universities, they were regarded as a 
business, with the underlying assumption being that they should have money because 
they were a private institution. 
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Participant C4 also believed that access to funding served as a significant barrier 
to interoperability. He remarked:  
I think it's money. I think it's access to funding. I think some of the larger PDs and 
some of the administrators and police departments that have an in with certain 
governmental agencies get first preference [to funding]. I think it's the will of the 
city councils and the board of supervisors and the people that think they know 
what they're doing to impede by not supporting the radio communications. Like 
it'll never happen here situation. And they're putting the lives of not only the 
officers but the community in jeopardy. 
Unlike the previous participant, he did not ascribe this lack of funding to a public/private 
split. Instead he attributed their lack of funding to the size of the institution he served. He 
believed they could not access the funding necessary because of their small size. He felt 
that larger agencies received preferential treatment because of their numbers. 
Participant C9 also saw finances as a large barrier to interoperability. He simply 
stated, “I think some of the biggest barriers to that is the finance.” He continued on to 
state: 
Everybody already has a system they've invested a ton of money into, that does 
what they want and that has the capacity, handles what they want done. Trying to 
jump on board is always difficult because, again, there you have, it's their system. 
It may not do everything we want it to do, or it may cost more than what we're 
willing to pay for it. 
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In his opinion, agencies were happy with their equipment and reluctant to invest 
further money to a new system because they were used to it. Although their systems may 
have not been perfect, they were used to using them and when weighing the balance, they 
did not see the value in investing further dollars. Participant C7 also commented on 
funding and said, “There's no central funding for all this equipment. So you may have a 
local agency who is not financially sound and then one that is, and they aren't going to be 
on the same page.” He believed that the variability found from agency to agency was a 
simple matter of budget. Some agencies could afford the investment while others could 
not. 
Policy was mentioned as another barrier to interoperability. The participants felt 
that policies differed by agency with many different views on how to communicate. 
Participant C7 spoke about this and said: 
I'd say the biggest barrier is just, for being able to operate really smoothly would 
be, there's no single oversight over this whole big interoperability thing. The feds 
do their own thing, locals do their own thing, the state does their own thing, and 
there's no single sheet of music that we are all playing off of. So I'd say that's the 
biggest barrier for us. 
He identified that the lack of a single governing agency effected interoperability 
significant. With no one agency appointed to take the lead, each agency had its own set of 
rules they followed with little regard to how others functioned. 
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 Participant C8 was worried about the source of information about interoperability; 
he believed that no one seemed to have an answer he could trust. Participant C8 said: 
Nobody’s really coming to me that says, ‘Here's kind of the comprehensive 
solution,’ something that I trust and understand at an executive level. And so I 
think that's a huge barrier because I know we've been talking about fully 
interoperable communication in the 35 years that I've been in this field. I think the 
complexity is a big issue. I just think over the years, the different reports I've 
seen, whether it's been plans on how to implement CLEMARS for the state, all 
this interoperability stuff, and it's just really difficult for me to get a grip on, okay, 
what's the way to go here? What do I need to support? 
He mentioned that the issue of interoperability was large, and that no one had clearly 
visualized an appropriate solution.  
Participant C6 spoke about how he saw a lack of training as a primary issue 
towards inoperability. He described his view point and said: 
The actual, ‘How do you get your radio over to that other channel?’ People forget. 
It's not something that we practice all the time, so usually there's one techy 
[technical] person that says, "Oh, here it is," and, of course, the dispatch 
supervisor is very up on that, and they know how to do it. So it's usually a little 
training piece at the event, and that's a barrier. That's probably the biggest one. 
He mentioned that until people were fully trained with frequent refreshers, their lack of 
expertise would negatively affect interoperability. 
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 Participant C3 also spoke about training and lack of access. He expressed his 
concerns and said: 
There’s training that we're not even-- we can't participate in, because we're 
private. But we can't go…Because, one, we can't-- we can go if we're invited or if 
there's room, but the reality is they don't send out a notice to my department, 
which is over 300 officers. They don't send a notice to our department and say 
that this is mandated by as a requirement for the Department of Homeland 
Security or whatever, just by virtue of us being private. So we're left out of that. I 
mean, we find ways to get in there, but we're not reimbursed for any of the 
training. We're not notified. Our training isn't tracked. We mirror that by our own 
efforts, but we're out of the loop. And again, that is a serious gap in our ability to 
address these threats. That's a weak link in-- I would even say national security, 
because on an American university such as ours, you get students from around the 
world. 
He expressed that until all universities were included in training opportunities, barriers to 
interoperability would continue to exist. 
 Participant C4 believed a major barrier to interoperability was the lack of a 
statewide policy. He believed basic standards in equipment needed to be created and 
remarked: 
I'd say there needs to be a state initiative that all radios are capable of at least on a 
county-wide basis. Somebody has to take, whether it's the Office of Emergency 
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Services, whether it's the California Highway Patrol, but somebody here needs to 
take the lead, and let's get all the same radios, and get on the same frequencies. I 
speak from those departments and those administrators that have an in [inside 
track]. 
Participant C9 also believed that a lack of policy standards interfered in interoperability. 
He stated: 
 Different groups have different policies that put stuff together, and obviously 
their policy exists for their needs, and it conflicts with us in some ways. Probably 
the last piece again, for this challenge is bringing all these people together and 
then trying to get them all to agree. And the person usually who's at the table who 
has the biggest agency typically would mean they're bringing the most to the 
table, and so they're expecting to have that level of a say when reality is we're all 
there for one purpose, it's cooperation and so we all have to have an equal amount 
of say.  
Participant C5 discussed priorities and believed that different agencies had different 
agendas. He believed this interfered in creating a unified policy and spoke about his 
agency:   
What we have, it works for us. But we have to balance priorities internally and 
with our partners. Of course we wish we had more high tech technology. But 
there is only so much money and so much time. We have to prioritize, and it’s just 
not at the top of our priorities. 
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Participant C3’s viewpoint underscored how priorities between departments could differ. 
He mentioned the lack of understanding of the importance of interoperability. Participant 
C3 said: 
When you look at what are the threats, that potential threats to both [public vs. 
private university campuses], they're exactly the same. An active shooter at my 
university versus a public university, that doesn't cross an active shooter's mind. 
He's not going to say, ‘Well, should I go to the private... or the public institution, 
because they're more equipped to defend themselves.’ Actually, it's part of the 
opposite, ‘Let me go to the private because there's pretty much-- I know what 
their limitations are, I know what they can't do and what they have access to.’ 
And again, those are things that I know about. But I know that in the aftermath, 
after there's an after-action report, people are going to question and it's going to 
come to light, ‘Well, why don't you have the same capability as a public 
institution?’ Well, because we're private and the law prohibits it. But if you're 
truly interested in addressing a constant threat that we all know exists on different 
American universities - which is active shooters and all the other things that 
happen in places where you have mass homicides - the reality is, a situation exists 
on private universities that allows for an unequal level of protection, just because 
we're not afforded the access to those things, if that makes sense.  
These participants could see how it was important to have interoperability but also noted 
many barriers to achieving such a system that could be used to make communication easier. 
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Research Question 3 
 The third research question was asked to collect information regarding the 
performance of campus based law enforcement agencies when involved in a multiagency 
or multijurisdictional event. The participants were asked, “Thinking back to your last 
multijurisdictional or multiagency event, how effective were you in communicating with 
all agencies involved?”  
 Theme 3: Communication worked smoothly. Three of the 10 participants 
mentioned there were no problems interoperating with their mutual aid partners during 
their last multijurisdictional event. Each of the cases responded that their communications 
were satisfactory. Participant C5 stated the communications in routine events with 
partners is effective. C1 discussed a recent shooting that occurred near the campus, which 
involved multiagency response among the campus police, city police, and fire 
department. Participant C1 simply stated, “We had no trouble at all. We communicated 
great. And generally, that is the case.” 
 Participant C10 similarly said,  
We are very effective. I mean, everybody was on our channel. That 
everybody was able to hear what was going on. Whether that was because they 
changed the dial or we handed them a radio, there were no barriers to 
communication. 
 For these participants interoperability at times of crisis was effective. They were 
able to speak with other agencies and coordinate responses with little to no effort. He 
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found that everyone worked together well and said, “There were no issues that impeded 
interoperability such as someone being on the wrong channel.” The one issue he noted 
was coverage area. He remarked that his agency was currently working on expanding 
their coverage area but faced some barriers. He indicated, “that's a very slow-going 
process because of the funding and then some of the federal rules and regulations that we 
have to-- all the hoops that we have to jump through to be able to do that. 
 Theme 4: Challenges with and learning from communication issues. Seven of 
the 10 participants cited problems with interoperable events occurring in the last 5 years 
and also described the lessons learned and changes made to enable better performance. 
C2 described a situation with a gunman who entered the university campus. The event 
began off-campus with the local police department. The gunman entered the campus 
seeking to evade police. The campus police were unaware the event was occurring 
because the two police agencies operate on different channels. Although no loss of life 
occurred, the lack of situational knowledge and effective coordination prompted C2 to 
increase interoperability. A recent event involving law enforcement response was noted 
by C2 as “extremely effective”. He continued on to state, 
 As a matter of fact, it was easy for us to mobilize and keep in contact with over, I 
believe it was, 165 SWAT operators that were on the campus area from numerous 
jurisdictions. Three SWAT teams that were made up by numerous jurisdictions 
and we were able to communicate.  
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He found that the changes that occurred over the past 5 years greatly increased the 
various agencies ability to work cooperatively and communicate effectively. Participant 
C3 also felt that the experience of working together had improved communication. 
However, he noted that this was only effective during planned events.  
 Participant C3 specifically remarked that in planned events, such as recent 
football games, the implementation of the unified command post has led to effective 
communications. He went on to speak about unplanned events and said that in an 
unplanned event involving an on-campus shooting, interoperability was “very difficult” 
and there were significant delays in information transfer. Participant C3 stated the agency 
was now in the process of obtaining a new radio system. 
 C4 also described delays in information transfer between his campus agency and 
the city police department during an unplanned event. C4 described the situation and 
remarked: 
We had some female students that met some males online and invited them to 
‘party’ at their dormitories. They were also having alcohol. These non-guests, 
young men come to the campus - I believe there was four of them - they proceed 
to party with the young females who were students. The party got loud. We 
received a cell phone complaint. We went up there. There was an RA [resident 
assistant] female there trying to control the situation. My officer arrives there, 
sees one of the males leaving the area or the apartment area, pushes the RA up 
against the wall, and continues to walk and he does not heed to the officer's 
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instructions to stop. And at the same time, that officer and another officer were 
dealing with three other individuals who were rude and obnoxious. They decided 
to-- they had to stop and dial the local police department because we have no 
radio communications with the department. So it took time for them to get the 
phone out - obviously to dial the numbers on speed dial - to get [name omitted] to 
respond. Once [name omitted] responded, one of the subjects was arrested for 
intoxication and another subject tried to fight one of the officers and fight one of 
the local PD officers and was also arrested.  
Because of a lack of communication, the amount of response time was greater than 
necessary. Participant C4 believed that if they had more ease of communication, the 
situation could have been handled more easily and smoothly. 
 Participant C4 commented on another recent event involving an attempted 
suicide:  
Well, we had an issue where we had a jumper that we thought was going to 
commit suicide and we couldn't communicate with the police department radio 
system, nor could we communicate with the fire department, emergency 
responders system. That's serious. So we had to get one of my officers to make 
sure they're right with that local agency. So basically, if I'm radioing my guy, he's 
going to verbally say to him what I'm saying-- both communications can be 
misinterpreted.  
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Participant C4 stated that for unplanned events, no progress had been made to improve 
interoperability for communications. However, for planned events, the practice remained 
to provide a radio to mutual aid partners for access to the campus radio system. The 
participant remained concerned for the future, stating, “In a real emergency, there 
probably won't be time to give them a radio. And will the phones be up or down? All 
unknown”. 
 C6 discussed that during their recent planned events, communications were 
sufficient due to the stockpile of radios on hand to issue to officers working the event. 
However, in a recent unplanned event involving use of force with approximately 50 
officers responding, the command structure was problematic and information was 
delayed to the field officers as well as information from the field to central command was 
ineffective. C6 noted that performance would be improved today and the tactics would be 
more swiftly communicated. 
 C7 also noted that in planned events, communication was satisfactory. In an 
unplanned event involving an active shooter at one of the hospitals, responders included 
city and federal agencies. One of the agencies could not communicate, which caused 
difficulty clearing buildings and disseminating information. This one agency acted 
autonomously, causing duplicate search and clear procedures of buildings. C7 noted:  
It caused lots of problems because you don't know what buildings they're clearing. 
You don't know where they're at. Obviously, they're all police officers in uniform, 
but it caused a problem because we're trying to cover as much ground as we can, 
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as quickly as we can. And you don't really know where they're at. And you're 
probably repeating places that they've already cleared, and just no coordinated 
effort with them. As a result of this event, the campus has distributed some of 
their radios to potential mutual aid partners: We have actually handed out our 
radios to some of the local agencies, just so if there's an event, they can grab our 
radio and go. That's helping for now, that we know they at least have one of our 
radios.  
 Participant C8 spoke of a recent large wildfire that engulfed most of the region. 
He saw some issues with interoperability as it related to the speed of an event and 
remarked:  
 While we had the technology to communicate interoperably, we didn't really use 
it. And I think that's because the event itself was so massive, so quick moving, 
and so confusing that it was difficult to know who to talk to, what to do, who was 
in charge. That was a real problem for us. And then, the second thing which may 
have been a bigger issue, and it's ironic because it's not necessarily related to the 
radio system exactly, is that in this particular situation, one of the things we failed 
to do is have a representative from our campus public safety group at CAL FIRE's 
Incident Management Team command post…Our group in the field reports to our 
EOC. Our EOC deals with a certain situation. And we tested those 
communication lines. But in this particular situation, our EOC really wasn't the 
EOC. Our command post really wasn't the command post because we were part of 
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a much larger event. And so the EOC and the command post was at a totally 
different location, 15 miles away from the campus. And we really needed to have 
somebody at that location to be gathering that information real time and then 
communicating back.  
This experience illustrated how even missing one detail could quickly derail efforts to 
interoperability. He learned from this experience that it was important to consider all 
agencies that might need to be involved in a coordinated response. He spoke about the 
lessons learned and reported:  
One [lesson] that we learned, and since then it's part of annual drills with fire 
department have really worked on with what is the incident command structure in 
one of these large events like this, because we had a different view of what it-- 
well, whether we want it to or not, it's going to be a certain way. And in these 
large events, natural or man-made, it more than likely is going to be driven by 
Ventura County and the operational area instead of us. And so our communication 
and our interoperability had to test that and control for that. And that's a bigger 
thing than just communicating with the fire department or the sheriff's 
department. It's really communicating with the operational area and the 
operational area EOC. So one of the biggest things we've done is develop the ICS 
communication lines and the concept of where our operational component fits in 
with the larger structure. 
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Participant C8 came to understand interoperability was more than just a radio system. To 
him, interoperability was also an understanding of the command and organization 
structure that occurred or changed depending on the event in question. 
Research Question 4 
The fourth research question was asked to collect information from the 
participants regarding the role that policy makers play in enhancing interoperability. The 
participants were asked, “How can government-wide policies and procedures improve the 
interoperability performance of your campus law enforcement agency?”  
Theme 5: Polices need to be defined and enhanced. Participants commented 
policies were needed to define standards and expenditures and communicating the 
importance of campus based law enforcement communications interoperability including 
access to funding. 
Participant C1 emphasized the need for standards and control of funding. He 
stated:  
There's no standards, a set of standards as to the systems and how that's going to 
work, much like radio lingo over the air. It's some agencies that use 10 codes, 
some that use plain English, some that don't. It's the same thing with the 
equipment. You saw that come out and there's still some lingering problems from 
all that money that was spent on that-- throughout the country, not us-- but I mean 
just through the country. So you think more money spent, perhaps, there's not 
enough policy around it so that it's spent to maximize what it was meant for.  
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He continued on to speak about how standards should be created and that leadership 
needed to exercised by some of the overarching organizations that regulated 
communication. Participant C1 said: 
But one of the things for communications is APCO [the Association for Public 
Communications Officials]. If there's something that needs to be done, APCO 
should be jumping on that because they're the leader of the industry when it 
comes to setting standards. And I don't know what their interoperability standards 
are, but APCO is the one that I would be going to and saying, ‘Hey,’ because 
that's it, ‘what are you guys saying we should be doing?’ Just like I do when we're 
talking about use of force or anything else. Go to those accrediting bodies and 
say, ‘Look, what is the best practice in this area for jail operations or for 
patrolling?’ I mean, anything. And communications is one, but really when you 
start on interoperability, I think APCO's probably the best place. 
Participant C2 supported this thought. He mentioned the need for policy that extends 
beyond locals and the need to change. Participant C2 said, “The problem is we should be 
thinking more global when it comes to our radio communication, not only county, state, 
but country-wide. It's time to be moving in that direction.” 
Case 3 also stated the need for standards and policy guidance, as well as the 
understanding of the importance of campus based communications. He said: 
[It] comes down to: one, someone articulating what that [communication] need is. 
And then two, someone saying, ‘It's a worthwhile cause.’ A lot of universities, it's 
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an afterthought. Security is an afterthought. I think the universities should be able 
- even though they're private - to put in those requests for those grant fundings, 
because it's in the best interest of the public. I think it's an individual case-by-case 
assessment. But to just flat out say they're not qualified and they don't meet the 
requirements simply because they're private, I think that's short-sighted. I think 
that it's-- and it's a little reckless and dangerous too.  
One of his chief concerns was the fact that universities did not seem to understand the 
importance of interoperability until after a serious event occurred. 
Participant C3 further emphasized the importance of campus based 
interoperability for communications, the need for policy consistency, and policy for 
training. He stated:  
But if you're truly interested in addressing a constant threat that we all know 
exists on different American universities - which is active shooters and all the 
other things that happen in places where you have mass homicides - the reality is, 
a situation exists on private universities that allows for an unequal level of 
protection, just because we're not afforded the access to those [grants]...there 
needs to be some consistency when it comes to how-- what our capabilities are, 
what our training is. And those that say, "They're private, they can do this for 
themselves," is a weak link in the chain of American law enforcement…the 
reality is we haven't addressed those soft spots, and that can only be addressed 
through consistent training. And ensuring that regardless of what the entity is, if 
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you're responsible for large groups of students, there should be a standard that 
requires everyone to have the same consistent training and the interoperability to 
talk to responding municipal first responders.  
Participant C3 continued to speak about the need for attention to the problem and called 
for action. He said: 
We have a national model. We have ICS. We have all of the national protocols for 
setting up incident commands and unified commands, and all of that. We have 
that. All that came about as a result of 9/11. I think there needs to be a serious 
reassessment of, what are the needs of universities?  
He believed that that the national protocols that were created after 9/11 needed to also be 
applied to private universities. He wanted to see people discussing these needs and how 
to increase communication so that campus would be safer. 
Participant C4 similarly highlighted the need for coordination and funding. He felt 
that a great deal of in-fighting and jockeying for control hindered efforts for 
interoperability. He said: 
Well, the government, whether it be city government, or state government, or 
regional government, need to cut out the jealousies, and actually have a real 
planning and steering committee that actually solves the problems instead of 
sitting around talking about them. They need to come up with some kind of 
funding. And I'm talking funding not only for radios, I'm talking-- this covers 
emergency preparedness, for Christ's sake. You need radios and communication, 
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emergency preparedness. How much cross-training is done between agencies on 
emergency preparedness, because everybody just worries about their own little 
domain, more or less?   
He believed that people needed to stop worrying about separate fiefdoms, and instead 
concentrate on what was most effective and safe. 
 Participant C5 mentioned the ongoing need to assess the incident command 
system (ICS) by increasing awareness of how it is used, routine training for mutual aid 
partners on a regional basis, and localize governance based upon the national Project 25 
standards guidance. Participant C6 similarly called for the need for ICS and said,  
There has to be some sort of regulation about how we set up our command 
structure of who's responsible. And that authority needs to be understood by the 
other agencies that are helping out in regards to use of force, time, place, tactics 
type. 
 Participant C7 cited the need for coordination and stated,  
I prefer a policy directive to us that says, ‘We want everybody on the same 
frequency. We want everybody following, generally, the same policy, be it you must run 
an ICP, EOC,’ just some kind of policy directive to us putting us all on the same, at least 
close to, the same page. 
Participant C8 also mentioned the desire for policy guidance and said, “I think, 
from my small kind of rural perspective, somebody's got to come and say, ‘Hey, this is 
the way you're going to handle communications, and here is the infrastructure that's in 
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place to do that.’” Participant C10 also spoke about the need for policy standards and 
funding control and remarked:  
If we're talking about a legislative piece to this-- if there was a legislative piece, it 
would be great to have some standards as to what the maintenance should look 
like, what they should be able to do, what the funding should look like. Because 
there are many, many, many needs that we have, including staffing and techs, and 
consultants and people that can maintain these radio systems operable, but that 
funding does not exist to the level that it needs to exist. Being on a campus, most 
people think that we can just rely on another dispatch center, or we can rely just 
get on another person's channel. They have no real clue as to the world of law 
enforcement, and fire and public safety. They are part of our events but don't 
understand the impacts of some of the decisions they make from a policy 
perspective or from a funding perspective. 
He believed until people began to understand the needs of universities, change would not 
occur. Participant C10 thought that people needed to be educated on the realities that 
universities faced in order for change to occur. 
Summary 
 A diverse population of cases participated in this study. Participants were from 
large and small universities, rural, suburban and urban universities, private and public 
universities, and were located in many geographic areas within the state of California. 
Despite this diversity in the demographic representation, the voices of the participants 
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were uniform and homogeneous. The participants emphatically and passionately stated 
that communications interoperability is paramount to campus safety and security. The 
participants collectively expressed that interoperability performance hinges on 
capabilities, collaboration, training, funding, and policy standards and direction. Even the 
participants who possessed advanced stages of capabilities expressed desire for policy 
guidance and the resolution that society must consider campus based law enforcement 
communications interoperability to be just as important as municipal law enforcement 
communications interoperability. Chapter 5 discusses the findings in light of the 
literature, the conclusions and recommendations, and the implications of social change. 
Chapter 5 concludes with recommendations for further research. 
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Chapter 5: Discussion, Implications, and Recommendations 
Introduction 
The purpose of this qualitative case study was to explore the perceptions of 
campus-based law enforcement personnel regarding interoperability capabilities and 
performance between campus-based law enforcement organizations and local mutual aid 
responding organizations during multiagency or multijurisdictional response. The study 
was based on the premise that communication between agencies is essential to effective 
responses to events that require mutual aid from local public safety partners and campus-
based law enforcement agencies.  
This was a qualitative multiple case study. I interviewed study participants to 
explore their perceptions of their organizations’ capabilities and performance regarding 
interoperable communications. Participants described (a) their communications 
capabilities, (b) their lived experiences of past events that required mutual aid and 
interoperability with neighboring jurisdictions and agencies, (c) their perceived barriers 
to achieving full interoperability, and (d) prescribed measures needed for policy 
improvement. I conducted semistructured interviews with law enforcement leaders from 
select 4-year universities in California. These leaders represented small and large 
universities from rural, suburban, and urban settings.  
This chapter includes a discussion and interpretation of study results. The chapter 
begins with an interpretation of study findings, as contextualized against previous 
research and the theoretical framework. Next, limitations and recommendations for future 
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research are presented. Finally, I discuss research implications and close with a brief 
conclusion. 
Interpretation of the Findings 
Through thematic analysis of interviews and content analysis of study documents, 
I identified five themes and six associated subthemes. The five main themes to emerge 
from the analysis included: (a) participants described the interoperable capabilities of 
their agencies, (b) participants identified barriers to interoperability, (c) communication 
worked smoothly, (d) challenges with and learning from communication issues, and, (e) 
policies need to be defined and changed. Six associated subthemes emerged for the main 
theme: participants described the interoperable capabilities of their agencies. These 
subthemes included: (a) how local governance was perceived, (b) SOPs, (c) participants 
described technology employed for interoperable communications, (d) employing voice 
communication for interoperable communication, and, (e) participants spoke about 
training in relation to interoperable communication.  
In this chapter, I discuss each of the themes and subthemes in relation to the 
research questions. Although interoperability performance has been studied through event 
after-action reports at local levels, addressed through trade literature, and described as an 
important issue in emergency response at the national level (DHS, 2015; Giblin et al., 
2013; Kapacu & Khosa, 2013; Reaves, 2015), a dearth of research existed on the 
capabilities and performance of campus-based law enforcement interoperability. 
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Participants Described the Interoperable Capabilities of their Agencies  
 Study participants discussed the interoperable capabilities of their individual 
agencies at length. The areas they focused on included governance, technology level, use 
of technological capabilities, SOPs, and training scenarios. Each of these areas was 
broken into a subtheme. 
 How local governance was perceived. Most participants reported that 
governance was coordinated and collaboratively operated with regular communication 
between agencies. Prior to this investigation, little research existed on the specific 
interoperable capabilities between campus and local law enforcement agencies and no 
research could be found focused on governance and interoperability. A novel finding in 
this study is that, although the majority of participants participated in local governance on 
a regular basis, most did not participate at a regional level within a statewide 
communications interoperability framework. Griffin (2009) noted that higher education 
institutions were responsible for crime reporting and prevention through leadership, 
which was echoed in data from the current study. Based on the interoperability 
continuum (DHS, 2015), study participants perceived and shared supportive evidence 
they thought were important relative to governance. Participants remarked that 
participation in collaborative governance enhanced interoperability, coordination, and 
mutual aid. 
Standard operating procedures. Results from participant interviews, as well as 
the content analysis of written documents, indicated that SOPs existed between campuses 
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and mutual aid partners. This subtheme indicated that universities in the current study 
were aware of, and possessed, such policies. Participants stated that existing standard 
procedures helped university law enforcement departments develop uniform methods for 
responding to incidents and guidelines for interoperability. This supported guidelines for 
preparation provided by the Major Cities Police Chiefs Association (2010). In addition, 
Reaves (2015) quantitatively described some of the communications characteristics of 
campus-based law enforcement agencies at educational institutions and found that 88% 
had some type of written understanding or agreement, which is consistent with the 
findings of this study. Giblin et al. (2013) explored the perceptions of campus-based and 
local law enforcement personnel through a paired match survey of municipal and 
campus-based law enforcement organizations. Giblin et al. (2013) found that the vast 
majority (95%) of campus based law enforcement agencies had reported they possessed a 
written plan and shared the plan with local law enforcement partners, which is consistent 
with the findings of this study. Kapucu and Khosa (2013) found that 96% of the 
respondents to their study reported collaboration with community police, fire, and first 
responders, and that a high-impact indicator of interoperability was strong community 
partnerships. Participants from the current investigation echoed this sentiment, expressing 
beliefs that SOPs were important and helped to build these partnerships.  
Participants described technology employed for interoperable 
communications. Participants described using a variety of communication equipment in 
use for response. This subtheme was similar to previous studies and pinpointed areas of 
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weakness in interoperable capabilities. For example, some participants explained that 
equipment from various agencies was stored in boxes to use during emergencies, a 
strategy that many previous researchers reported as unsuccessful (Damanik & Gunawan, 
2011; Facella, 2005; Jones & McGrath, 2005; McFarland, 2007; Miller, Granato, 
Feuerstein, & Ruffino, 2005; Upham, 2009; U.S. Government Accountability Office, 
2007). Despite this widely published information on the futility of this strategy, such 
practices continue, justifying concerns shared by many in the field. 
Of note was the wide range of equipment available for use by the campus 
agencies. Participants described various implementations including a regional command 
center, deployable gateways, interoperable channels, and swapping radios, supporting 
findings from previous research on this weakness in interoperable communications. The 
findings of this study align with those from the National Task Force on Interoperability 
(2005) and Oversight of FirstNet (2013), which reported the following key impediments 
to interoperability: aging and failing communications equipment, incompatible 
equipment or frequencies, and a limited and disjointed radio communications spectrum.  
The findings of this study differ from Giblin et al. (2013) and Reaves (2015). 
Giblin et al. (2013) found that agencies tended to agree on the existence of an 
interoperable communications system for incident response, noting that more than 68% 
of campus law enforcement agencies claimed to have interoperable communications 
systems. However, results from the current study indicated a lack of implementation of 
interoperable communications systems. The findings of this study also demonstrated a 
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lower degree of success of full radio system interoperability than Reaves (2015), who 
reported that 48% of all 4-year campuses had achieved full interoperability. Only one 
participant from the current study claimed the achievement of maximal interoperability 
via an open-standards communications system with mutual aid partners. 
Findings from the current study illustrate a lack of substantial progress to 
adopting open-standards systems since the DHS baseline study (2006) of law 
enforcement organizations without specificity to municipality or campus policing. 
Although findings from the DHS baseline study indicated that 87% of local agencies 
focused on improving interoperability and planned significant upgrades to their radio 
systems within the following 10 years, such upgrades have not occurred in campus-based 
policing.  
Employing voice communication for interoperable communication. Although 
not mentioned in the literature, a novel finding from this study was that many 
departments bypassed the use of radio communication and defaulted to the use of cellular 
technology to communicate during interagency incidents. Cell phones were perceived as 
more effective than existing radio equipment, although they were nonsecured and 
sometimes unreliable due to dependence on signal quality.  
Participants spoke about challenges associated with communicating across 
departments because of discrepancies in equipment and lack of access to shared channels, 
which increased reliance on cell phone technology. Reaves (2015) noted that half of 
campus based law enforcement agencies provided handheld smart devices such as smart 
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phones to officers, but did not investigate whether these devices were used in addition to, 
or in replacement of, radio systems during mutual aid events while neither Giblin et al. 
(2013) nor Kapacu and Khosa (2013) explored cellular phone use for interoperability. 
Participants spoke about training in relation to interoperable 
communication. Although study participants described attending joint training 
opportunities, many believed that more training was necessary. Findings from Giblin et 
al. (2013) revealed the importance of joint training which was supported by data from the 
current study. This study, however, found the majority of participants participated in joint 
training and exercises, which are higher than Giblin et al. (2013) who reported only 66% 
of the agencies had participated in emergency simulations within the past 12 months, and 
Kapucu and Khosa (2013) who reported 78% of respondents noted regular participation 
in training. Findings are aligned with Reaves’s (2015) study that reported 95% of campus 
agencies participated in training and exercises. Current findings support the Clery Act 
(Griffin, 2009), with SOPs between campus and municipal partners, and training 
exceeding once per year. Respondents from the current study reported regular training, 
but believed that additional training would be helpful.  
Findings in this study indicated successful and mature implementation of NIMS 
and ICS (DHS, 2008; Hawkins, 2007; Peak et al, 2008) throughout campus-based law 
enforcement organizations, with the majority of participants reporting practiced use of 
NIMS and ICS. This finding is consistent with Presidential Directive-5 implemented 
through DHS, which requires universities to be compliant with NIMS (Edwards and 
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Goodrich, 2009). This finding complements Kapacu and Khosa (2013), who also reported 
high usage of NIMS and ICS for compliancy with campus all hazard planning. Findings 
also revealed that participants were focused on the Interoperability Continuum for 
capabilities (DHS, 2015) including (a) technology is an enabler for interoperability, (b) 
governance is an enabler for collaboration, (c) SOPs are essential for delineation of 
responsibilities during multijurisdictional or multiagency response supportive of NIMS 
and ICS, (d) training and exercises contribute to interoperability knowledge, situational 
awareness and can enable performance, and (e) frequency of usage of interoperability is 
an indicator of performance success.  
Participants Identified Barriers to Interoperability 
Researchers agree on the communications difficulties that first responders face 
when involved in multijurisdictional or multiagency events (Bharosa et al, 2010; 
Bipartisan Policy Center, 2011; Desourdis, 2012; Sandy Hook Advisory Commission, 
2015; Stack, 2015); however, previous researchers had not explored the need for policy 
through the lens of campus-based law enforcement. The participants in this study 
provided information to help address this gap in the literature. Barriers identified in this 
study included the lack of funding, the lack of policy standards, the need for 
understanding the importance of campus-based law enforcement response, and the need 
for more inclusive and frequent training. Griffin (2009) discussed key nationwide policy 
implementation needed to enhance interoperability, as represented through the 
Presidential Directives. Findings from the current investigation highlighted the lack of 
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access to funding and policy guidance for technology needed to improve interoperable 
communications among campus-based agencies. Thus, findings from this study support 
and expand upon Griffin’s work. 
Communication Worked Smoothly  
 Some study participants discussed effective communication during incidents. 
They found that communication with other agencies was smooth and they were able to 
coordinate responses to incidents. One participant who claimed effective communications 
was a participant of an open-standard shared radio system, highlighted as maximum 
interoperability on the Interoperability Continuum (SAFECOM, 2015). However, two 
participants were not. Despite the use of suboptimal communication technology from 
these two participants, including shared channels and gateways, they were able to speak 
with other agencies and coordinate responses. This finding calls into question the edict 
for open-standards shared Project 25 communications systems and provides evidence of 
effective multiagency communication through lower levels of technological achievement 
on the interoperability continuum (SAFECOM, 2015). 
Challenges with and Learning from Communication Issues 
 Participants cited problems with interoperable events that occurred during the 
previous 5 years, as well as lessons learned and procedural changes made to improve 
responses to events. Many of their responses supported information found in the literature 
about challenging emergency responses. Participants indicted that although some planned 
events went well, unplanned events were often chaotic and characterized by poor 
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communication. Participants reported issues, such as (a) using different channels that did 
not facilitate information-sharing, (b) difficulties sharing information and learning what 
actions needed to be taken, and (c) increased response times. These findings echo 
analyses from multiagency actions in which necessary coordination across agencies did 
not go well (Desourdis, 2012; Multnomah County, 2015; Sandy Hook Advisory 
Commission, 2015; Straub, Cowell, Zeunik, Gorban, 2017; Systems Planning 
Corporation, 2009; University of Texas Police Department, 2010, Virginia Tech, 2007). 
These studies reported similar difficulties and indicated the need for significant changes 
and technology upgrades. 
Policies Need to be Defined and Changed 
The participants of this study were the key leaders of their respective campus-
based law enforcement agencies and reported perceptions of being left out of key policy 
guidance. Participants remarked on the ongoing need for policy guidance and assistance 
with planning efforts to enhance interoperability. Notably, findings of this study 
highlighted participants’ perceptions of feeling excluded from policy decisions at the 
local, state, and federal levels. Participants also indicated being treated as inferior to local 
municipal law enforcement agencies. The participants uniformly remarked that their 
responsibilities were similar to leaders at municipal policing agencies, as they were 
responsible for their campus and nearby boundaries. These findings support those 
provided by Bromley, as cited by Giblin (2013), of university campuses encompassing 
cities within cities. Participants in the current study believed their responsibilities were as 
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extensive as other law enforcement agencies, but that they received less support and had 
less influence. Participants expressed concerns regarding inadequate access to funding, 
technology, and information.  
Theoretical Implications 
 GST Alignment. Von Bertalanffy’s General Systems Theory (1968) stated that 
systems are open and have the common elements of input, output, process, feedback, 
environmental controls, and goals. GST posits that systems are complex and consist of 
elements that interact with their environment and intrinsic dynamic qualities. Findings 
from the current study support GST through the five interrelated systems expressed 
through the Interoperability Continuum (DHS, 2015).  
In order for campus-based law enforcement organizations to maximize 
interoperability capabilities, all elements of the Continuum must interact during an 
interoperable event. The complex interplay of the capabilities encompassing technology, 
SOPs, governance, training, and usage can create or inhibit the performance of campus-
based law enforcement agencies during multijurisdictional or multiagency responses. 
Findings from the current study indicated that the insufficient capabilities of campus law 
enforcement agencies contribute to diminished performance during events.  
Kapucu (2006) reported that emergency communication is multi-organizational 
and requires coordination. As synthesized by Cheng (2013), the effectiveness of the 
response, or performance, is judged by maximizing coordination among disparate 
agencies, which is indicative of GST as expressed through the Continuum (DHS, 2015). 
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Findings of the current study support the enhanced need for policy direction and guidance 
that can enhance communications flow and situational awareness among all event 
responders, which supports Kuehn et al.’s (2011) contention that groups maximally 
benefit through rich information-sharing in open communications systems.  
 UTAUT Model Alignment. Findings from this study support the UTAUT Model 
in several ways. Notably, most campus-based law enforcement agencies examined in this 
study did not perform optimally during interoperable events, due to sub-optimal 
interoperable capabilities. The UTAUT element of performance expectancy provided 
some insight into this phenomenon. Performance expectancy refers to the degree to 
which the adopter of technology believes it will provide benefits or enhance performance 
(Venkatesh et al., 2003). 
Findings from this study also highlight decision-makers’ desire to understand 
their options to maximize capabilities, with most participants expressing a thirst for 
knowledge and a need for more policy guidance. Similarly, findings from this study 
support the need for more collaboration and policy guidance. Because campus-based 
organizations are not participants of regional governance groups with access to statewide 
interoperability planning and direction, they lack access to key learning opportunities 
from governance group collaboration and coordination. Within the law enforcement 
setting, Hu et al. (2011) and Lin et al. (2004) reported that the greatest influence of 
acceptance and use was perceived usefulness. Findings from this study revealed that the 
key campus-based law enforcement decision-makers had low levels of knowledge of 
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enhancing key technological capabilities related to their performance. Also, because 
campus agencies felt excluded from policymaking, they believed they could not 
collaborate and discuss interoperability, which drives performance expectancy.  
Another UTAUT element essential to the findings of this study was effort 
expectancy, which describes the amount of effort associated with technology use. Most 
campus agencies regarded their technical capabilities as inferior to their mutual aid 
partners, and no participant stated that they felt their technical capabilities were superior 
to those of mutual aid partners. The leaders of campus-based law enforcement agencies 
who had not maximized their capabilities expressed the need for policies that were 
delivered to them. This passive position suggests that campus-based leaders do not 
actively engage with policymakers to advance their agency’s technical capabilities. The 
results of this study indicated that leaders who applied effort, and engaged and 
collaborated with interoperable partners, had the greatest performance success.  
Social influence was an important factor in this study. As defined in the UTAUT 
model, social influence describes the degree to which decision-makers value the opinions 
of others, regarding technology adoption and use. Social perception seemed to have a 
small effect on voluntary adoption of technology. Campus organizations were not 
mandated to advance interoperable capabilities, and social status or prestige was not 
improved after the adoption of technology. In other words, it is unlikely that a campus 
police chief will elevate his or her standing with his peers or campus staff by increasing 
the agency’s interoperable capabilities. Because many study participants felt that their 
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organizations were regarded as inferior to municipal policing agencies, they might not 
feel pressure or social influence to improve interoperable capabilities. Although most 
participants expressed disdain for not being treated as equals to municipal law 
enforcement organizations, in the context of social influence, findings suggest such 
inequalities foster flexible technology adoption.  
Aligned with Lin et al.’s (2004) findings in a law enforcement setting, social 
influence was an important factor of user acceptance; society (students, employees and 
parents) was perceived to be unaware of the capabilities of campus law enforcement 
agencies charged with their protection. Social influence would have a more substantial 
influence on campus-based agencies if the public was more aware of the consequences of 
inferior technology acceptance as it relates to emergency response, or if interoperable 
capabilities were determinants of school choice. Although the mutual aid partners and 
local responding agencies were aware of the campus’s interoperable capabilities, this has 
little effect on social influence. This finding supports Hu et al.’s (2011) conclusion that 
peer influence has no distinct effect on intention to use technology.  
Another influence of intention to use technology in this model was behavioral 
intention, which refers to the influences of available choices such as understanding the 
advantages of use, preparing for usage, and envisioning improvements upon using the 
technology (Sheppard et al., 1988). Findings from this study reveal that interoperability 
can be achieved through a myriad of possibilities, as expressed through the participants, 
including swapping radios, gateways and patches, and shared channels. Although these 
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choices are inferior to shared, open-standards systems, participants universally concluded 
that factors, such as lack of money and policy guidance, hindered the achievement of 
maximum interoperability. 
The participants utilized various approaches to interoperability, operating under 
the adage of getting the job done, regardless of barriers or obstacles. Participants clearly 
articulated the advantages of maximizing interoperability communications and expressed 
interests in using it, but were unable to create visions or plans to achieve maximum 
interoperability. Lin et al. (2004) postulated that behavioral intention drives technology 
acceptance, which was supported by findings from the current study. This study’s 
findings support Lin’s findings because participants achieved interoperable 
communications through several methods, arriving at an acceptable and tolerable 
standard of performance, instead of seeking maximum interoperable performance.  
Facilitating conditions is the final element of the UTAUT model. Venkatesh et al. 
(2003) described facilitating conditions as the organizational and technical infrastructures 
that exist to support the use of technology. Although Hu et al. (2011) found that law 
enforcement officers placed less emphasis on facilitating conditions, findings from the 
current study revealed that facilitating conditions were a substantial and primary driver of 
communications interoperability and performance. Study results also indicated that 
collaboration, training, governance, funding, and policy guidance were essential 
organizational infrastructures needed for enhanced communications interoperability. The 
availability and coordination of frequencies, channels, shared radio systems, and radio 
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technology were essential infrastructure requirements for interoperable communications 
capabilities and performance. These findings challenge Hu et al. (2011), unequivocally 
discerning that facilitating conditions are substantial drivers of technology usage. 
Limitations of the Study 
This study was bound by a few limitations. First, findings were limited to the 
perceptions of campus-based law enforcement agencies in the state of California. 
Although California lacks a statewide radio communications network, other states have 
invested in this technology. Thus, results may not be transferable to other settings.  
The selection of 10 cases from a population of 34 universities with campus police 
departments represents a small sample size. Individuals with community colleges, trade 
schools, institutions granting less than 4-year degrees, or K-12 educational institutions 
were not included. In addition, participants were only selected if they possessed 
knowledge of an interoperable, multijurisdictional or multiagency event that occurred in 
the previous 5 years. These inclusion criteria precluded the participation of individuals 
who may have knowledge of the subject but had not experienced such an event.  
Participants for the current study were chosen and interviews were conducted 
until thematic saturation occurred, instead of contacting the entire population of potential 
research candidates. Also, only campus-based law enforcement agencies were chosen to 
participate in the study; their respective mutual aid partners were not included, thus their 
partner’s perspectives were not included. It is important to note that other campus based 
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first responders, such as fire and medical response personnel who also used interoperable 
communications during emergency incidents, were not included in this study. 
Recommendations for Further Research 
Several recommendations for future research as related to this study’s parameters 
may be made. These areas for future research are important, given the minimal amount of 
research that currently exists in campus-based law enforcement communications. While 
the following recommendations are not exhaustive, they serve to improve the continuance 
of knowledge for this important research topic. 
The first recommendation is to expand the current analysis to include more types 
of educational institutions, other than 4-year universities. Some examples of such target 
populations may include community colleges, trade schools, and K-12 educational 
environments. Another recommendation is to include the perceptions of the mutual aid 
partners, such as local, state, and federal law enforcement partners who share response 
efforts with educational institutions. An additional recommendation is to examine 
methods of interoperability since this study revealed (1) the use of cellular phones as a 
communication medium during interagency response, and (2) agencies were satisfied 
with interoperable communication despite achieving maximum technological 
interoperability. A final recommendation is to replicate the current study in another state 
that has implemented a statewide open-standards interoperable communications system 
that is leveraged by the majority of the local agencies including campuses.  
160 
 
Implications for Positive Social Change 
This study provided knowledge needed to address an important gap in public 
safety communications research. Campus-based law enforcement organizations are 
responsible for the safety and security of university students, employees, and campus 
visitors. This study highlights the serious need of universities to maximize the 
capabilities of officers charged with protecting campus occupants. When first responders 
have maximum communication during an event, regardless of agency or affiliation, 
responses are more effectively coordinated and lives may be saved. 
The implication for social change within campus-based law enforcement agencies 
is increased productivity and enhanced officer safety. Productivity enhancement includes 
attention to training needs, knowledge transfer, and improved command and control 
during situations. Coordinated responses facilitate the quick and effective resolution of 
situations. For example, during an active shooter event, when all responding agencies 
share equal access to communications, the event may be resolved more quickly with 
increased officer safety. 
The implication for social change for society, particularly those who visit, are 
employed by, or attend universities, is increased campus safety and security. Citizen 
safety is a core function of emergency response and law enforcement organizations. 
Improving interoperable communications may facilitate quick event resolution that 
reduces losses to life and property. Improving interoperable communications may also 
assist with recovery efforts. 
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The implications for those charged with policy creation and guidance is an 
awareness of the needs of this subset of law enforcement agencies. Through awareness of 
the important issue of collaborative response among campus-based law enforcement 
organizations and mutual aid partners, policy guidance can be created to improve the 
effectiveness of communications capabilities, provide planning and guidance for 
enhancing performance, and develop opportunities for funding campus law enforcement 
communications, such as grants and other forms of financial support. The final 
implication for policy makers is the realization that campus-based law enforcement 
agencies must be treated with the same respect as municipal policing agencies, and 
afforded the same opportunities to enhance communications performance. 
Conclusions 
Participants from this study discussed their use of interoperable communication. 
Although the leaders were located throughout the state of California and represented 
diverse campus settings, their responses were predominately uniform, as all respondents 
believed that communications interoperability was paramount to success during 
responses to multijurisdictional or multiagency events. Collectively, study participants 
agreed that interoperable capabilities were indicators of performance, and that 
maximizing communication was essential to effectively protecting campus students, 
employees, and visitors. Participants believed that communications involved inputs and 
outputs, which aligned with the GST model that formed the study’s theoretical 
framework. Participants highlighted the need for money and funding to improve 
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communications interoperability, as well as the need for policy improvement. Correlating 
to the UTAUT model, participants recounted that technology is essential to effective 
communication. Findings from this study provide a deeper understanding of the barriers 
to effective, interoperable communications faced by campus-based law enforcement 
agencies. Participants provided real examples of interoperable events from the past 5 
years, and discussed policy implications. 
This study contributes to the knowledge of communications interoperability in 
emergency responses. The findings from this multiple case study revealed that 
communications interoperability is problematic for campus-based law enforcement 
agencies, and the problems are systemic across university size and geographic location. 
This study gave a voice to a neglected group of law enforcement agencies tasked with 
citizen protection. Viewing the capabilities and barriers to performance through the lens 
of the leadership of campus-based law enforcement agencies, via interoperable events 
fraught with challenges, provides an impetus of the need for more effective policies. As 
one of the few studies focused on campus-based law enforcement, and the scarcity of 
existing research on their communications capabilities, the findings of this study may 
help policymakers to improve the interoperable communications of campus-based law 
enforcement organizations when involved in events that exceed their capabilities and 
necessitates mutual aid from outside public safety agencies.  
163 
 
 References 
Agarwal, R., & Prasad, J. (1998). A conceptual and operational definition of personal 
innovativeness in the domain of information technology. Information Systems 
Research 9, 204-215. doi:10.1287/isre.9.2.204 
Agranoff, R., & McGuire, M. (2003). Collaborative public management: New strategies   
for local governments. Washington, DC: Georgetown University Press. 
Ajzen, I. (1991). The theory of planned behavior. Organizational Behavior and Human 
Decision Processes, 50(2), 179-211. doi:10.1016/0749-5978(91)90020-T 
Ajzen, I., & Fishbein, M. (1980). Understanding attitudes and predicting social behavior. 
Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall. 
Anderson, A., Compton, D., & Mason, T. (2004). Managing in a dangerous world: The   
national incident management system. Engineering Management Journal, 16(4), 
3-9. doi:10.1080/10429247.2004.11415260 
Arlington County. (2002). After-action report on the response to the September 11   
terrorist attack on the Pentagon. Arlington, VA: Titan Systems Corporation. 
Retrieved from http://permanent.access.gpo.gov/lps21127/after_report.pdf 
Assessing the framework and coordination of the national emergency communications 
plan: Hearing before the Subcommittee on Emergency Communications, 
Preparedness, and Response of the Committee on Homeland Security House of 
Representatives, 110th Cong. 2 (2008). [Serial No. 110-125]. Retrieved from 
164 
 
 http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/CHRG-110hhrg44766/pdf/CHRG-
110hhrg44766.pdf  
Bacchus, R., Taher, T., Zdunek, K., & Roberson, D. (2010). Spectrum utilization study in 
support of dynamic spectrum access for public safety. 2010 IEEE Symposium on 
New Frontiers in Dynamic Spectrum (DySPAN). 
doi:10.1109/dyspan.2010.5457871 
Bagozzi, R. P., Davis, F. D., & Warshaw, P. R. (1992). Development and test of a theory 
of technological learning and usage. Human Relations 45(7), 660-686. 
doi:10.1177/001872679204500702 
Barbera, J. A., & Macintyre, A. G. (2007). Medical surge capacity and capability 
handbook: A management system for integrating medical and health resources  
during large-scale emergencies (2nd ed.). Retrieved from http://www.phe.gov/  
preparedness/planning/mscc/handbook/Documents/mscc080626.pdf 
Barnes, M. D., Hanson, C. L., Novilla, L. M., Meacham, A. T., McIntyre, E., & Erickson, 
B. C. (2008). Analysis of media agenda setting during and after Hurricane 
Katrina: Implications for emergency preparedness, disaster response, and disaster 
policy. American Journal of Public Health, 98(4), 604-610. 
doi:10.2105/ajph.2007.112235 
Bazeley, P. & Jackson, K. (2013). Qualitative data analysis with NVivo (2nd ed.). 
London: Sage Publications Limited. 
165 
 
Bea, K., & Hogue, H. B. (2006). Federal emergency management and homeland security 
organization: Historical developments and legislative options: RL33369. 
Congressional Research Service: Report, 1-41. Retrieved from http://fas.org/sgp/ 
crs /homesec/RL33369.pdf 
Bertalanffy, L., von. (1950). An outline of general system theory. British Journal for the 
Philosophy of Science, 1(2), 134-165. doi:10.1093/bjps/I.2.134 
Bertalanffy, L., von. (1968). General systems theory: Foundations, developments, 
applications. New York, NY: Braziller. 
Bharosa, N., Lee, J., & Janssen, M. (2010). Challenges and obstacles in sharing and   
coordinating information during multiagency disaster response: Propositions   
from field exercises. Information Systems Frontiers, 12(1), 49-65. 
doi:http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s10796-009-9174-z 
Bipartisan Policy Center. (2011). Tenth anniversary report card: The status of the 9/11   
commission recommendations. Retrieved from http://www.bipartisanpolicy.org/ 
recommendations 
Birch, A., & Irvine, V. (2009). Pre-service teachers’ acceptance of ICT integration in the 
classroom: Applying the UTAUT mode. Educational Media International, 46(4),  
295-315. doi:10.1080/09523980903387506 
Braun, V., & Clarke, V. (2006). Using thematic analysis in psychology. Qualitative 
research in psychology, 3(2), 77-101. doi:10.1191/1478088706qp063oa 
166 
 
Braun, V., & Clarke, V. (2012). Thematic analysis. H. M. Cooper & American 
Psychological Association (Ed.). APA handbook of research methods in 
psychology, 7-14. Washington, DC: American Psychological Association. 
Buck, D. A., Trainor, J. E., & Aguirre, B. E. (2006). A critical evaluation of the incident   
command system and NIMS. Journal of Homeland Security and Emergency 
Management, 3(3), 1-27. doi:10.2202/1547-7355.1252 
Buracchini, E. (2000). The software radio concept. Communications Magazine, IEEE,   
38(9), 138-143. doi:10.1109/35.868153 
Careless, J. (2009). New York City’s public safety communications three years after 
9/11. Emergency Medical Services, 33(9), 96-98. 
Carlsson, C., Carlsson, J., Hyvonen, K., Puhakainen, J., & Walden, P. (2006, January 4-
7). Adoption of mobile devices—searching for answers with the UTAUT. 
Proceedings of the 39th Hawaii International Conference on System Sciences,  
Kauai, 132a. doi:10.1109/hicss.2006.38 
Casady, T. K., Cottingham, I., Paulo, J., Ramírez, A. S., Tomkins, A. J., Farrell, K., . . . & 
Shank, N. (2015). A randomized-trial evaluation of a law enforcement  
application for smartphones and laptops that uses GIS and location-based  
services to pinpoint persons-of-interest. Retrieved from https://www.ncjrs.gov/  
pdffiles1/nij/grants/248593.pdf 
167 
 
Chau, P. Y. K., & Hu, P. J. (2002). Examining a model of information technology 
acceptance by individual professionals: An exploratory study. Journal of  
Management Information Systems, 18(4), 191-230.  
Chen, K., & Chang, M. (2013). User acceptance of ‘near field communication’ mobile  
phone service: An investigation based on the ‘unified theory of acceptance and 
use of technology’ model. Service Industries Journal [serial online], 33(6), 609-
623. doi:10.1080/02642069.2011.622369 
Cheng, S. S. (2013). Crisis communication failure: A case study of typhoon Morakot. 
Asian Social Science, 9(3), 18-32. doi:10.5539/ass.v9n3p18 
Coeurderoy, R., Guilmot, N., & Vas, A. (2014). Explaining factors affecting  
technological change adoption. Management Decision, 52(6), 1082-1100. 
doi:10.1108/md-10-2013-0540  
Comfort, L. K., & Haase, T. W. (2006). Communication, coherence, and collective   
action: The impact of Hurricane Katrina on communications infrastructure. Public  
Works Management and Policy, 10(4), 328. doi:10.1177/1087724x06289052 
Comfort, L. K., & Kapucu, N. (2006). Inter-organizational coordination in extreme   
events: The World Trade Center attacks, September 11, 2001. Natural Hazards,  
39(2), 309-327. doi:10.1007/s11069-006-0030-x 
Cook, A. (2009). Towards an emergency response report card: Evaluating the response to   
the I-35W bridge collapse. Journal of Homeland Security and Emergency  
Management, 6(1), 1-22. doi:10.2202/1547-7355.1605 
168 
 
Creswell, J. W. (2013). Research design: Qualitative, quantitative, and mixed methods   
approaches (4th ed.). Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage. 
Creswell, J. W., Hanson, B., Clark, A., & Morales, J. (2007). Qualitative research  
methods. Counseling Psychologist, 35, 236-264. doi:10.1177/0011000006287390 
Damanik, G., & Gunawan, D. (2011). Public safety communications using common   
frequency 700 MHz in Indonesia. Telecommunication Systems, Services, and  
Applications (TSSA), 2011 6th International Conference, 296-298. IEEE. 
doi:10.1109/tssa.2011.6095454 
Daniels, R. (2007). Revitalizing emergency management after Katrina. Public Manager,  
36(3), 16-20.  
Davies, J., Foxall, G., & Pallister, J. (2002). Beyond the intention-behavior mythology: 
An integrated model of recycling. Marketing Theory, 2, 29-113. 
doi:10.1177/1470593102002001645 
Davis, F. D. (1989). Perceived usefulness, perceived ease of use, and user acceptance of  
information technology. MIS Quarterly, 13(3), 319-340. doi:10.2307/249008 
Davis, T., Rogers, H., Shays, C., Bonilla, H., Buyer, S., Myrick, S., . . . & Miller, J. 
(2006). A failure of initiative: Final report of the select bipartisan committee to  
investigate the preparation for and response to Hurricane Katrina. 
doi:10.1093/publius/pjm024  
169 
 
DeLone, W. H., & McLean, E. R. (1992). Information system success: The quest for the  
dependent variable. Information Systems Research, 3(1), 60-95. 
doi:10.1287/isre.3.1.60 
Denhardt, R. B., Denhardt, J. V., & Aristigueta, M. P. (2009). Managing human behavior   
in public and nonprofit organizations (2nd ed.). Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage. 
Desourdis, R. I. (2009). Interoperability defined. In R. Desourdis, P. J. Rosamilia, C. P. 
Jacobson, J. E. Sinclair, & J. R. McClure (Eds.), Achieving interoperability in 
critical IT and communications systems (pp. 1-20). Norwood, MA: Artech House. 
Desourdis, R. I. (2012). Pearl Harbor, 9/11, Katrina, Virginia Tech shootings, Deepwater  
Horizon planning deficiencies: A sense-respond information-sharing solution. In  
Homeland Security (HST), 2012 IEEE Conference on Technologies for Homeland  
Security, (pp. 220-231). IEEE. doi:10.1109/ths.2012.6459853 
Dillon, A., & Morris, M. G. (1996). User acceptance of new information technology:  
Theories and models. In Annual review of information science and technology. 
Medford, NJ: Information Today. 
Doody, O., & Noonan, M. (2013). Preparing and conducting interviews to collect 
data. Nurse Researcher, 20(5), 28-32. doi:10.7748/nr2013.05.20.5.28.e327 
Drack, M. (2009). Ludwig von Bertalanffy’s early systems approach. Systems Research  
and Behavioral Science, 26, 563-572. doi:10.1002/sres.992 
Dwarkanath, S., & Gusty, D. (2010). Information sharing: A strategic approach. 
Proceedings of the 7th International ISCRAM Conference, Seattle, WA.  
170 
 
Edwards, F. L., & Goodrich, D. C. (2009). The role of transportation in campus  
          emergency planning (MTI Report 08-06). San Jose: CA: Mineta Transportation     
          Institute-College of Business. Retrieved from http://scholarworks.sjsu.edu/cgi/   
          viewcontent.cgi? article=1138&context=mti_publications 
Elo, S., Kaariainen, M., Kanste, O., Polkki, T., Utriainen, K ., & Kyngas, H. (2014).  
Qualitative content analysis: A focus on trustworthiness. Sage Open, 4(1), 1–10. 
doi:10.1177/2158244014522633 
Elo, S., Kyngäs, H. (2008). The qualitative content analysis process. Journal of Advanced  
Nursing, 62(1), 107–115. doi:10.1111/j.1365-2648.2007.04569.x 
Emmel, N. (2013). Sampling and choosing cases in qualitative research: A realist  
approach. Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage.  
Ensuring operability during catastrophic events: Hearing before the Subcommittee on  
Emergency Preparedness, Science, and Technology of the United States House of  
Representatives, 110th Cong. 1 (2005). [Serial No. 109-49]. U. S. Government 
Printing Office.  
Erickson, W. H. (2001, May). The report of Governor Bill Owens’s Columbine review  
commission. Retrieved from http://www.state.co.us/columbine/Columbine_  
20_WEBFULL.pdf 
Facella, J. (2005). Communications interoperability: What a chief has to know. Law and   
Order, 53(8), 42-43. 
171 
 
Fishbein, M.A., & Ajzen, I. (1975). Belief, attitude, intention and behavior: An  
introduction to theory and research. Reading, MA: Addison-Wesley. 
Gerring, J. (2004). What is a case study and what is it good for? American Political  
Science Review, 98(2), 341-54. doi:10.1017/s0003055404001182 
Giblin, M. J., Haynes, M. R., Burruss, G. W., & Schafer, J. A. (2013). Agree or disagree?  
Discordance in agency responses regarding campus safety. Journal of Crime and  
Justice, 36(3), 374-397, doi:10.1080/0735648X.2012.701100 
Gonzalez, R. (2010). Developing a multi-agent system of a crisis response organization. 
Emerald, 16(5), 847-870. doi:10.1108/14637151011076502. 
Graves, R. (2004). Key technologies for emergency response. Paper presented at the First   
International Workshop on Information Systems for Crisis Response and  
Management. (ISCRAM2004). Brussels, Belgium. 
Griffin, O. (2009). Constructing a legal and managerial paradigm applicable to the   
modern-day safety and security challenge at colleges and universities. Saint Louis   
University Law Journal, 54, 241-270. 
Guo, W., & Huang, X. (2011). Achieving capacity fairness for wireless mesh networks. 
Wireless Communications and Mobile Computing, 11(5), 632-643. 
doi:10.1002/wcm.793 
H.R. 615, 114th Cong. Public Law 114-29 (2015) (enacted). 
172 
 
Hallahan, R., & Peha, J. M. (2010). Quantifying the costs of a nationwide public safety  
wireless network. Telecommunications Policy, 34(4), 200-220. 
doi:10.1016/j.telpol.2010.01.002 
Hamilton, L. H., & Kean, T. H. (2004). The 9/11 report: The national commission on   
terrorist attacks upon the United States. New York, NY: St. Martin’s Press. 
Hawkins, D. (2007). Issue Brief 2—Communications in the incident command system. 
Washington, DC: SEARCH-National Consortium for Justice Information and 
Statistics & United States of America. Retrieved from https://www.ncjrs.gov/  
App/Publications/ abstract.aspx?ID=246913. 
Higher Education Opportunity Act, Public Law 110-315 (2008). Retrieved from  
http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/PLAW-110publ315/pdf/PLAW-110publ315.pdf 
Homeland Security Presidential Directive/HSPD-5, Management of Domestic Incidents. 
(HSPD-5, 2003). Retrieved from the DHS website at https://www.dhs.gov/ 
publication/homeland-security-presidential-directive-5 
Hsieh, H.F. & Shannon, S.E. (2016). Three approaches to qualitative content analysis.  
Qualitative Health Review 15(9), 1277-1288. doi:10.1177/1049732305276687 
Hu, P. J. H., Chen, H., Hu, H. F., Larson, C., & Butierez, C. (2011). Law enforcement  
officers’ acceptance of advanced e-government technology: A survey study of  
COPLINK Mobile. Electronic Commerce Research and Applications, 10(1), 6-16. 
doi:10.1016/j.elerap.2010.06.002 
173 
 
Interoperability in public safety communications equipment. Hearing before the House  
Subcommittee on Technology and Innovation, Committee on Science and  
Technology, House of Representatives, 111th Cong. (2010). (Testimony of 
Derrick Orr). Retrieved from http:// http://www.nist.gov/director/ocla/ 
testimony/upload/Orr_Testimony052710final.pdf 
Interoperability in the next administration: assessing the derailed 700 mhz D block 
public safety spectrum auction: Hearing before the Subcommittee on Emergency 
Communications, Preparedness, and Response of the Committee on Homeland 
Security House of Representatives, 110th Cong. 2 (2008). [Serial No. 110-137]. 
Interoperable communications: Hearing before the Subcommittee on Homeland Security, 
of the Committee on Appropriations. House of Representatives, 111th Cong.1. 
(2009). (Testimony of David Boyd). Retrieved from https://www.gpo.gov/ 
fdsys/pkg/CHRG-111hhrg52213/html/CHRG-111hhrg52213.htm 
Jenkins, W. O. (2010). Emergency communications: Establishment of the emergency   
communications preparedness center and related interagency coordination 
challenges. GAO Reports, 1-29. 
Jones, M., & McGrath, L. (2005). Over-the-air software download considerations for   
public safety and other markets. Proceedings of the SDR 2005 Technical 
Conference, Garden Grove, CA. 
174 
 
Kapacu, N., & Khosa, S. (2013). Disaster resiliency and culture of preparedness for  
university and college campuses. Administration and Society, 45(1), 3-37. 
doi:10.1177/0095399712471626 
Kapucu, N. (2006). Interagency communication networks during emergencies: Boundary  
spanners in multiagency coordination. American Review of Public Administration,  
36(2), 207-225. doi:10.1177/0275074005280605 
Khan, Y. (2011, April). Overview of project 25 and its subsystems. 10th Research   
Seminar Series Workshop, Bradford, England. 
Koch T. (1994). Establishing rigour in qualitative research: The decision trail. Journal of  
Advanced Nursing,19, 976-986. doi:10.1111/j.1365-2648.1994.tb01177.x 
Krauss, B. (2007). Performance measurement and interoperability. Retrieved from  
http://www.cops.usdoj.gov/files/ric/CDROMs/TechDocs/Interoperable/ 
PerformanceMeasures.pdf  
Krippendorff, K. (2004). Content analysis: An introduction to its methodology (2nd ed.). 
Sage: Thousand Oaks. 
Kuehn, A., Kaschewsky, M., Kappeler, A., Spichiger, A., & Riedle, R. (2011). 
Interoperability and information brokers in public safety: An approach toward  
seamless emergency communications. Journal of Theoretical & Applied  
Electronic Commerce Research, 6(1), 43-60.  
doi:10.4067/S0718-18762011000100005. 
175 
 
Legris, P., Ingham, J., & Collerette, P. (2003). Why do people use information  
technology? A critical review of the technology acceptance model. Information &  
Management, 40(3), 191-204. doi:10.1016/s0378-7206(01)00143-4 
Lehr, W., & Jesuale, N. (2009). Public safety radios need to pool spectrum. IEEE   
Communications Magazine, 47(3), 103-109. doi:10.1109/mcom.2009.4804394 
Lester, W. (2007). Transformational leadership and NIMS. Public Manager, 36(3), 11-
16. 
Lester, W., & Krejci, D. (2007). Business “not” as usual: The national incident  
management system, federalism, and leadership. Public Administration Review,  
67, 84-93. doi:10.1111/j.1540-6210.2007.00817.x 
Levinson, J., & Granot, H. (2002). Transportation disaster response handbook. New   
York: Academic Press. 
Li, H., & Qian, L. (2011). Cross-network spectrum sensing for mission-critical cognitive   
radio networks: Collaboration through gateways. Military Communications  
Conference, 2011-MILCOM 2011, 1041-1046. IEEE. 
doi:10.1109/milcom.2011.6127434 
Lien, Y. N., Jang, H. C., & Tsai, T. C. (2009). A MANET-based emergency  
communication and information system for catastrophic natural disasters. 29th  
IEEE International Conference. Distributed Computing Systems Workshops,  
Quebec, Canada. doi:10.1109/ICDCSW.2009.72 
176 
 
Lin, C., Hu, P. J., & Chen, H. (2004). Technology implementation management in law  
enforcement: COPLINK system usability and user acceptance evaluations. Social  
Science Computer Review, 22(1), 24-36. doi:10.1177/0894439303259881 
Lin, S. H., Wu, E. H., & Jin, M. H. (2012). Emergency incident management system for  
community safety services (EIMS). 12th IEEE International. ITS  
Telecommunications (ITST), Taipei, Taiwan. doi:10.1109/itst.2012.6425294 
Longstaff, P. H. (2005). Security, resilience, and communication in unpredictable  
environments such as terrorism, natural disasters, and complex technology. 
Retrieved from http://pirp.harvard.edu/pubs_pdf/longsta/longsta-p05-3.pdf. 
Lucas, H. C., Swanson, E. B., & Zmud, R. W. (2007). Implementation, innovation, and  
related themes over the years in information systems research. Journal of the  
Association for Information Systems, 8(4), 206-10. 
Major Cities Police Chiefs Association. (2010). Campus security guidelines. Retrieved  
from https://www.majorcitieschiefs.com/pdf/news/MCC_CampusSecurity.pdf 
Manoj, B. S., & Baker, A. (2007). Communication challenges in emergency response. 
Communications of the ACM, 50(3), 51-53. doi:10.1145/1226736.1226765 
Marsden, J., Treglia, J., & McKnight, L. (2012). Dynamic emergency response   
communication: The intelligent, deployable, augmented wireless gateway  
(iDAWG). 2012 IEEE International Multi-Disciplinary Conference on Cognitive  
Methods in Situation Awareness and Decision Support (CogSIMA), 279-286. 
doi:10.1109/cogsima.2012.6188397 
177 
 
Marshall, C., & Rossman, G. B. (1999). Designing qualitative research (3rd ed.). 
Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage. 
Mayer-Schonberger, V. (2005). The politics of public safety communication  
interoperability regulation. Telecommunications Policy, 29(11), 832. 
doi:10.1016/j.telpol.2005.06.008  
McFarland, B. J. (2007). Solving wireless communications interoperability problems   
among emergency first responders depends on greater National Guard  
involvement. Norfolk, VA: National Defense University, Joint Advanced  
Warfighting School. 
McKinsey & Co. (2002). Improving NYPD emergency preparedness and response. 
Report to the New York Police Department. Retrieved from  
http://911depository.info/ PDFs/McKinsey%20Reports/Improving%20NYPD%20 
Emergency%20Preparedness%20and%20Response.pdf  
McNabb, D. E. (2010). Case research in public administration. Armonk, NY: ME 
Sharpe. 
McNabb, D. E. (2013). Research methods in public administration and nonprofit   
management: Quantitative and qualitative approaches. Armonk, NY: ME Sharpe. 
Miller, H. G., Granato, R. P., Feuerstein, J. W., & Ruffino, L. (2005). Toward   
interoperable first response. IT Professional, 7(1), 13-20. 
doi:10.1109/mitp.2005.1407799 
178 
 
Miller, T. (2017). Telling the difficult things: Creating spaces for disclosure, rapport and 
‘collusion’ in qualitative interviews. Women's Studies International Forum, 6181-
86. doi:10.1016/j.wsif.2016.07.005 
Miles, M. B. & Huberman, A. M. (1994). Qualitative data analysis: An expanded 
sourcebook (2nd ed.). Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage. 
Moore, L. K. (2008). Emergency communications legislation: Implications for the 110th 
Congress. Retrieved from http://assets.opencrs.com/rpts/ RL33747_20080319.pdf 
Moore, L. K. (2010). Emergency communications: The future of 911. Darby, PA:   
DIANE. 
Morris, J. C., Morris, E. D., & Jones, D. M. (2007). Reaching for the philosopher’s stone:   
Contingent coordination and the military’s response to Hurricane Katrina. Public  
Administration Review, 67, 94-106. doi:10.1111/j.1540-6210.2007.00818.x 
Moustakas, C. (1994). Phenomenological research methods. Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage.  
Multnomah County. (2015). Reynolds high school active shooter response: An analysis 
of the response to the Reynolds high school shooting on June 10, 2014. Retrieved 
from: https://multco.us/file/57742/download 
Mun, Y. Y., Jackson, J. D., Park, J. S., & Probst, J. C. (2006). Understanding information  
technology acceptance by individual professionals: Toward an integrative view. 
Information and Management, 43(3), 350-363. doi:10.1016/j.im.2005.08.006 
National Task Force on Interoperability. (2005). Why can’t we talk? Working together to  
bridge the communications gap to save lives: A guide for public officials. 
179 
 
Washington, DC: Author, U. S. Department of Justice. Retrieved from 
http://emilms.fema.gov/IS700aNEW/assets/National_Task_Force_Interoperability
_Supplemental.pdf 
Obama, B. H. (2010, May). A national security strategy. Washington, DC: The White   
House. 
Oklahoma City Police Department. (1995). After-action report: Alfred P. Murrah federal   
building bombing, 19 April 1995 in Oklahoma City, Oklahoma. Retrieved from  
http:// www.ok.gov/OEM/documents/Bombing%20After%20Action%20Report. 
pdf 
Oliveira, T., & Martins, M. F. (2011). Literature review of information technology  
adoption models at firm level. Electronic Journal Information Systems  
Evaluation, 14(1), 110-121. 
Opdenakker, R. (2006). Advantages and disadvantages of four interview techniques in 
qualitative research. Forum Qualitative Sozialforschung / Forum: Qualitative 
Social Research, 7(4). Retrieved from http://www.qualitative-research.net/ 
index.php/fqs/article/view/175/392 
Oversight of First Responder Network Authority (FirstNet) and Emergency 
Communications: Hearing before the Subcommittee on Communications and  
Technology of the House of Representatives Committee on Energy and  
Commerce, 113th Cong. 1 (2013). Retrieved from http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys  
/pkg/CHRG-113hhrg80378/pdf/CHRG-113hhrg80378.pdf 
180 
 
Patton, M. Q. (2002). Qualitative research and evaluation methods (3rd ed.). Thousand 
Oaks, CA: Sage  
Patton, M. Q. (2015). Qualitative research & evaluation methods: Integrating theory and  
practice (4th ed.). Thousand Oaks: CA: Sage. 
Peak, K. J., Barthe, E. P., & Garcia, A. (2008). Campus policing in America. Police  
Quarterly, 11(2), 239-260. doi:10.1177/1098611107306840 
Pechta, L. E., Brandenburg, D. C., & Seeger, M. W. (2010). Understanding the dynamics  
of emergency communication: Propositions for a four-channel model. Journal of  
Homeland Security and Emergency Management, 7(1).  
doi:10.2202/1547- 7355.1671 
Peha, J. M. (2005). Regulatory and policy issues protecting public safety with better  
communications systems. Communications Magazine, IEEE, 43(3), 10-11. 
doi:10.1109/mcom.2005.1404581 
Petrescu-Prahova, M., & Butts, C. T. (2008). Emergent coordination in the World Trade   
Center disaster. International Journal of Mass Emergencies and Disasters,28,  
133-168. 
Pezalla, A. E., Pettigrew, J., & Miller-Day, M. (2012). Researching the researcher-as-
instrument: An exercise in interviewer self-reflexivity. Qualitative Reseazrch, 12,  
165-185. doi:10.1177/1468794111422107 
Project SAFECOM: More time, more money, more communication? What progress have 
we made in achieving interoperable communication between local, state, and 
181 
 
federal first responders?: Hearing before the Subcommittee on Technology, 
Information Policy, Intergovernmental Relations, and the Census of the 
Committee on Government Reform, House of Representatives, 108th Cong. 2 
(2004). Retrieved from http://babel.hathitrust.org/cgi/pt?id=pur1. 
32754077976375;view=1up;seq=3 
Pullen, D., Swabey, K., Abadooz, M., & Ranjit-Sing, T. K. (2015). Pre-service teachers'  
acceptance and use of mobile learning in Malaysia. Australian Educational  
Computing, 30(1), 1-14. 
Reaves, B. A. (2015). Campus law enforcement, 2011-12. U. S. Department of Justice:  
BJS Statisticians. Retrieved from http://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/cle1112.pdf 
Ritchie, J., Lewis, J., & Elam, G. (2013). Designing and selecting samples. In J. Ritchie, 
J. Lewis, C. M. Nicholls, & R. Ormston (Eds.), Qualitative research practice: A 
guide for social science students and researchers, 77-108. Thousand Oaks, CA: 
Sage.  
Rogers, E. (2004a). A prospective and retrospective look at the diffusion model. Journal 
of Health Communication, 913-19. doi:10.1080/10810730490271449. 
Rogers, E. (2004b). Diffusion of innovations (5th ed.). New York, NY: The Free Press. 
Rounds, M. M., & Doll, O. (2009). Full interoperability for all South Dakota public   
safety. In E. A. Blackstone & S. Hakim (Eds.), Safeguarding Homeland Security,  
197-205. New York, NY: Springer. doi:10.1007/978-1-4419-0371-6_18 
182 
 
Ruben, B. D. (1992). The communication-information relationship in system-theoretic  
perspective. Journal of the American Society for Information Science,43(1), 15-  
27. doi:10.1002/(SICI)1097-4571(199201)43:1<15::AID-ASI2>3.0.CO;2-K 
Samoutis, G. A., Soteriades, E. S., Stoffers, H. E., Zachariadou, T., Philalithis, A., &  
Lionis, C. (2008). Designing a multifaceted quality improvement intervention in  
primary care in a country where general practice is seeking recognition: The case  
of Cyprus. BMC Health Services Research, 8(1), 1-9.  
doi:10.1186/1472-6963-8-181 
Sandy Hook Advisory Commission. (2015, March 6). Final report of the Sandy Hook  
advisory commission. Retrieved from http://www.shac.ct.gov/SHAC_Final_  
Report_3-6-2015.pdf  
Schepers, J., & Wetzels, M. (2007, January). A meta-analysis of the technology  
acceptance model: Investigating subjective norm and moderation effects. 
Information and Management, 44(1), 90-103. doi:10.1016/j.im.2006.10.007 
Security on America's college campuses: Hearing before the Committee on Homeland 
Security and Governmental Affairs, United States Senate, 110th Cong. 1 (2007) 
(Testimony of Steven Healy). 
Sedensky, S. J., III. (2013, Nov 25). Report of the state attorney for the judicial district  
of Danbury on the shootings at Sandy Hook elementary school at 36 Yogananda 
Street, Newtown, Connecticut, on December 14, 2012. Retrieved from 
 http://www.ct.gov/csao/lib/csao/Sandy_Hook_Final_Report.pdf 
183 
 
Seeger, M. W., & Ulmer, R. R. (2002). A post-crisis discourse of renewal: The cases of   
Malden Mills and Cole Hardwoods. Journal of Applied Communication Research,   
30, 126-142. doi:10.1080/00909880216578 
Shenton, A.K. (2004). Strategies for ensuring trustworthiness in qualitative research 
projects. Education for Information, 22, 63-7. doi:10.3233/EFI-2004-22201 
Sheppard, B. H., Hartwick, J., & Warshaw, P. R. (1988). The theory of reasoned action:  
A meta-analysis of past research with recommendations for modifications and  
future research. Journal of Consumer Research, 15(3), 325-343. 
doi:10.1086/209170 
Simon, S. (2006). From 9/11 to Katrina: Lessons missed/opportunities gained. Journal of 
Information Science & Technology, 1-3.  
Simpson, D. (2015). Improving Interoperability [Powerpoint presentation]. Retrieved 
from http://napco.org/ documents/2015-06_Roseville.pdf 
Simpson, D. M., Lasley, C. B., Rockaway, T. D., & Weigel, T. (2010). Understanding   
critical infrastructure failure: Examining the experience of Biloxi and Gulfport, 
Mississippi, after Hurricane Katrina. International Journal of Critical 
Infrastructures, 6(3), 246-276. doi:10.1504/ijcis.2010.033339 
Sniehotta, F. F., Presseau, J., & Araújo-Soares, V. (2014). Time to retire the theory of  
planned behaviour. Health Psychology Review, 8(1), 1-7. 
doi:10.1080/17437199.2013.869710 
184 
 
Stack, R. (2015). Unlocking interoperability: What it means for next-generation public 
safety communications. Emergency Management. Retrieved from 
http://www.govtech.com/em/next-gen-911/Unlocking-Interoperability-What-It-
Means-for-Next-Generation-Public-Safety-Communications.html 
Stake, R. E. (2013). Multiple case study analysis. New York, NY: Guilford. 
Stephan, K. D. (2006, June). We've got to talk: Emergency communications and   
engineering ethics. ISTAS 2006. IEEE International Symposium on Technology  
and Society, New York, June 8-10. doi:10.1109/mts.2007.906675 
Straub, E. T. (2009). Understanding technology adoption: Theory and future directions  
for informal learning. Review of Educational Research, 79(2), 625-649. 
doi:10.3102/0034654308325896  
Straub, F., Cowell, B., Zeunik, J., & Gorban, B. (2017). Managing the response to a 
mobile mass shooting: A critical incident review of the Kalamazoo, Michigan, 
public safety response to the February 20, 2016, mass shooting incident. 
Retrieved from: https://www.policefoundation.org/wp-
content/uploads/2017/05/PF_Managing-the-Response-to-a-Mobile-Mass-
Shooting_5.10.17.pdf 
Stuver, P. (2006). Maximizing emergency communication. Risk Management, 53(5), 30-
34.  
185 
 
Sun, H., & Zhang, P. (2006). The role of moderating factors in user technology  
acceptance. International Journal of Human-Computer Studies, 64, 53-78. 
doi:10.1016/j.ijhcs.2005.04.013 
Suzuki, L. A., Ahluwalia, M. K., Kwong-Arora, A., & Mattis, J. S. (2007). Qualitative  
research methods. Counseling Psychologist, 35, 236-264. Retrieved from  
http://tcp.sagepub.com 
Systems Planning Corporation. (2009). Mass shootings at Virginia Tech. Addendum to 
the report of the review panel, Governor Timothy M. Kaine, Commonwealth of  
Virginia. Retrieved from http://scholar.lib.vt.edu/prevail/docs/  
April16ReportRev20091204.pdf 
Szajna, B. (1996). Empirical evaluation of the revised technology acceptance model. 
Management Science, 42(1), 85-92. doi:10.1287/mnsc.42.1.85 
Taiwo, A. A., & Downe, A. G. (2013). The theory of user acceptance and use of  
technology (UTAUT): A meta-analytic review of empirical findings. Journal of  
Theoretical and Applied Information Technology, 49(1), 48-58. 
Tarhini, A., Hassouna, M., Abbasi, M. S., & Orozco, J. (2015). Towards the acceptance  
of RSS to support learning: An empirical study to validate the technology  
acceptance model in Lebanon. Electronic Journal of e-Learning, 13(1), 30-41. 
Thayer, L. (1968). Communication and communication systems. Homewood, IL: Irwin. 
The National Commission for the Protection of Human Subjects of Biomedical and 
Behavioral Research (1979). The Belmont report: ethical principles and 
186 
 
guidelines for the protection of human subjects of research. Washington (District 
of Columbia): US Department of Health and Human Services. Retrieved 
from https://www.hhs.gov/ohrp/regulations-and-policy/belmont-report/index.html 
The White House, Office of the Press Secretary. (2003b, Dec 17). HSPD-7: Homeland 
Security Presidential Directive-7. Retrieved from http://fas.org/irp/offdocs/ 
nspd/hspd-7.html 
The White House, Office of the Press Secretary. (2003c, Dec. 17). HSPD-8: Homeland 
Security Presidential Directive-8. Retrieved from http://fas.org/irp/offdocs/nspd/ 
hspd-8.html 
The White House, Office of the Press Secretary. (2011, March 30). PPD-8: Presidential 
Policy Directive 8. Retrieved from the Homeland Security Website at 
http://www.dhs.gov/presidential-policy-directive-8-national-preparednes 
Thomas, D. R. (2006). A general inductive approach for analyzing qualitative evaluation 
data. American journal of evaluation, 27(2), 237-246. 
doi:10.1177/1098214005283748 
Thomas, E., & Magilvy, J. K. (2011). Qualitative rigor or research validity in qualitative 
research. Journal for Specialists In Pediatric Nursing, 16(2), 151- 155. 
doi:10.1111/j.1744-6155.2011.00283.x 
Townsend, F. F. (2006). The federal response to Hurricane Katrina: Lessons learned. 
Retrieved from http://www.floods.org/PDF/Katrina_Lessons_Learned_  
Fact_Sheet_0206.pdf 
187 
 
Tracy, S. J. (2010). Qualitative quality: Eight “big-tent” criteria for excellent qualitative  
research. Qualitative Inquiry, 16(10), 837-851. 
Tracy, S. J. (2012). Qualitative research methods: Collecting evidence, crafting analysis, 
communicating impact. John Wiley & Sons: New York. 
 Trimmer, K., Beachboard, J., Wiggins, C., & Woodhouse, W. (2008). Electronic  
medical records use: An examination of resident physician intentions. 
Proceedings of the 41st Hawaii International Conference on System Sciences, 1-
10. doi:10.1109/hicss.2008.140 
U. S. Department of Homeland Security, Federal Emergency Management Agency. 
(DHS, FEMA, 2010). Developing and maintaining emergency operations plans. 
Retrieved from http://www.fema.gov/pdf/about/divisions/npd/CPG_101_V2.pdf 
U. S. Department of Homeland Security, Office of Inspector General. (DHS, OIG, 2012, 
November). DHS’s oversight of interoperable communications. Retrieved from 
http://www.oig.dhs.gov /assets/Mgmt/2013/OIG_13-06_Nov12.pdf 
U. S. Department of Homeland Security, Office of Inspector General. (DHS, OIG, 2015, 
May 27). Corrective actions still needed to achieve interoperable 
communications. Retrieved from https://www.oig.dhs.gov/assets/GrantReports/ 
2015/OIG_15-97-VR_May15.pd 
U. S. Department of Homeland Security, Office of the Press Secretary. (DHS Office of 
the Press Secretary, 2004, March 1). Department of Homeland Security Secretary 
Tom Ridge approves national incident management system (NIMS). [Press 
188 
 
release]. Retrieved from Homeland Security Digital Library Website (HSDL) at 
https://www.fws.gov/contaminants/FWS_OSCP_05/fwscontingencyappendices/A
-NCP-NRP/NIMSpressrelease3-1-04.pdf 
U. S. Department of Homeland Security. (DHS, 2006). National interoperability baseline 
survey. Retrieved from Retrieved from the Homeland Security Website at 
http://www.safecomprogram.gov/library/Lists/Library/Attachments 
/2/2006NationalInteroperabilityBaselineSurvey.pdf  
U. S. Department of Homeland Security. (DHS, 2008a). Establishing governance to 
achieve statewide communications interoperability. Retrieved from  
https://apcointl.org/spectrum-management/resources/interoperability/siecs.html 
U. S. Department of Homeland Security. (DHS, 2008b). Interoperability continuum. 
Retrieved from http://www.Safecomprogramgov/  
U. S. Department of Homeland Security. (DHS, 2008c). National emergency 
communications plan. Retrieved from http://www.dhs.gov/xlibrary/assets/ 
national_emergency_communications_plan.pdf 
U. S. Department of Homeland Security. (DHS, 2013). SAFECOM. Retrieved from the 
Homeland Security Website at http://www.safecomprogram.gov/highlights/ 
safecom_fact_sheet_ final_10242013.pdf 
U. S. Department of Homeland Security. (DHS, 2014). Boston one year later: DHS’s 
lessons learned. Retrieved from https://www.llis.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/ 
189 
 
Boston%20Marathon%20Bombings%20Positive%20Effects%20of%20Preparedn
ess_0.pdf 
U. S. Department of Homeland Security. (DHS, 2015, August 31). Interoperability 
continuum. Retrieved September 7, 2015, from the Homeland Security Website at 
http://www.dhs.gov/safecom/resources-library  
U. S. Department of Justice. (2015a). After-action assessment of the police response to 
the August 2014 demonstrations in Ferguson, Missouri. Retrieved from  
https://www.hsdl.org/?view&did=78690 
U. S. Department of Justice. (2015b). Campus law enforcement. Retrieved from 
http://www.bjs.gov/index.cfm?ty=tp&tid=76  
U. S. Government Accountability Office. (GAO, 2007). First responders: Much work 
remains to improve communications interoperability. Washington, DC: Author. 
U. S. Government Accountability Office. (GAO, 2012, February). Emergency 
communications: Various challenges likely to slow implementation of a public 
safety broadband network. (Publication No. GAO-12-343). Retrieved from GAO 
Website at http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-12-343 
U. S. Senate. (2006). Hurricane Katrina: A nation still unprepared. A special report of 
the Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs. Washington, 
DC: Government Printing Office. 
190 
 
University of Texas Police Department. (2010, Sept. 28). Active shooter/suicide after  
action report. Retrieved from http://www.utexas.edu/police/reports/ utpd_after_  
action_report.pdf 
Upham, R. (2009). City of Scottsdale public safety radio interoperability. Retrieved from   
http://www.usfa.fema.gov/pdf/efop/efo44142.pdf 
Uzarski, J. S. (2007). Analysis of United States' broadband policy. Monterey, CA: Naval  
Postgraduate School. Retrieved from http://www.dtic.mil/dtic/tr/fulltext/u2/  
a467327.pdf 
Vaismoradi, M., Turunen, H., & Bondas, T. (2013). Content analysis and thematic 
analysis: Implications for conducting a qualitative descriptive study. Nursing & 
Health Sciences, 15(3), 398-405. doi:10.1111/nhs.12048 
Vanderstoep, S. W., & Johnston, D. D. (2009). Research methods for everyday life:  
Blending qualitative and quantitative approaches. San Francisco, CA: Jossey-  
Bass. 
Venkatesh, V., & Davis, F. D. (2000). A theoretical extension of the technology  
acceptance model: Four longitudinal field studies. Management Science, 46(2),  
186-204. doi:10.1287/mnsc.46.2.186.11926 
Venkatesh, V., Morris, M. G., Davis, G. B., & Davis, F. D. (2003). User acceptance of  
information technology: Toward a unified view. MIS Quarterly, 27(3), 425-478. 
191 
 
Venkatesh, V., Thong, J. Y., & Xu, X. (2012). Consumer acceptance and use of  
information technology: Extending the unified theory of acceptance and use of  
technology. MIS Quarterly, 36(1), 157-178. 
Virginia Tech. (2007). Information and communications infrastructure, Virginia Tech. 
Confidential presidential working paper, telecommunications working group,  
August 17, 2007. Retrieved from http://www.vtnews.vt.edu/documents/2007-08-
22_communications_infrastructure.pdf, January 2008.  
Wang, J., Ghosh, M., & Challapali, K. (2011). Emerging cognitive radio applications: A   
survey. Communications Magazine, IEEE, 49(3), 74-81. 
doi:10.1109/mcom.2011.5723803 
Webb, E. J., Campbell, D. T., Swartz, R. D., & Sechrest, L. (2000). Unobtrusive 
measures, revised. Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage. 
Werner, C. L. (2009). The success of Safecom. Firehouse, 34(6), 92-93. 
White, J. D., & Adams, G. B. (1994). Research in public administration. Thousand Oaks,  
CA: Sage. 
Williams, M. D., Rana, N. P., & Dwivedi, Y. K. (2015). The unified theory of  
acceptance and use of technology (UTAUT): A literature review. Journal of 
Enterprise Information Management, 28(3), 443-488.  
doi:10.1108/jeim-09-2014-0088  
Willis, J. (2007). Foundations of qualitative research: Interpretive and critical 
approaches. Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage. 
192 
 
Winter, S., Berente, N., Howison, J., & Butler, B. (2014). Beyond the organizational  
'container': Conceptualizing 21st century sociotechnical work. Information and  
Organization, 24(4), 250-269. doi:10.1016/j.infoandorg.2014.10.003 
Woolley, J. T., & Peters, G. (2008). The American presidency project. Santa Barbara, 
CA. Retrieved from http://www.presidency.ucsb edu/ws. 
Yang, L., Prasanna, R., & King, M. (2009). On-site information systems design for  
emergency first responders. Journal of Information Technology Theory and  
Application, 10(1), 1-23. Retrieved from http://aisel.aisnet.org/jitta/ 
Yin, R. (2013). Case study research: Design and methods. Beverly Hills, CA: Sage. 
Yousafzai, S. Y., Foxall, G. R., & Pallister, J. G. (2010). Explaining Internet banking 
behavior: Theory of reasoned action, theory of planned behavior, or technology 
acceptance model. Journal of Applied Social Psychology, 40(5), 1172- 1202. 
doi:10.1111/j.1559-1816.2010.00615.x 
Yu, F. R., Zhang, J., Tang, H., Chan, H. C., & Leung, V. C. (2009). Enhancing   
interoperability in heterogeneous mobile wireless networks for disaster response. 
Wireless Communications, IEEE Transactions, 8(5), 2424-2433. 
doi:10.1109/milcom.2007.4454927 
Zuiderwijk, A., Janssen, M., & Dwivedi, Y. K. (2015). Acceptance and use predictors of   
open data technologies: Drawing upon the unified theory of acceptance and use of  
technology. Government Information Quarterly. doi:10.1016/j.giq.2015.09.005 
193 
 
Appendix A: Demographics Survey  
(Administered Verbally) 
This survey and questions are designed to collect information pertaining to your 
case as it relates to campus-based law enforcement interoperability. Data collection will 
be used for dissertation purposes only. Pseudonyms will be assigned to safeguard 
participants' anonymity.  
1. Which agency do you represent? 
2. How long have you been employed at this agency? 
3. What is the size of your agency: How many sworn and unsworn officers? 
4. What type of radios and radio systems do you use? 
5. Has your agency been involved in a multijurisdictional or multiagency 
event within the last 5 years? 
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Appendix B: Researcher's NIH Certification 
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Appendix C: Interview Protocol  
Notes for the Researcher 
Audiorecord the interview if permission is granted. 
Hold the interview in a setting free from interruptions. 
Each interview should last approximately 60 minutes. 
Interview Method 
The interview questions are administered in an open-ended format, allowing for 
in-depth answers. Follow-up questions will be used to enhance the depth of the 
responses. I will use a semistructured research design with four predetermined, open-
ended questions. All predetermined questions will be the same in each interview for 
consistency. 
Interview Place and Time 
I will work with the participant to set an agreeable place and time, which is 
convenient for the participant. I will ask the participant to choose a place that will be free 
from interruption. 
Interview Overview 
The interview will last approximately 60 minutes. 
Components of the Interview 
1. Review purpose and procedures of the study with the participant. 
2. Review confidentiality and informed consent.  
3. Administer the demographic survey. 
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4. Discuss the purpose of the interview as follows: 
The purpose of this interview is to gain an understand the interoperability of your 
agency with other agencies in your area using your radios and radio system. During this 
time, I look forward to learning what your perceptions are regarding your interoperability 
capabilities and performance during multijurisdictional events.  
5. Ask for permission to audio record the interview, as follows: 
As we go through our discussion today, I will be taking some notes. I would also 
like to audio-tape this interview to get an exact record of our conversation that I can 
transcribe and review. No one besides myself will listen to this recording, and I will be 
the only person with access to the transcription. Your confidentiality will be protected. 
Do I have your permission to audio-record our interview? 
6. Provide an overview of the questions, as follows:  
The questions I will be asking are intended provide me with an understanding of 
your perceptions and personal experiences. There are no right or wrong answers to these 
questions. This interview should last about 1 hour. Do you have any questions before we 
begin? 
Interview Questions 
1. What are your interoperability capabilities when your law enforcement agency 
is involved in a multijurisdictional or multiagency event?  
Probes: What technologies do you use? How often would you say that 
interoperable is being used, and what types of events drive the use? What types of 
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training and exercises for interoperable communications exist in your area, and does your 
agency participate? Do you have standard operating procedures (SOPs) for interoperating 
with other agencies, and can you describe them? Is there a local governance group in 
your area for interoperable communications, and is your agency a member of this group? 
2. What barriers do you perceive that inhibit your agency from achieving full 
interoperability with your neighbors? 
Probes: For each barrier you named, how large of an effect does it have on your 
interoperability? Of the barriers you named, which barriers would be ranked 1, 2, and 3 
and why? 
3. Thinking back to your last multijurisdictional or multiagency event, how 
effective were you in communicating with all agencies involved? 
Probes: What were specific issues impeding interoperability? Since the event, 
what improvements or changes have been made? Can you please describe the important 
lessons you learned from your last multiagency or multijurisdictional event as it relates to 
interoperability? Would your performance in the event you described be different today if 
it were to occur now? How would it be different? 
4. How can government-wide policies and procedures improve the 
interoperability performance of your campus law enforcement agency? 
Probes: What roles do policymakers play in enhancing interoperability 
performance for campus-based law enforcement agencies such as yours? To what extent 
have the NIMS protocols influenced your interoperable communications and why? 
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6. Conclude the interview, as follows; 
Ask the participant for permission to follow up if clarification is needed for any 
point raised in the interview. Remind participants that they will receive a copy of the 
transcript with a request to verify that it correctly reflects the information the participant 
has provided during the interview. Ask the participant to respond within 2 weeks with 
confirmation or corrections, if necessary. 
Thank the participant for their time and information provided.  
 
